POLICE CANNOT INVESTIGATE PC & PNDT ACT OFFENCES, RULES SUPREME COURT
The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh Crl.A. No. 2938/2025, Diary No. 22340/2025 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842
The Supreme Court has held that police cannot register an FIR or act as the primary investigating agency for offences under the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994. A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh ruled that investigation of complaints under the Act is the exclusive responsibility of the Appropriate Authority constituted under the statute, with police permitted only a supplemental role when called upon by that Authority. The Court further held that a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence under the Act on the strength of a chargesheet filed after a police investigation.
Background
The matter reached the Supreme Court by way of a reference from the Allahabad High Court, whose judgment dated September 30, 2024 framed three questions concerning the interplay between Sections 27 and 28 of the Act. Section 27 declares every offence under the Act to be cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable, the classification ordinarily associated with police-registered FIRs. Section 28, however, bars any court from taking cognizance of an offence under the Act except on a complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority or an authorised officer, or by a private person who has given the Authority fifteen days’ prior notice of the intended complaint.
The apparent tension between these two provisions one signalling police jurisdiction, the other channelling cognizance strictly through the Appropriate Authority, is what the Court was asked to resolve. Senior Advocate Mukta Gupta, assisted by Advocate-on-Record Nitin Saluja, was appointed amicus curiae to assist the bench.
The Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court held that Section 27 cannot be read in isolation from Section 28 and the rest of the statutory scheme. It pointed to Section 17(4), which vests the Appropriate Authority with the function of investigating complaints, taking immediate action and initiating independent investigations; Section 17A, which arms the Authority with powers to summon persons, call for documents and issue search warrants and Section 30, which empowers the Authority to conduct searches and seizures with whatever assistance it considers necessary.
The Court also drew significance from the fact that Section 30 expressly imports certain CrPC procedures relating to searches and seizures, reasoning that this showed Parliament had consciously incorporated general criminal procedure only where it intended to, making it inappropriate to assume that ordinary police-investigation procedure applies by default elsewhere in the Act. Given the specialised, sensitive nature of the subject matter, requiring medical and technical expertise and the Act’s socially beneficial purpose, the Court concluded that police were never meant to function as investigators under this statute.
A practical difficulty reinforced this conclusion: an FIR registered by police cannot be carried to its logical conclusion under the Act’s own procedure, since Section 28 permits cognizance only on a complaint from specified persons, not on a police chargesheet. The Court also invoked Rule 18A(3)(iv), a statutory rule requiring that recourse to police be avoided as far as possible.
Answers to the Three Questions
On whether FIR registration is permissible merely because offences are made cognizable, the Court held that it is not, the scheme of Sections 27 and 28, read together, rules out police-led registration for offences under the Act.
On who may investigate such complaints, the Court held that this responsibility rests with the Appropriate Authority alone; police may play only a supplemental role and only when required by the Authority.
On whether a Magistrate can take cognizance based on a police chargesheet, the Court held that Section 28 sets out a complete and exclusive mechanism for cognizance and a chargesheet arising from police investigation cannot substitute for a complaint under that provision.
The Court clarified that this restriction is confined to offences under the PC & PNDT Act itself and does not curtail the police’s ordinary power to investigate and prosecute independent offences disclosed under the Indian Penal Code or the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita arising from the same facts.
Supplementary Opinion
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice N. Kotiswar Singh elaborated that police assistance may still be sought by the Appropriate Authority for specific purposes such as providing protection, tracing an accused, digital or forensic assistance, or preserving a scene but such assistance cannot displace the Authority’s primary responsibility for investigating PC & PNDT offences.
He also explained that a single transaction may spawn two separate procedural tracks: the Appropriate Authority investigating the PC & PNDT offence, while police independently investigate any IPC/BNS offence arising from the same facts. Where police investigating an IPC/BNS offence uncover material suggesting a PC & PNDT violation, they must forward it to the Appropriate Authority and the Authority must reciprocate if it discovers material pointing to an independent IPC/BNS offence. Having answered the three referred questions, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Allahabad High Court to decide the underlying case in light of this ruling.
Shomdeepta Chanda
Associate
The Indian Lawyer & Allied Services
Watch our latest video