The Supreme Court in Sai Maghalakshmi Traders v Sri Lakshmi Srinivasa Agro Foods on 28th October 2026 called it what it is: any perception of a High Court being better suited for a particular type of dispute is “entirely misguided and erroneous,” and territorial jurisdiction in various courts cannot on its own justify “forum shopping” or perpetuate a “hierarchy among the High Courts.” Despite this, it is not a hidden fact anymore that Delhi attracts IP suitors as a moth does to a flame, playing host to 4263 IP suits between January 2021 and July 2026. Why so? Here, as noted by the DHC in ABD Maestro v Great Galleon Ventures, the majority of suits are heard quickly, the registry is digital, and the benches feature judges specialised in various IP matters. However, in alignment with the Supreme Court’s stance on forum shopping, the DHC pushed back on territorial jurisdiction so that the ones whose lis actually arises in Delhi can get their day in the Court. The Single Bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav on 3 November 2026 returned a batch of 17 plaints back to the plaintiffs for lacking territorial jurisdiction in Delhi.
(Quick commentary on the drafting: the decision is pleasing to the eye, beautiful formatting with structured tables on various occasions!) Justice Kaurav accumulated all cases, listed 10 issues with them, and explained how to deal with the question of jurisdiction. This post is split into a two-part series: In Part I, we will look at the need for precise jurisdiction in composite suits, understand the meaning of “carry on business”, navigate cause of action in various situations, and draw a line on investigator-led trap purchases. In Part II, we will walk through certain principles and doctrines such as that of dynamic effect, forum non conveniens, and demurrer and see how they play out in invoking territorial jurisdiction.
Specify Jurisdiction!
The DHC explains that when a plaintiff packs all copyright, trademark infringement, passing off, etc. in one composite suit, the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction for each of these claims- i.e., for copyright and trademark infringement under Sections 134(2) and 62(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Copyright Act, respectively, and for passing off (which is to protect unregistered marks and business goodwill) under Section 20 of the CPC. If the court lacks jurisdiction even in one of these, the judgement would not be valid. This prevents the plaintiff from prioritising convenience over the statutory mandates. There is a thin line with respect to composite suits- for plaintiffs who do suffer from more than one claim and the plaintiffs who just want to throw all claims, solid and dubious, at the wall, wishing most of them hit the nail- both find it lit-economical. So, a strict establishment of jurisdiction necessitates that plaintiffs carefully vet their pleadings instead of treating a composite suit as a catch-all net.
What it Takes to be Carrying on Business?
The term “CARRIES ON BUSINESS” occurs in Sections 20(a) and (b), CPC, S. 134(2), Trade Marks Act, and S. 62(2), Copyright Act. The Court discussed whether mere sale of goods constitutes carrying on business at that place by the corporation. For this, it relied on the Supreme Court’s Dhodha House (2004), as per which mere availability of goods or sale of goods at a place won’t amount to carrying on business. Here’s what would amount to it: the corporation must have an interest in a business in that place; if the agent is carrying on the business, then it must be a special agent carrying on business in the name of the principal (so, for example, sale of goods by this special agent but in the principal’s name); and lastly, the activities carried on must be an essential part of the business. Now, I am not certain why the sale of goods would not be considered an essential part of the business. Could it be that a mere sale of goods doesn’t necessarily tell whether the plaintiff had an interest or control in a business in the place? A further dive into Dhodha House might give a reasonable justification.
The Court reaffirmed what was ruled in the SC precedent, Sanjaya Dalia (2015), that the Explanation under Section 20 of CPC (allowing suit-filing where defendant carries on business) must be read into Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act (allowing filing of suit where plaintiff carries on its business). This was to state that a plaintiff having multiple offices/branches cannot choose from a buffet of jurisdictions. In such a scenario, the principal office of the plaintiff has to be identified, and only if the cause of action arises at a subordinate office can the jurisdiction of that subordinate office be applied. This distinction is important because the special IP provisions that were meant to offer procedural flexibility to plaintiffs must not act as a loophole for plaintiffs with multiple branch offices to cherry-pick a forum from those branch locations, while having no nexus with the dispute at hand.
Situational Cause of Action (CoA)
An IP suit can also be filed in a jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or partly, has occurred other than parties carrying their business. Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India empowers High Courts to exercise their local jurisdiction if the CoA arises “wholly / in part” there. ONGC v Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) described CoA as “bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court.” Deriving from this description, the SC in Adani Exports (2001) established that there must be a nexus between the COA and the lis, and facts with no such relevance will not constitute cause of action in the said jurisdiction. This means that while a certificate of registration might be essential to prove an IP suit, if the plaintiff cannot use it to drag the lis into a forum where no actual violation occurred, i.e., it won’t constitute CoA.
The Court explained CoA arising in four situations. In a quia timet action (a plaintiff anticipates that the defendant will infringe their rights and so files a suit to stop the defendant from doing so), CoA arises if the defendant engages in the activity- deliberate and imminent- which is likely to result in a strong possibility of infringement that would cause damage- severe and irreparable. If the defendant required regulatory approval to sell those allegedly infringed goods, deliberate activity would be procuring the required license or permission.
In a passing-off action, a direct sale to a distributor, wholesaler, or retailer at a commercial scale gives rise to a CoA. Merely goods being available; a firm (not acting as a distributor, etc., or an agent of the defendant) making the sale; the defendant procuring goods from outside sources, or introducing goods into the forum via independent distribution won’t confer jurisdiction. Delivery of goods to the agent/carrier of the plaintiff is deemed as delivery to the plaintiff/its investigator.
Offline, mere registration of the mark does not constitute COA in that jurisdiction. Online, to show that COA arose through a website, the plaintiff is to show that the defendant was targeting specifically within the territory and that this has caused damage to the plaintiff in that territory. Plaintiff must show that commercial transactions were concluded through the website (this requirement being relaxed in situations where the defendant is not in India).
I think this rulebook on jurisdiction and its application is imperative, especially in Digital India, where virtual presence of physical shops is growing. Mere availability of goods cannot be a substantive cause of action that could establish that irreparable/significant damage is being caused to the plaintiff. On top of that, treating every website accessible pan-India as an independent CoA reduces the horizontal allocation of jurisdiction to a nullity. By that logic, it would mean that globally all big brands must be hosted by Delhi if a plaintiff thinks their rights have been infringed simply because the global shops have a virtual presence in the Indian market. (More on territorial jurisdiction in case of website activity, read here.)
Role of Investigator
The Court hasn’t entirely eliminated the use of an investigator or any other person appointed by the plaintiff to gather evidence of infringement. It allows it if an investigator must be involved to make out a credible, believable case to approach the court, or if the investigator can establish a commercial transaction. Barring these situations, the Court concluded that, as a rule, a plaintiff setting up such an investigator or any other person would amount to manufacturing jurisdiction because then all a plaintiff would need is an orchestrated trap purchase in the desired jurisdiction.
The Court also devised a safeguard: the Plaintiff comes to the Court with unclean hands if they do not disclose that they are aware of the defendant’s ordinary course of trade running anywhere else than Delhi, and still use an investigator deliberately to stage delivery of goods in Delhi. Finding unclean hands, the Court can outrightly deny the relief of injunction even if the plaintiff has a strong prima facie infringement case. The Court can also pose relevant questions to the parties in such a case (Section 165 of BSA).
This safeguard, I believe, will force the plaintiff to proactively search and disclose if the defendant operates ordinarily elsewhere. They cannot rely on merely highlighting a single courier delivery to Delhi to procure jurisdiction.
In Part II of this series, we will examine how the Court tackled the dynamic effect principle, rebranded the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and shifted boundaries of the demurrer doctrine.