In a significant judgment reaffirming the principles of free speech, artistic freedom, and judicial accountability, the Madras High Court refused to entertain a plea seeking a ban on the Tamil film Karuppu. The Court emphatically held that judges are not beyond criticism and that the judiciary cannot demand immunity from public scrutiny merely because a cinematic work portrays corruption within the justice delivery system.
The judgment, delivered by Justice G.R. Swaminathan and Justice V. Lakshminarayanan in R.S. Tamilvendan v. Secretary to the State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2026) is notable not only for its robust defence of artistic freedom but also for its candid discussion on judicial corruption, criticism of courts, and the limits of contempt jurisdiction.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, a practising advocate, approached the Madras High Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing authorities to ban or regulate the screening of the Tamil film Karuppu in theatres and on OTT platforms. According to the petitioner, the film portrayed courts and judges in a manner that undermined the dignity and majesty of the judiciary. He argued that the depiction of a corrupt judge and an unethical lawyer controlling court proceedings was damaging to public confidence in the judicial system.
The film was produced by Dream Warrior Pictures and featured actors including R.J. Balaji, Suriya, and Trisha. The petitioner contended that such portrayal amounted to an attack on the judiciary and warranted judicial intervention. However, the Court found no merit in these claims and dismissed the petition.
Court’s Preliminary Observations
The Court began by expressing its dissatisfaction with the quality of the representation submitted by the petitioner. It pointed out several linguistic and spelling errors in the Tamil representation, observing that the petitioner, despite his name suggesting devotion to the Tamil language, had made numerous mistakes. However, instead of dismissing the petition on technical grounds, the Bench chose to examine the substantive issues involved.
This approach reflected the Court’s preference for addressing constitutional questions on their merits rather than rejecting petitions solely on procedural shortcomings.
Can Portrayal of Corrupt Judges Justify a Ban?
The central issue before the Court was whether a film depicting a corrupt judicial officer and an unethical advocate could be prohibited from public exhibition.
The Bench answered this question in the negative. It acknowledged that the movie portrayed a fictional court where corruption and manipulation were rampant. Nevertheless, the Court held that such a depiction, by itself, could not justify censorship or prohibition. The judges noted that exaggeration is a common feature of Tamil cinema and that audiences understand films as artistic and dramatic representations rather than literal accounts of reality.
The Court observed that artistic works often employ hyperbole, fictionalisation, and dramatic devices to convey their themes. Therefore, cinematic portrayals should not be evaluated through a narrow or literal lens.
Judicial Corruption: An Uncomfortable Reality
One of the most striking aspects of the judgment is the Court’s candid acknowledgement that corruption exists within the judiciary.
The Bench noted that while sweeping allegations against the entire judicial system would be unfair, it would be equally unrealistic to deny the existence of corrupt judges. Referring to observations made by former Chief Justice S.P. Bharucha and earlier judicial pronouncements, the Court recognised that judicial corruption is a genuine concern that requires constant vigilance.
The Court referred to the Supreme Court decision in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. V. Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil (1997), where corruption in the judiciary was described as “cancerous cells” that periodically infiltrate the institution. It observed that High Courts regularly take disciplinary action against judicial officers found guilty of misconduct and corruption.
Importantly, the Court highlighted that judicial corruption cannot exist in isolation and often involves unethical elements within the legal profession. Thus, combating corruption is a shared responsibility of both the Bench and the Bar.
Artistic Freedom and the Doctrine of Artistic Licence
The Court strongly defended the principle of artistic freedom. Referring to several Supreme Court decisions, including Manoharlal Sharma v. Sanjay Leela Bhansali, Nachiketa Walhekar v. CBFC, and Viacom 18 Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Bench emphasised that artistic creations must be given considerable latitude.
According to the Court, artists have the freedom to:
- Create fictional characters;
- Exaggerate real-life situations;
- Present controversial themes;
- Employ satire and symbolism;
- Offer critical perspectives on institutions.
The judgment observed that art has historically challenged authority and social conventions. Restricting creativity merely because it causes discomfort would undermine the very purpose of artistic expression. The Court reiterated that creative works must be assessed differently from factual reports or documentaries because fiction inherently involves imagination and embellishment.
Freedom of Speech Under Article 19(1)(a)
The judgment extensively relied on Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, which guarantees freedom of speech and expression.
The Court observed that films are an important medium through which ideas, opinions, and social commentary are communicated. Consequently, cinematic expression enjoys constitutional protection. Any restriction upon such expression must satisfy the requirements of Article 19(2), which permits only reasonable restrictions in specified circumstances such as public order, morality, defamation, contempt of court, or incitement to offences.
The Court reaffirmed the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram that freedom of expression cannot be suppressed merely because some individuals disagree with the content or find it offensive.
Role of the Central Board of Film Certification
Another important aspect considered by the Court was the statutory framework governing film certification.
The Bench noted that under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) is the expert body authorised to examine films and determine whether they should be certified for public exhibition. The CBFC may impose cuts, restrict audiences, or even deny certification where necessary.
Since Karuppu had already been examined and certified by the CBFC, the Court held that it would not substitute its own views for those of the statutory authority. Unless the certification itself was challenged and shown to be legally flawed, the Court would not interfere.
This reasoning reflects judicial restraint and respect for specialised regulatory bodies.
“Judges Need Not Be Treated as Holy Cows”
The most quoted portion of the judgment is undoubtedly the Court’s observation that:
“Judges need not be treated as holy cows. Justice is not a cloistered virtue.”
This statement draws inspiration from the famous words of Lord Atkin, who argued that justice must remain open to public scrutiny and criticism.
The Court stressed that criticism of judicial functioning is not only permissible but often beneficial. Constructive criticism can promote introspection, accountability, and institutional improvement. Shielding judges from public comment would not enhance respect for the judiciary; rather, it might generate suspicion and resentment.
The Bench further observed that judicial institutions are robust enough to withstand criticism and should not react defensively to every unfavourable comment.
Judiciary and Public Criticism
The Court cited several landmark judgments to support the proposition that judges are not immune from criticism.
In Sheela Barse v. Union of India, the Supreme Court recognised criticism of judicial functioning as a healthy mechanism for self-correction. Similarly, in D.C. Saxena v. Chief Justice of India, it was observed that public debate in a democracy may include sharp and unpleasant criticism of public officials. The Madras High Court extended this principle to judges and courts.
The Bench also referred to Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media Pvt. Ltd., where courts were encouraged to welcome constructive criticism and public debate. Such openness strengthens democratic institutions rather than weakening them.
Contempt of Court and Fictional Portrayals
The petitioner argued that the film amounted to criminal contempt because it scandalised the judiciary. The Court rejected this contention.
Analysing Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Bench held that contempt provisions must be interpreted narrowly because they restrict the fundamental right to free speech. Penal provisions affecting constitutional freedoms require strict construction.
The Court noted that the film was set in a fictional court located in an imaginary place called “Seven Wells Court.” Since no such court actually exists, portraying its presiding officer as corrupt could not be regarded as scandalising a real court. The depiction was therefore part of a fictional narrative rather than an attack on an identifiable judicial institution.
Moreover, the Court observed that the film did not portray the entire judicial system as corrupt, thereby weakening the allegation of contempt even further.
The “Broad Shoulders” Test
The judgment adopted what may be termed the “broad shoulders” approach. Relying on S. Rangarajan, the Court held that allegations of contempt or institutional insult must be assessed from the perspective of a calm, reasonable, and broad-minded observer rather than a hypersensitive individual.
The Court observed that in the modern era of social media, offensive and exaggerated comments are increasingly common. Judicial institutions must therefore display maturity and resilience rather than responding to every criticism through censorship or contempt proceedings.
The Bench memorably remarked that “the judicial caravan has to move on,” signalling the importance of institutional confidence and composure.
Courts as Protectors of Liberty
The judgment concludes with a powerful reaffirmation of the judiciary’s constitutional role. The Court observed that citizens approach courts seeking protection from arbitrary state action. Since courts function as guardians of liberty, they must be cautious before issuing orders that restrict constitutional freedoms. The judiciary cannot become an instrument for suppressing expression merely because certain views are unpopular or uncomfortable.
According to the Court, freedom of expression protects not only speech that society approves of but also speech that many may dislike or strongly disagree with.
Conclusion
The Madras High Court’s decision in R.S. Tamilvendan v. Secretary to the State of Tamil Nadu is a powerful reaffirmation of constitutional values. By refusing to ban Karuppu, the Court defended artistic freedom, respected the statutory role of the CBFC, and reinforced the importance of free speech in a democratic society.
More significantly, the judgment sends a broader message about the judiciary itself. Courts derive legitimacy not from immunity to criticism but from transparency, accountability, and public confidence. By declaring that judges need not be treated as “holy cows” and that justice is not a “cloistered virtue,” the Bench recognised that robust public debate and scrutiny are essential components of a healthy democracy.
The ruling thus stands as an important reminder that constitutional freedoms cannot be sacrificed at the altar of institutional sensitivity. In a democratic republic, even the judiciary must remain open to criticism, satire, artistic interpretation, and public discourse, provided such expression remains within the limits prescribed by law.
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