Delhi High Court has reiterated that a tenant cannot dictate the manner in which a landlord should utilise the accommodation available to him while resisting an eviction petition based on bona fide requirement. The Court observed that the landlord is the best judge of his requirements, and courts cannot substitute the landlord’s assessment with an alternative arrangement merely because the tenant considers such an arrangement sufficient.
In Naresh Kumar v. Sunny Kashyap & Anr., RC.REV. 330/2026, decided on September 8, 2026, Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar dismissed a tenant’s revision petition challenging an eviction order passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”). The High Court held that the Additional Rent Controller (“ARC”) had properly examined the landlord-tenant relationship, the bona fide requirement of the respondents and the alleged availability of alternative accommodation.
The Court further emphasised the limited and supervisory nature of revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, holding that the High Court cannot undertake a fresh appreciation of evidence merely because another view may be possible.
Background of the Case
The dispute arose out of an eviction petition concerning premises occupied by the petitioner, Naresh Kumar, as a tenant. The respondents sought eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The Additional Rent Controller, Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts, by an order dated April 7, 2026, dismissed the tenant’s application seeking leave to defend and consequently passed an eviction order against him.
Aggrieved, the tenant approached the Delhi High Court through a revision petition under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
The challenge before the High Court was principally founded on three grounds: absence of a landlord-tenant relationship, alleged change in the purpose for which the premises were required, and availability of suitable alternative accommodation with the respondents.
Tenant Disputed Landlord-Tenant Relationship
The petitioner contended that he had been a tenant under the ancestors of the respondents and had never attorned to the present respondents. On this basis, he argued that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties. The High Court rejected the contention.
The Court noted that the petitioner had himself admitted in his application seeking leave to defend that the premises were originally owned by the respondents’ grandfather, who was also the landlord. The petitioner further acknowledged that rent was subsequently received by the respondents’ father.
Accordingly, the Court held that the tenant’s own pleadings undermined his objection to the landlord-tenant relationship.
The Court reiterated that in proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, a landlord is not required to establish ownership according to the stringent standard applicable to a title suit. What is required is a title superior to that of the tenant.
Since the petitioner neither claimed an independent title in himself nor asserted ownership in favour of someone outside the respondents’ family, his plea of non-attornment did not raise a triable issue.
Change from Confectionery Shop to Law Office
Another objection raised by the petitioner related to the purpose for which eviction was sought. According to the tenant, the respondents had originally pleaded that they required the premises for establishing a confectionery shop. Their case was subsequently amended to state that the premises were required for running a law office.
The petitioner argued that this change cast doubt upon the genuineness of the requirement. The High Court, however, held that a mere amendment or refinement of the proposed use does not automatically make the requirement mala fide.
The relevant consideration was whether the requirement ultimately pleaded and supported before the Rent Controller was genuine and bona fide.
Importantly, the petitioner himself had admitted that both respondents were practising advocates. In these circumstances, their stated requirement of the premises for running a law office was consistent with their profession.
The Court observed that there was no material showing that the requirement was fanciful, whimsical or merely a device for securing eviction.
Thus, the change in the proposed use from a confectionery shop to a law office was not sufficient to defeat the eviction proceedings.
Landlord Is the Best Judge of His Requirement
The principal issue before the High Court concerned the tenant’s claim that the respondents already possessed alternative accommodation and therefore did not genuinely require the tenanted premises.
The ARC had reiterated the settled principle that courts should not place themselves in the landlord’s position and dictate how his property ought to be utilised. It relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Ragavendra Kumar v. Prem Machinery & Co., (2000) 1 SCC 679, where it was held that the landlord is the best judge of his residential or business requirement and enjoys freedom in determining which premises are suitable for that purpose.
The High Court endorsed this approach. It held that the tenant’s argument that the respondents already had a chamber essentially required the Court to undertake its own comparative assessment of different premises available to the landlords.
Justice Shankar observed that such an exercise would amount to replacing the landlord’s subjective assessment with that of the Court.
The Court categorically observed:
“It is settled that the landlord is the best judge of his or her requirement and that the tenant cannot dictate the manner in which the landlord ought to utilise the available accommodation.”
The judicial inquiry is confined to examining whether the requirement is bona fide and whether there exists a reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. The Court cannot prescribe a different arrangement simply because the tenant believes that such an arrangement would suffice.
Mere Existence of Another Property Is Not Enough
A significant aspect of the judgment is the distinction between the mere existence of another property and its suitability as alternative accommodation.
The tenant had relied upon several properties allegedly available to the respondents. The ARC examined each property separately rather than mechanically accepting the respondents’ assertion that no alternative accommodation was available.
The High Court approved this property-wise analysis.
Lawyer’s Chamber at Tis Hazari Courts
The first alleged alternative was Lawyer’s Chamber No. K-127 at Tis Hazari Courts. The respondents acknowledged the chamber’s existence but stated that it belonged to their late father and was insufficient to accommodate three advocates, the two respondents and the wife of respondent no. 1.
The ARC also observed that a lawyer’s chamber in a District Court complex could not simply be treated as independently owned property of the advocates concerned. More importantly, the tenant had failed to establish that the chamber was sufficient and suitable for the respondents’ professional requirements.
The High Court therefore found no perversity in the ARC’s conclusion that the chamber did not constitute suitable alternative accommodation.
Residential Property at Pandit Park
The petitioner also relied upon a residential property situated at Pandit Park, Ghondli Village, Krishna Nagar. Although the respondents admitted the existence of the property, they maintained that it was being used solely as a residence and had never been utilised as an office.
The tenant merely asserted that the premises could also be used as an office but produced no cogent material supporting this contention.
The ARC additionally considered the location of the property in relation to Karkardooma Courts Complex, which was stated to be the respondents’ principal place of legal practice.
The High Court held that the respondents could not be compelled to use a comparatively less convenient residential property merely because the tenant believed it could serve as their office.
This reinforces an important principle in rent-control jurisprudence: alternative accommodation must be realistically suitable for the landlord’s stated requirement; theoretical availability is insufficient.
Shops at Bhikam Singh Colony
The petitioner further relied upon Shops Nos. 1 and 4 situated in property No. 32/112, Gali No. 10, Bhikam Singh Colony, Vishwas Nagar.
The respondents stated that these shops had fallen to the shares of other family members pursuant to a family settlement dated October 21, 2016, and were not under their control.
The ARC examined the memorandum of family settlement relied upon by the respondents. On the other hand, the tenant failed to produce material establishing that the shops were actually available to the respondents for establishing their law office.
The High Court consequently upheld the finding that these shops could not be regarded as suitable alternative accommodation.
The Court specifically noted that the ARC had considered not merely the physical existence of the properties relied upon by the tenant but also their ownership, availability and suitability.
Scope of Revision Under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act
Apart from the principles concerning bona fide requirement, the judgment provides an important reiteration of the limited scope of the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
The Court relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30.
Referring particularly to Abid-Ul-Islam, the Court noted that the absence of an appellate remedy against the Rent Controller’s order is deliberate. The power conferred upon the High Court is essentially one of superintendence over the decision-making process and cannot be converted into a regular appellate jurisdiction.
The High Court therefore cannot reassess the entire evidence merely to determine whether it would have reached a different conclusion.
Interference in revision would ordinarily be justified where the impugned order suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity; where the conclusion is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous premise of law; or where a material plea has remained unconsidered.
No Roving Re-Appreciation of Evidence
Applying these principles, the High Court found that the ARC had considered each objection raised by the tenant.
The landlord-tenant relationship was examined on the basis of the tenant’s own admissions. The bona fide requirement was considered in light of the respondents’ profession as practising advocates. Each property alleged to constitute alternative accommodation was separately evaluated.
The tenant’s revision petition, according to the High Court, essentially sought a fresh evaluation of the same material with the hope of obtaining a conclusion more favourable to him.
The Court held that such an exercise falls outside the scope of Section 25B(8). Even where the evidence may conceivably permit another interpretation, the possibility of a different view is not by itself sufficient for revisional interference. The revisional jurisdiction is directed towards examining the legality and propriety of the decision-making process rather than replacing the Rent Controller’s conclusion with that of the High Court.
No Triable Issue Made Out
The High Court ultimately found that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any triable issue warranting leave to defend. The ARC had considered the objections concerning the landlord-tenant relationship, bona fide requirement and alternative accommodation and had recorded reasoned findings on all three aspects.
The High Court found these conclusions to be supported by the pleadings and material on record. They could not be characterised as perverse, irrational or conclusions that no reasonable court could have reached.
Consequently, the Court found no error apparent on the face of the record or jurisdictional infirmity justifying interference.
The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, and the eviction order dated April 7, 2026 was sustained.
Key Takeaways from the Judgment
The decision reiterates several important principles governing eviction petitions based on bona fide requirement under the Delhi Rent Control Act:
- A tenant cannot dictate how a landlord should utilise his property. The landlord remains the best judge of his residential or professional requirements.
- Alternative accommodation must be reasonably suitable. The mere existence of another property does not automatically defeat a claim of bona fide requirement.
- Suitability depends on practical considerations. Ownership, availability, size, location, nature of use and the landlord’s actual requirements are relevant considerations.
- Courts cannot devise alternative arrangements for landlords. A tenant cannot resist eviction merely by suggesting that the landlord could manage his affairs differently.
- A landlord need not prove absolute title in Section 14(1)(e) proceedings. It is sufficient to demonstrate a title superior to that of the tenant.
- A change or refinement in the proposed use is not automatically mala fide. The decisive consideration is whether the requirement ultimately pleaded is genuine and bona fide.
- Section 25B(8) revision is not an appeal. The High Court cannot conduct a fresh or roving re-appreciation of evidence merely because another view is possible.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court’s decision in Naresh Kumar v. Sunny Kashyap & Anr. reinforces the principle that the choice regarding how a landlord should use his property primarily belongs to the landlord, not to the tenant or the Court.
While a claim of bona fide requirement remains subject to judicial scrutiny, that scrutiny does not permit a tenant to redesign the landlord’s professional or residential arrangements. The existence of another property becomes relevant only when it is actually available and reasonably suitable for satisfying the requirement for which eviction is sought.
The judgment also serves as a reminder of the restricted scope of revision under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. Once the Rent Controller has considered the relevant objections, evaluated the alleged alternative accommodations and arrived at a reasoned conclusion supported by the record, the High Court will not interfere merely because the tenant proposes another possible assessment of the evidence.