On 16 March 2026, a single bench (SB) of the Delhi High Court (DHC), in Mahindra and Mahindra Limited v. Diksha Sharma, provided a decisive inflection point in the evolution of dynamic injunction jurisprudence in India. The case started from a fairly typical trademark dispute involving the misuse of the “MAHINDRA” mark by packers and movers operating deceptively similar domain names as MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA. Yet, the Court’s categorical refusal to sustain the dynamic injunction framework that extends the remedies beyond the life of the suit is what makes the case interesting, and this post will discuss.
Functus Officio and the Limits of Procedural Innovation
After obtaining relief against parties using deceptively similar domain names incorporating the “MAHINDRA” mark for packers and movers services previously, Mahindra sought the ability to add newly discovered infringing websites or domain names even after the final decree. The reliefs sought in the case had included a permanent injunction restraining use of the trademark, a mandatory injunction to block/suspend and delist the specific Infringing domain names, damages for infringing the mark, and a declaration of the mark as a well known trdemark. The rationale of Mahindra was that online infringers often evade enforcement by creating mirror or redirect websites, and now sought that appropriate application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) be made to the Joint Registrar (Judicial) to extend the final judgment passed by the Court vide orders dated 10.04.2023 and 02.05.2024 to these mirror websites (Para 11).
First, the Court addressed Mahindra’s attempt to preserve post-decree flexibility through what was effectively a dynamic injunction mechanism. The doctrinal centre of the judgment lies in the Court’s strict application of the principle of functus officio. Under the framework of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, once a judgment is pronounced and a decree is drawn, the court ordinarily ceases to retain jurisdiction over the dispute, except in limited statutory situations such as review or correction of clerical errors. The Court held that once a final decree is passed, any interim injunction granted during the proceedings merges into that decree. Consequently, the interim order cannot survive independently in a manner that would allow the suit to remain procedurally open for the addition of new infringing entities.
Secondly, the Court rejected the proposal that the process of identifying and adding such infringing websites could be handled by the Joint Registrar on jurisdictional grounds. It reasoned that if the Court itself ceases to exercise jurisdiction over the matter after passing the decree, it cannot indirectly retain such authority by delegating it to a court officer. Permitting such delegation would, in the Court’s view, run contrary to the procedural structure of civil adjudication under the CPC.
Thirdly, the Court examined the broader structural implications of allowing post-decree impleadment. It noted that the mechanism proposed by Mahindra would effectively keep the suit capable of revival whenever new infringing websites appeared. This, the Court cautioned, would undermine the principle of finality that attaches to civil proceedings once a decree is passed. Allowing suits to remain indefinitely capable of reopening could blur the line between adjudication and enforcement.
At the same time, the Court acknowledged the practical challenges posed by digital infringement. Online actors frequently replicate infringing content through mirror or redirect websites in order to bypass court orders. While courts, including the DHC have previously adapted procedural remedies to address these developments, the judgment emphasises that such innovations must remain within the statutory limits of the CPC The Court therefore does not dismiss dynamic injunctions as a concept, but signals that their continued evolution must be more firmly grounded within the existing procedural framework.
This is where the judgment departs from earlier decisions such as UTV Software Communication Ltd. v. 1337X.To (see here) and Universal City Studios LLC v. Mixdrop Co. (see here)., which had permitted plaintiffs to implead mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites even after the decree by filing an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC, even after the decree through applications before the Joint Registrar. Those decisions had effectively operationalised a ‘dynamic +’ model, allowing injunctions to expand in response to new infringing avatars without reopening the suit. Arnav (here) also discusses the upcoming ‘superlative’ injunctions in this context. The present ruling, however, signals a retrenchment from it.
Shifting Ground for Dynamic Injunctions
Over the past few years, dynamic injunctions have emerged as a crucial enforcement tool in digital IP litigation (read up more about them on the blog here). They enabled plaintiffs to respond to the fluidity of online infringement through mirror websites without repeatedly approaching the Court. The present ruling disrupts this ecosystem.
There have remained concerns since the introduction of dynamic injunctions for their potential for overuse, or overly broad and hyper-protectionist scope (see here, here, here and here), and Reva (here) points out how the varying adoption and application of the test for granting dynamic and dynamic+ injunctions continue to cause significant judicial inconsistency. Similarly, Kartik (here) notes that while pre-emptive measures may be necessary, dynamic+ injunctions have led to problematic judgments where infringement is often largely assumed, not proved. Regardless, the judicial creativity for dynamic injunctions is a necessary evil.
Plaintiffs (Mahindra & Mahindra Limited) had argued that without post-decree flexibility, enforcement would become illusory in the face of constantly mutating infringing platforms. While the Court does not dispute this concern, it effectively shifts the burden back onto traditional procedural routes. This means that practitioners will now have to rely on execution proceedings or initiate fresh litigation to address new instances of infringement. The ruling does not prohibit courts from granting dynamic injunctions altogether. Courts can still issue them during the pendency of a suit. The limitation arises after the decree, where the Court refuses to allow the injunction to be expanded through applications against newly discovered actors. However, the efficiency gains of the dynamic injunction model have been curtailed.
First, the ruling affects the practical reach of dynamic injunctions. While courts can still grant them during the pendency of a suit, the judgment clarifies that such mechanisms cannot be altered for broader protection once a decree is passed. In fast-moving online infringement ecosystems, where mirror or redirect websites appear even after disposal, rights holders may now need fresh proceedings or execution steps rather than extending the injunction through simplified applications, increasing time and costs. But in a trademark dispute, Mahindra & Mahindra Limited was effectively seeking a perpetual dynamic injunction against third parties, which raises the question: does this not amount to a blanket injunction against unidentified future users of the mark? In that sense, while the order narrows the remedy by excluding post-decree actors, it also exposes the overbreadth of the relief originally sought.
Second, the order highlights the limits of open-ended injunctions against unidentified third parties. A continuing injunction that could extend to newly discovered actors using variations of the “MAHINDRA” mark was dissuaded, and the Court refused signals against decrees that risk operating as blanket injunctions against parties who were never before the court.
Third, the court’s main reasoning comes down to “interim order of any nature, particularly, an interim injunction order finally merges and subsumes itself in the final judgment and decree, and thus, does not exist independently for any authority, much less a learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) to exercise any jurisdiction at all. Wherefrom such power or jurisdiction is conferred or vested upon the Principal Officer of the Court, that too, post pronouncement of the judgment, is unknown and surely cannot be traced to any provision in the CPC.” Dynamic injunctions had functioned as a bridge between civil procedure and intermediary compliance, enabling courts to issue evolving directions in response to new URLs or domains. Earlier, dynamic injunctions allowed courts to extend blocking directions to newly identified URLs through procedural applications. By rejecting such post-decree expansion, the Court makes enforcement more dependent on renewed judicial directions.
The Court’s obiter notes that one can “easily fathom the huge financial losses that institutions and companies… may face even after being successful in a litigation,” and that “no successful litigant can be expected to hold a decree and still be frustrated on account of non-implementation thereof.” The Court has repeatedly emphasized the inadequacy of the current legal framework in addressing digital infringement though and described the situation as one of “urgent and alarming need,” calling upon the legislature and the Central Government to introduce “radical changes” to both the CPC and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.
The ruling does not close the door on dynamic injunctions but relocates the conversation. It signals that the future of such remedies lies not in incremental judicial innovation but in deliberate legislative reform. Until such reform materialises (which almost always takes its sweet time), practitioners will have to navigate a more rigid procedural landscape, where the doctrine of finality is firmly prioritised even at the cost of enforcement efficiency. In essence, the ball is now squarely in the legislature’s court.