The Supreme Court has acquitted a man convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), holding that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta set aside the concurrent findings of the Special Judge (POCSO), East Jaintia Hills, and the Meghalaya High Court, which had upheld a 10-year rigorous imprisonment sentence.
The Court stressed that the acquittal did not rest on one lapse alone: it followed from the cumulative effect of several deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence, of which the failure of the child victim and her cousin to identify the accused in court was only one.
The Court acknowledged at the outset that the case arose from “a very disturbing set of allegations” involving a specially abled minor, but reiterated that a criminal court can convict only on evidence that is free from doubt.
Background of the Case
The appellant was tried in Special POCSO Case No. 38 of 2020 on the basis of FIR No. 261(6)15/2015, registered at Police Station Khliehriat, East Jaintia Hills District. By judgment dated 7 December 2021, the Special Judge (POCSO) convicted him under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment, with a fine of Rs 1 lakh and five months’ simple imprisonment in default. The Meghalaya High Court dismissed his appeal on 29 March 2022.
According to the prosecution, the victim, a minor girl with 40% intellectual disability, was sexually assaulted at her home on 28 May 2015 while her mother (PW-1) was away. PW-1 allegedly saw the appellant plucking mulberry leaves in the adjoining garden as she left. The victim went to her cousin, Ms. J (PW-2), who learnt of the allegation and told PW-1 the next day. PW-1, however, did not pursue it because the child did not affirm the accusation.
On 7 June 2015, the victim reportedly told her teacher, Ms. Princely, about the incident. The FIR was lodged by PW-1 on 8 June 2015, nearly ten days after the alleged date, and no scientific evidence could be collected. These are allegations; the Supreme Court found them unproven.
Arguments Advanced Before the Supreme Court
Senior Advocate Gaurav Agrawal, for the appellant, argued that the ten-day delay in lodging the FIR was unexplained and that the teacher, a crucial witness, was never examined.
He said both the victim and PW-2 failed to identify the appellant on oath despite knowing him earlier, that both admitted his name came from PW-1, and that the victim’s admission of being instructed by the prosecutor showed tutoring. He also pointed to the inconsistent accounts of the appellant’s relationship with the family, the absence of independent corroboration, and a proved alibi that the courts below ignored.
Advocate General Amit Kumar, for the State of Meghalaya, relied on the Section 164 CrPC (Section 183 BNSS) statements of the victim and PW-2, recorded by a Magistrate when the incident was fresh. He submitted that the victim’s inability to identify the accused about two years later was explained by her condition and the passage of time. He further argued that the appellant, seen near the house while the child was alone, bore the burden under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Section 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023].
Victim’s Failure to Identify the Accused Raises Serious Doubts
Because the conviction rested primarily on a child witness with mental disability, the Bench undertook a “minute re-appreciation” of the evidence. It accepted that a mentally challenged victim must be given some latitude, but found that even after due deference there was a complete failure of the victim to identify the accused before the court.
In her examination-in-chief, the victim called the accused her uncle, the eldest brother of her father. In cross-examination, she said she had forgotten his face, could not remember the person who came to her house, and could not identify him now. The Court noted that the prosecution made no attempt to have her identify him in examination-in-chief. The defence took the risk of asking about identity and elicited a negative answer, yet neither the Public Prosecutor nor the Presiding Officer re-examined her to resolve the anomaly, and no one confronted her with her Section 164 CrPC (Section 183 BNSS) statement.
With no scientific corroboration available because of the delay, the Court held it “unsafe to rely upon” her testimony to sustain the conviction.
Alleged Tutoring and Contradictions in Witness Testimonies
The victim admitted in cross-examination that she had met the Special Prosecutor before testifying and had been told what to say, and that her mother had told her the accused’s name. The Court held that this, coupled with her identification failure, “creates a doubt” that she may have been tutored to depose against the appellant.
PW-2 was equally unhelpful to the prosecution. She first said she saw the victim and the accused eating betel nut at the house, but in cross-examination she said she did not know the accused, would not recognise him, and had been given the name by PW-1. In re-examination she called her earlier statement incorrect and could not identify the accused in the courtroom. The Court observed that the Public Prosecutor made no effort to confront her with her Section 164 CrPC (Section 183 BNSS) statement, and held that her admissions struck at the foundation of her testimony.
The relationship evidence was also inconsistent. The victim described the accused as her father’s eldest brother, while PW-1 described him as the husband of her brother’s sister-in-law. The Court found this significant because PW-2 and PW-4 both admitted that PW-1 had supplied the name. PW-1’s own conduct, including her failure to act on PW-2’s report or physically check her daughter, was termed “very unnatural”.
Delay in FIR and Material Omissions Weaken Prosecution Case
The Court accepted that an FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia, but held that omission of a material incriminating fact forming the foundation of the prosecution case assumes considerable significance. A material improvement at trial calls for closer scrutiny, and an unexplained omission may cost the later version much of its evidentiary force.
It drew support from two precedents:
- Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 137: non-mention in the FIR of essential facts known to the informant points towards suspicion.
- Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1026: omissions of important facts affecting the probabilities of the case are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act (Section 10 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) in judging the veracity of the prosecution case.
Applying these principles, the Bench noted that the FIR, lodged after ten days, mentioned neither that PW-1 had seen the accused in the garden nor that PW-2 had informed her of the incident the next day. Had these facts occurred as projected at trial, there was no reason for them not to appear in the FIR. The improvements made by PW-1 in evidence rendered her testimony “highly doubtful and unsafe”.
Non-Examination of Key Witness Warrants Adverse Inference
The prosecution’s own case was that the victim’s disclosure to her teacher, Ms. Princely, led to the FIR. Yet the teacher was never examined, and no explanation was offered.
The Court reiterated that the prosecution need not examine every cited witness, but must examine those whose evidence goes to the root of the matter. Where a material witness who can throw light on the genesis of the occurrence is withheld without a plausible explanation, an adverse inference is justified. It relied on the three-Judge Bench decision in Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, (2001) 6 SCC 145, which holds that withholding an available material witness obliges the court to draw an adverse inference.
The teacher’s evidence, the Bench said, would have shown the exact nature of the child’s disclosure and the reason for the delay. “In the specific facts of the present case,” the omission persuaded it to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution.
Denial of Effective Cross-Examination of Medical Witnesses
The Court found a serious procedural lapse at trial. When the medical jurist, Dr. E. Shullet (PW-3), was to be cross-examined, the defence counsel was out of station. The accused said only his counsel could cross-examine effectively, but the trial court neither arranged legal aid nor deferred the cross-examination.
The Bench held that PW-3’s testimony remained untested, not on account of any waiver by the accused, but because his counsel was unavailable that day. For Dr. W. Nongtdu (PW-8), it found that the trial court did not even offer the defence an opportunity to cross-examine. It concluded that the testimony of both medical witnesses could not be read in evidence.
The Court acknowledged that PW-3’s partial deposition indicated genital injuries suggestive of sexual assault, but the untested testimony could not be relied upon.
Last-Seen Theory Cannot Shift Burden of Proof to Accused
The Court described the State’s Section 106 of the Evidence Act [Section 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023] argument as “absolutely farfetched and unconvincing”. It noted that the last-seen theory was a material improvement on the FIR, which contained no such allegation.
Even in her sworn testimony, PW-1 said only that she saw the accused plucking mulberry leaves in the garden before leaving for Sutanga. She nowhere stated that the victim was with him or that the two were seen together at any point. The circumstance of the accused and victim being last seen together was therefore not established, and there was no question of shifting the burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act [Section 109 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023].
PW-1 had also said in cross-examination that the accused came around 4:00 pm but did not enter the house that day.
Defence Plea of Alibi and Failure to Prove Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt
The Court found the accused “very candid in his defence plea”. He took the risk of putting the identification question to the victim, then pleaded alibi, entering the witness box and examining three more witnesses, supported by a documentary exhibit (D-Exh. 1). After examining the defence witnesses and documents, the Bench found credible evidence proving the alibi and held that the trial court and High Court had too lightly brushed it aside. Its summary records that the defence evidence indicated the accused had gone to another village in connection with a property transaction.
The acquittal, however, rested on cumulative reasoning rather than one lapse. The Court listed the following circumstances as creating serious doubt:
- the unnatural conduct of the victim’s mother, coupled with the significant delay in lodging the FIR;
- the failure of the victim and her cousin to identify the accused before the court;
- contradictory versions of the accused’s relationship with the victim’s family;
- non-examination of the teacher, Ms. Princely; and
- defence evidence of the accused having gone to another village.
Cumulatively, these made it “wholly unsafe to sustain the conviction”. The failure to identify the accused, standing alone, was not the sole basis of the decision.
Supreme Court Sets Aside POCSO Conviction and Acquits Accused
The Bench held that the prosecution had failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the courts below erred in relying on the “wavering testimony” of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4. It set aside the conviction and sentence dated 7 December 2021 and the High Court’s judgment dated 29 March 2022, allowed the appeal, acquitted the appellant, and directed his release forthwith if not wanted in any other case.
The ruling does not dilute the sensitivity owed to child victims; the Court expressly allowed latitude in assessing the evidence of a mentally challenged witness. What it affirms is that this latitude does not relax the standard of proof. Where a POCSO conviction rests largely on a child witness, the identity of the accused must still be proved by reliable evidence that withstands scrutiny alongside the surrounding circumstances.
The decision also points to practical safeguards: prosecutors should ensure identification in court and confront witnesses with earlier statements, material witnesses should not be withheld, and the accused must get an effective opportunity to cross-examine, including through legal aid or deferral where counsel is absent.
Important Link
Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams