A public servant cannot seek immunity from a corruption investigation by treating an alleged demand for a bribe as an act performed in the course of official duties, the Supreme Court has ruled. Holding that Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, does not extend to demands for illegal gratification, the Court clarified that prior approval for investigation is necessary only where the alleged offence relates to a recommendation made or decision taken in the discharge of official functions.
In Tejaram v. State of Rajasthan (2026 INSC 1147), a Bench comprising Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N.V. Anjaria rejected the plea of a Rajasthan Police constable who challenged the criminal proceedings against him over an alleged demand of ₹1.5 lakh as a bribe. The Court held that the act of demanding a bribe is independent of official duties, and the absence of prior approval under Section 17A cannot invalidate an investigation into such allegations.
Background of the Case
The appellant, Tejaram, was serving as a constable in the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sirohi, Rajasthan. The dispute arose following allegations involving another constable, Devendra Kumar, who was posted at Police Station Abu City, Sirohi.
According to the appellant, Devendra Kumar had been deputed to Madurai along with another constable for investigation-related official work. Tejaram alleged that Devendra Kumar had accepted illegal gratification from accused persons to facilitate their escape.
The appellant claimed that, in retaliation, Devendra Kumar submitted a false complaint through an email dated 22 April 2021 to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, alleging that Tejaram had demanded ₹1.5 lakh as a bribe on behalf of the Superintendent of Police.
On the basis of the complaint, FIR No. 174 of 2021, dated 4 June 2021, was registered against Tejaram under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The appellant was arrested on 1 September 2021. Subsequently, sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was granted on 8 December 2023, and a chargesheet was filed on 19 January 2024.
On 12 September 2024, the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pali, directed the framing of a charge against the appellant under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as amended in 2018.
Aggrieved by the order, Tejaram approached the Rajasthan High Court through Criminal Revision Petition No. 1608 of 2024. However, the High Court dismissed his revision petition on 26 March 2025, prompting him to approach the Supreme Court.
Whether Prior Approval Under Section 17A Was Mandatory
The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether the investigation and subsequent criminal proceedings against the appellant were legally sustainable in the absence of prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Appearing for the appellant, Senior Advocate Abhimanyu Bhandari contended that Section 17A imposed a mandatory restriction on initiating an enquiry or investigation against a public servant for acts performed in the discharge of official functions without obtaining previous approval from the competent authority.
He argued that failure to obtain such approval could not be cured at a subsequent stage. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Yashwant Sinha v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Nara Chandrababu Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh.
The appellant also referred to pending questions concerning the procedural or substantive nature of Sections 17A and 19 of the Act.
Opposing these submissions, Additional Advocate General Sansriti Pathak, appearing for the State of Rajasthan, argued that Section 17A does not extend protection to criminal acts unrelated to official duties.
The State maintained that demanding illegal gratification could not be characterised as a recommendation made or decision taken in the discharge of official functions. Consequently, the statutory requirement of previous approval was not attracted.
Supreme Court Explains the Limited Scope of Section 17A
Examining the statutory framework, the Supreme Court observed that Section 17A restricts police officers from conducting an enquiry, inquiry or investigation into offences allegedly committed by public servants where such offences are relatable to recommendations made or decisions taken in the discharge of official functions or duties, without previous approval of the competent authority.
The provision also contains an exception where a person is arrested on the spot on a charge of accepting or attempting to accept an undue advantage.
The Court emphasised that the protection contemplated under Section 17A is conditional and cannot be extended merely because the accused holds public office.
In paragraph 6, the Court identified the decisive statutory expression as:
“discharge his official functions or duties”
The Bench explained that the legislature had intended to protect public servants through Section 17A, but such protection could operate only when the statutory conditions were satisfied.
For the provision to apply, there must be a recommendation or decision made by the public servant in the discharge of official functions, and the alleged offence must be relatable to that recommendation or decision.
The Court found that these essential requirements were absent in the present case.
The allegation against Tejaram concerned a demand for ₹1.5 lakh as illegal gratification. Such conduct, the Court held, could not be treated as part of his official responsibilities or connected with any decision or recommendation made in his official capacity.
The Bench observed that demanding a bribe is a purely criminal act, independent of the discharge of official duties. The mere fact that the accused was a public servant did not bring the allegation within the protective scope of Section 17A.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the absence of prior approval could not invalidate the initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellant.
Earlier Judicial Precedents on Investigation Without Prior Approval
The Supreme Court examined several judicial decisions concerning the applicability of Section 17A to corruption allegations.
In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Santosh Karnani (2023 SCC OnLine SC 427), the Court had rejected the contention that an investigation involving an allegation of demanding a bribe was invalid because previous approval under Section 17A had not been obtained.
That decision explained that the statutory requirement concerns offences relatable to recommendations or decisions made in the discharge of official duties. It also recognised that requiring previous approval in trap cases could defeat the purpose of the investigation.
The Bench noted that this reasoning had subsequently been relied upon in Surendra Dhariwal v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal Nos. 3717–3718 of 2025, decided on 25 August 2025.
The Court further referred to its recent decision in Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan (2026 SCC OnLine SC 807), which similarly involved allegations of demanding illegal gratification.
In that case, the Supreme Court had expressly rejected the applicability of Section 17A to allegations involving demands for illegal gratification, holding that the provision was intended to protect recommendations and decisions made in the discharge of official duties.
The Bench also considered the Kerala High Court’s decision in Shankara Bhat v. State of Kerala (2021 SCC OnLine Ker 16357), which distinguished criminal acts unrelated to official duties from conduct attracting statutory protection.
The Kerala High Court had observed that offences such as misappropriation, falsification of accounts, cheating, criminal breach of trust and receiving bribes fell outside the scope of Section 17A where they lacked the necessary connection with official duties.
The Supreme Court noted that the same principle had been reiterated in M.R. Simon v. State of Kerala (2024 SCC OnLine Ker 7255).
Drawing upon these authorities, the Bench found a consistent judicial position that Section 17A cannot be invoked to prevent investigation into an independent criminal act merely because the accused is a public servant.
Distinction Between Prior Approval Under Section 17A and Prosecution Sanction Under Section 19
The Supreme Court separately examined the appellant’s objection concerning sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
While Section 17A concerns previous approval for an enquiry, inquiry or investigation into specified offences connected with official recommendations or decisions, Section 19 deals with sanction for prosecution.
In the present case, sanction under Section 19 had been granted on 8 December 2023, before the filing of the chargesheet on 19 January 2024.
The appellant sought to question the timing of the prosecution sanction. However, the Supreme Court noted that the sanction had been obtained before cognizance was taken.
Considering the circumstances, the Court held that the alleged irregularity relating to the timing of sanction did not vitiate the entire criminal proceedings or the trial.
The Bench clarified that the trial would proceed on its merits, with both parties entitled to advance their respective contentions.
The Court also addressed the submission concerning the pending larger-bench reference on the validity of Section 17A in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India.
It held that the reference did not affect the present proceedings because the dispute could be resolved on the ground that Section 17A was not applicable to the allegations against the appellant.