Witch-Hunting Reflects Deep-Rooted Social Prejudice Against Women: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has strongly condemned the continuing practice of witch-hunting, observing that branding women as witches reflects a deep-rooted social prejudice in which vulnerable women are made scapegoats for misfortunes they did not cause. In Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 INSC 852, the Court affirmed the conviction and life sentence of a man involved in the brutal murder of a woman accused of practising witchcraft. Describing witch-hunting as an “anathema to human dignity,” the Court stressed that superstition and irrational fear cannot be permitted to override the rule of law, constitutional morality and reason.

The judgment was delivered by a Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria on August 13, 2026. The appeal arose from the Orissa High Court’s decision affirming the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) [Sections 103 and 3(5) of BNS] and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life.

Background of the Case

The case arose from a disturbing incident that took place in February 1998 in Sundargarh district of Odisha. According to the prosecution, the youngest daughter of Manobodha Naik died on February 17, 1998. Members of the family believed that her death had been caused by witchcraft allegedly practised by Puni Naik.

Following this accusation, appellant Balku Oram and co-accused Udai Oram went to Puni Naik’s house, dragged her out and took her near Manobodha Naik’s house. There, she was brutally assaulted. The incident was witnessed by Puni Naik’s daughter, Sukra Naik (PW-3). Puni subsequently succumbed to the injuries sustained in the assault.

The following morning, Sukra Naik, accompanied by her maternal uncle, approached the police and lodged a complaint. An FIR was registered against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC [Sections 103 and 3(5) of BNS].

The prosecution examined nine witnesses. The Trial Court principally relied upon the eyewitness account of PW-3 and convicted the appellant and the co-accused for murder, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The Orissa High Court subsequently affirmed the conviction, finding that the medical evidence corroborated the eyewitness testimony and that injuries had been inflicted on vital parts of the deceased’s body.

Arguments Before the Supreme Court

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant primarily questioned the reliability of the prosecution’s sole eyewitness. It was argued that PW-3 was the daughter of the deceased and therefore an interested witness whose testimony could not, without independent corroboration, form the basis of conviction.

The appellant also sought conversion of the conviction from murder under Section 302 IPC (Section 103 BNS) to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC (Section 105 of the BNS). It was contended that the act had been committed on account of grave and sudden provocation and therefore lacked the requisite intention for murder.

A further objection concerned the alleged delay in lodging the FIR. The incident had occurred on February 17, 1998, while the FIR was registered the following day.

The defence also attempted to highlight certain discrepancies in PW-3’s account concerning the time of death and the weapons allegedly carried by the accused.

The State, on the other hand, submitted that a witness cannot be discarded merely because she happens to be related to the deceased. It emphasised that PW-3’s testimony stood corroborated by medical evidence. The State further relied upon the settled principle that conviction can legally rest upon the testimony of a single reliable witness because the quality of evidence, rather than the number of witnesses, is decisive.

Supreme Court on Interference Under Article 136

At the outset, the Supreme Court noted that both the Trial Court and the High Court had concurrently found the appellant guilty.

Referring to its precedents on Article 136 of the Constitution, the Court reiterated that although its powers are wide, interference with concurrent findings of fact in criminal proceedings is ordinarily confined to exceptional circumstances.

Such interference may be warranted where the findings are perverse or improper, where there has been an error of law or procedure, where evidence has been misread, or where the conclusions are manifestly unsustainable on the material available.

The Court therefore examined whether the case presented any exceptional circumstance justifying interference with the concurrent findings against the appellant.

Conviction Can Rest on Testimony of a Sole Eyewitness

A significant aspect of the judgment concerns the evidentiary value of a sole eyewitness. PW-3, the daughter of the deceased, had witnessed her mother being dragged away and brutally assaulted. The Supreme Court found that her account remained substantially unshaken during examination and cross-examination.

The Court reiterated that direct ocular evidence, where natural, cogent and trustworthy, constitutes one of the strongest forms of evidence.

Relying upon the celebrated decision in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, the Bench reiterated that there is no rule of law requiring a particular number of witnesses for proving a fact. The principle underlying Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act (Section 139 in Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) is that evidence must be weighed rather than counted.

One credible witness may therefore be sufficient to establish guilt, while several unreliable witnesses may fail to do so. If the testimony of a solitary witness is found entirely trustworthy, there is no legal impediment to recording a conviction on that basis alone.

The Court found PW-3 to be a natural eyewitness whose presence at the scene could not reasonably be doubted. Her testimony regarding the assault was sufficiently credible and was also supported by medical evidence.

Related Witness Is Not Necessarily an Interested Witness

The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that PW-3’s evidence ought to be discarded because she was the daughter of the deceased. The Court drew an important distinction between a “related witness” and an “interested witness.”

Merely being related to the victim does not make a witness interested or unreliable. For a witness to be regarded as interested, circumstances must indicate some direct motive, personal animosity or other reason for falsely implicating the accused.

A close relative who naturally happens to witness an offence cannot therefore be treated as unreliable merely because of the relationship.

Applying these principles, the Court held that PW-3’s relationship with her deceased mother did not diminish the evidentiary value of her account. Her direct testimony was corroborated by medical evidence and established the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Plea to Reduce Murder Conviction Rejected

The appellant sought to bring the offence within Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC (Section 105 BNS) by contending that the killing occurred under circumstances amounting to grave and sudden provocation.

The Supreme Court was not persuaded. The post-mortem examination disclosed numerous injuries, including injuries to the head, neck, chest, abdomen, shoulder and thighs.

Referring to Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P., the Court noted that the distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder depends upon the intention of the accused, which must be gathered from the totality of circumstances. Relevant considerations include the nature of the weapon, the part of the body targeted, the nature and number of injuries, whether the occurrence resulted from a sudden fight, whether there was premeditation and whether the accused acted cruelly or unusually.

In the present case, the grievous injuries inflicted on the deceased’s head, neck, chest and other vital parts demonstrated a clear intention to cause death. The Court found nothing on record capable of bringing the case within any exception to Section 300 IPC (Section 101 BNS).

Accordingly, the request to convert the conviction from Section 302 IPC (Section 103 BNS) to Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC (Section 105 BNS) was rejected.

Delay in FIR Was Properly Explained

The Court similarly rejected the challenge based upon the delay in lodging the FIR. The incident occurred during the evening of February 17, 1998, while the matter was reported at the police station at approximately 11 a.m. the following day.

The Court placed considerable importance on the circumstances confronting PW-3. She was only about 15–16 years old when she witnessed the brutal assault and murder of her mother.

The Bench observed that it was natural for a young daughter who had just witnessed such an incident to be under shock and despair. It was only after her maternal uncle arrived that she gathered the courage to approach the police.

The Court therefore found it unreasonable to expect the daughter to immediately rush to the police station during the night after witnessing her mother’s murder. The delay was consequently held to have been satisfactorily explained.

Witch-Hunting an “Anathema to Human Dignity”

Beyond determining the appellant’s criminal liability, the Supreme Court devoted a separate part of its judgment to the broader social problem underlying the crime, significantly titled “Witch-Hunting: An Anathema to Human Dignity.”

The Bench said that the facts had deeply disturbed the conscience of the Court. A defenceless woman had been branded as a practitioner of witchcraft and brutally killed, while her young daughter was forced to witness the murder.

The Court recognised that witch-hunting continues to plague certain sections of Indian society, where prejudice, superstition and irrational fear supersede the rule of law and constitutional morality.

Importantly, the judgment places the problem within a gendered social context. The Court observed that the brutality connected with witch-hunting goes considerably beyond killing. Its victims, mostly women, may be subjected to torture, beatings, sexual violence and social ostracisation. Superstitious beliefs and irrational fears can thus transform vulnerable women into targets of collective hostility.

The observation recognises witch-hunting not simply as an isolated criminal offence but as a manifestation of social prejudice that disproportionately exposes vulnerable women to violence and humiliation.

Women Made Scapegoats for Society’s Misfortunes

One of the most significant observations in the judgment concerns the tendency to blame women for events for which they bear no responsibility. The Supreme Court observed:

“Sometimes in the most difficult situations, it often becomes an easy escape to blame a woman for the acts she did not commit, thus reflecting a deeply rooted social prejudice that often seeks scapegoats rather than solutions.”

The Court’s observation goes to the heart of the social dynamics behind witch-hunting. Instead of searching for rational explanations for illness, death or other misfortunes, superstition may lead communities to identify a supposedly responsible individual, with vulnerable women becoming convenient targets.

Against this collective irrationality, the Court emphasised reason as the essential safeguard, describing it as the virtue capable of standing as a bulwark against such irrational behaviour.

Constitutional Vision: Equality, Fraternity and Scientific Temper

The judgment also places the eradication of witch-hunting within India’s constitutional framework. The Supreme Court observed that the Constitution envisages a society founded upon equality, fraternity and scientific temperament, in which practices derogatory to women are discarded.

Despite this constitutional commitment, witch-hunting continues to survive within certain sections of society. For the Court, the contradiction is fundamental. A constitutional democracy cannot permit practices founded upon superstition, prejudice and degradation of women to operate outside the principles of the rule of law and constitutional morality.

The judgment thus gives the issue a dimension extending beyond conventional criminal law. Witch-hunting implicates the constitutional promise of equality and dignity and stands in direct tension with the development of scientific temper and rejection of practices derogatory to women.

The Court’s emphasis upon reason and scientific temperament is particularly important because witch-hunting frequently emerges from attempts to explain illness, death or personal misfortune through supernatural attribution rather than rational inquiry.

Supreme Court Affirms Murder Conviction

After examining the evidence and the legal objections raised by the appellant, the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below.

The direct evidence against Balku Oram was found compelling. The Court concluded that the appellant, along with the co-accused, had brutally murdered Puni Naik on the allegation that she had caused the death of Manobodha Naik’s youngest daughter through witchcraft.

It held that both the Trial Court and the High Court had correctly determined the appellant’s culpability. The conviction and sentence were accordingly affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed.

Click Here to Read the Official Judgment

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision sends a strong message that superstition can never become a justification for violence. The brutal killing of Puni Naik demonstrated the devastating consequences that follow when irrational belief is allowed to replace reason and legal process.

The Court’s recognition that women are often made scapegoats for events beyond their control is particularly significant. Witch-hunting, in this understanding, is not merely the product of superstition; it is also sustained by entrenched prejudices that make vulnerable women convenient targets for blame, exclusion and violence.

Affirming the conviction and life sentence, the Supreme Court expressed the hope that the case would serve as a solemn reminder that justice must always prevail over superstition and irrational beliefs.

The judgment ultimately reinforces a simple but powerful constitutional proposition: where superstition produces violence and prejudice seeks a scapegoat, the answer must be reason, dignity and the rule of law.

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