The Delhi High Court has been recently grappling with issues concerning Copyright Strikes and takedowns by platforms, which have been necessitating Section 60 suits before the IPD Bench in Delhi. In Saurabh Maurya v. John Doe, CS(COMM) 870 of 2026, the Instagram account of a content creator had been suspended upon copyright strikes. Inspite of restoration of the content by Meta, the Plaintiff has pressed that the mode and manner of dealing with copyright strikes by intermediary platforms is in itself illegal. In light of this, the Court has framed a question – “Whether the extant system and procedure of suspension, take-down, and subsequent deletion of an account followed by social media platforms (intermediaries) based on copyright strikes is in line with the principles laid-down in Shreya Singhal and Myspace Inc.?” It is this legal question that I try to answer!
The Platforms’ Procedures
Vishno’s post sets out in detail how the strike procedures of YouTube, Amazon and Meta operate. Without repeating much, three features matter. A complaint from a self-proclaimed right holder, reviewed by automated systems and platform staff who admittedly moderate, suffices to remove content and record a strike, and three strikes terminate the channel or seller account. Once the uploader counter notifies, the proclaimed rightsowner needs to merely submit a copy of a lawsuit filed anywhere, even abroad, which then, keeps the content down for as long as the suit lasts. And the platforms’ own fair use guidance, built around US law, concedes that fair use is a subjective, case by case decision that only courts can make.
Throughout this process, the platform maintains that it is a neutral intermediary and lacks competence to determine questions of copyright infringement or ownership. That characterization is correct under Indian law. However, an intermediary that cannot adjudicate may act, in my view, voluntarily only once, upon trust, when a complaint is received. Once the user contests the complaint, the intermediary possesses nothing upon which to act, save its own judgment, and Indian law does not permit that judgment to be substituted for a Court’s while also claiming the benefit of safe harbor.
This piece develops this argument in two parts. The first sets out Section 79 of the IT Act and the two judgments that are relevant to the issue. The second construes the word “voluntary” in the IT Rules, in the light of the amendments of 2025 and 2026, and inquires what, if anything, authorizes the continued takedown of content inspite of a contest, as well as the termination of an account/channel.
Section 79 of the IT Act as an Exemption as against a Power
Section 79(1) exempts an intermediary from liability for any third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by it, subject to sub-sections (2) and (3). Sub-section (2) conditions the exemption upon the intermediary’s function being “limited to providing access to a communication system,” or upon its not initiating the transmission, selecting the receiver, or selecting or modifying the information, and upon its observing “due diligence while discharging his duties under this Act” together with “such other guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf.”
Sub-section (3)(b) withdraws the exemption where the intermediary, upon receiving actual knowledge or on being notified by the appropriate Government or its agency that information is being used to commit an unlawful act, fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to it.
The proviso to Section 81, the overriding effect section, provides that nothing in the Act shall restrict any person from exercising any right conferred under the Copyright Act, 1957 (for an interesting discussion on the interaction of S. 79 and S. 81 see the comments section here). None of these provisions confer upon an intermediary any power over a user.
In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court read Section 79(3)(b) down. Paragraph 121 observes that Section 79 is an exemption provision, contrasts it with Section 69A, under which blocking requires a reasoned order after a hearing to the originator and intermediary, and remarks that the intermediary applying its own mind to whether information should or should not be blocked is noticeably absent. Paragraph 122 holds that actual knowledge means knowledge that a court order has been passed asking it to expeditiously remove or disable access to certain material, since otherwise the intermediary is then to judge as to which of such requests are legitimate and which are not. Paragraph 124.3, upon which the plaintiff in Saurabh Maurya relies, records the conclusion in those terms.
Importantly, the Court in Shreya Singhal (supra) confined its construction to unlawful acts “relatable to Article 19(2),” among which copyright does not figure (or does it?). In MySpace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., a Division Bench of DHC held in paragraph 66 that Sections 79 and 81 and Section 51(a)(ii) “have to be read harmoniously” and that in the case of copyright lawm it is sufficient that MySpace receives specific knowledge of the infringing works from the content owner without the necessity of a court order, directing in paragraph 78 removal within thirty six hours of a notice specifying the work and its location. That decision is the source of notice and takedown for copyright in India, and also marks its limit.
MySpace determined what an intermediary must do in order to retain its immunity when a rights owner notifies it. It was not asked what the intermediary may do to the uploader once the uploader disputes the notice, or whether an account may be terminated upon accumulated notices. Upon those questions the judgment points in the opposite. Paragraph 40 cautioned that a general notice would compel the intermediary to “blindly remove the content” and that “an indiscriminate and blind acceptance” of the owner’s list “would result in grave damage.” Paragraph 72 added that the removal of lawful content upon a general notice “would surely be in breach of a private contract with its user,” citing Roadshow Films v. iiNet upon “the legal risk of wrongfully terminating a user account.” Thus, MySpace sanctioned takedown upon a specific notice because such a notice renders the initial removal safe, and it did not license the platform to determine the dispute which follows.
The Amended IT Rules (Intermediary Guidelines) and the Meaning of “Voluntary”
Platforms advance a common argument while defending strikes and channel terminations, and it will, most definitely, constitute their answer to the question framed in Saurabh Maurya. Section 79(2)(c) conditions safe harbor upon due diligence and upon observance of the Government’s guidelines, the Intermediary Guidelines of 2021 (as amended from time to time). Rule 3(1)(b), as amended in 2023, requires the intermediary to “make reasonable efforts by itself, and to cause the users of its computer resource to not host” information that “infringes any patent, trademark, copyright or other proprietary rights.”
Rule 3(1)(c) requires it to inform users that, upon noncompliance with its user agreement, “it has the right to terminate or suspend the access or usage rights of the users to the computer resource immediately, or to remove or disable access to non-compliant information, or both.” The Rules describe removal for a violation of Rule 3(1)(b) as removal “on a voluntary basis,” and until November 2025 a proviso to Rule 3(1)(d), since re-enacted differently as Rule 2(1-B) read with 3(1)(g), declared that such removal does not forfeit the exemption. MySpace holds that a specific notice fixes the platform with knowledge and that disregarding it loses the protection. On that reading, striking content upon complaint and terminating repeat infringers is due diligence which the Act requires and the Rules protect. The argument however must be tested.
The next part (Part 2) tests this argument and construes the meaning of “voluntary” takedowns under the amended IT Rules, examines whether a filed plaint can keep content down, and turns to the termination of channels and seller accounts.