Allahabad High Court has clarified that conversion to another religion does not, by itself, automatically extinguish a person’s Scheduled Tribe status. Unlike the constitutional framework relating to Scheduled Castes, the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 does not prescribe a religion-based exclusion. The decisive question is whether, despite conversion or a change in religious identity, the person continues to retain the essential attributes of tribal identity and remains connected with and accepted by the concerned tribal community.
While recognising the principle that conversion per se cannot terminate Scheduled Tribe status, the Court ultimately dismissed the petitions. On the facts, it found that the petitioner had failed to establish that she continued to possess the requisite Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe identity on the dates when the disputed lands were purchased.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Nanhki @ Naimunnisha, a resident of Village Korchi, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, claimed that she belonged by birth to the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe. She stated that she was the daughter of Mahaveer, who belonged to the Bhuiyan community, and relied upon a Scheduled Tribe certificate issued by the Tehsildar, Duddhi.
She subsequently purchased agricultural lands situated in Village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, through registered sale deeds. According to her, the vendors belonged to the Gour Scheduled Tribe. Her case, therefore, was that the transactions were transfers between persons belonging to Scheduled Tribes and did not violate the statutory restrictions governing alienation of tribal land.
The registered sale deeds remained unchallenged for several years and revenue entries were also made in the petitioner’s favour.
The dispute arose when proceedings were initiated under Sections 104 and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006. On January 22, 2026, the Deputy Collector, Duddhi held the transfers to be in violation of the statutory restrictions governing transfer of land belonging to Scheduled Tribes and declared the transactions void, with consequential vesting of the land in the State Government.
Three separate sale deeds were involved in the connected petitions, dated November 4, 2011, July 25, 2017 and November 26, 2018.
Aggrieved, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner disputed the allegation that she had converted to Islam. She maintained that she continued to belong to the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe and had neither abandoned her original identity nor severed her relationship with the tribal community.
It was argued that merely marrying Sirajuddin according to Islamic rites, adopting another name, or being described as Muslim in certain documents could not conclusively prove that she had ceased to be a member of the Scheduled Tribe. According to the petitioner, she continued to reside in her village and follow the customs of the Bhuiyan community.
A significant legal argument raised by the petitioner concerned the distinction between the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.
It was contended that there is no provision in the Scheduled Tribes Order comparable to paragraph 3 of the Scheduled Castes Order that imposes a religion-based restriction. Therefore, even assuming that she had adopted another religion, such conversion could not automatically destroy a status acquired by birth.
Reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 3 SCC 400, to contend that a status acquired by birth is not ordinarily displaced merely by marriage with a person belonging to another community.
The petitioner further relied upon the Scheduled Tribe certificate issued in her favour. She argued that the State could not simply disregard a certificate issued by its own competent authority, particularly when it had never been cancelled.
Another objection concerned the considerable delay in initiating proceedings. The transactions dated back to 2011–2018, whereas the statutory notice was issued only in December 2025. The petitioner argued that concluded registered transactions could not be reopened after such a long period, particularly when the caste status of the parties had been disclosed in the instruments themselves.
State’s Contentions
The State initially objected to the maintainability of the writ petitions on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy under Section 210 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code.
On merits, however, its principal contention was that the case involved much more than an inter-religious marriage.
The State relied upon inquiry reports, statements, identity documents and the family register. It contended that Nanhki had married Sirajuddin according to Islamic rites, subsequently became known as Naimunnisha, lived with him for decades and had two children bearing Muslim names. The family register also recorded her religion as Muslim.
According to the State, these circumstances demonstrated a prolonged adoption of a different religious and social identity.
More importantly, it argued that the petitioner had failed to produce substantive evidence showing that she continued to observe Bhuiyan customs and traditions, participate in the tribe’s community life or remain recognised and accepted by members of the Bhuiyan community.
Reliance was placed upon State of Kerala v. Chandramohanan, (2004) 3 SCC 429, and Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others, 2026 (3) Supreme 514.
The State argued that conversion may not automatically terminate tribal status, but where the evidence establishes complete severance from tribal customs and assimilation into another religious and social identity, the claimant may cease to be regarded as part of the tribe.
Alternative Remedy Not an Absolute Bar
Before examining the central controversy, the High Court dealt with the State’s objection regarding the availability of a statutory revision under Section 210 of the Revenue Code.
The Court reiterated that the existence of an efficacious alternative remedy ordinarily persuades a constitutional court to exercise restraint under Article 226. However, the rule is one of discretion rather than an absolute jurisdictional prohibition.
In the present case, important questions arose concerning the statutory regime applicable to transactions predating the relevant provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code and, more significantly, the legal test for determining whether a person born into a Scheduled Tribe continued to possess that status after an alleged change in religious and social identity.
The Court therefore considered it appropriate to decide the matter on merits instead of relegating the petitioner to the revisional remedy.
Conversion Does Not Automatically Extinguish Scheduled Tribe Status
The central legal finding of the judgment concerns the effect of religious conversion upon Scheduled Tribe status. The High Court expressly accepted, though “to that limited extent”, the petitioner’s submission that mere conversion to another religion does not by itself automatically extinguish Scheduled Tribe status.
Referring to State of Kerala v. Chandramohanan, the Court observed that no broad proposition can be laid down that a person ceases to be a member of a Scheduled Tribe merely because of a change of religion.
Instead, the issue is fundamentally one of fact. The Court held that the inquiry must focus upon factors such as:
- continuing tribal traits and customs;
- observance of tribal traditions;
- customary practices;
- social organisation and community life;
- continuing connection with the tribal community; and
- recognition and acceptance by the concerned tribe.
The Court further relied upon Chinthada Anand to note that the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 does not prescribe a religion-based exclusion.
Accordingly, conversion cannot be treated as an inflexible legal rule resulting in automatic extinction of Scheduled Tribe status. Whether the status continues must be determined from the facts and evidence in each individual case.
This distinction is significant because tribal identity, in constitutional law, cannot be reduced solely to an individual’s formal religious affiliation.
Continuing Tribal Identity Is the Determinative Test
The Court, however, made it equally clear that birth in a Scheduled Tribe is not necessarily the end of the inquiry when subsequent circumstances raise a genuine question about continuing tribal affiliation.
The relevant question in the present case was whether Nanhki @ Naimunnisha continued to retain the attributes and community affiliation necessary to constitute membership of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe on the dates of the disputed transactions.
The High Court distinguished Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika. That decision primarily concerned the status of a child born from an inter-community marriage and considered factors such as upbringing, social circumstances and community acceptance.
Although the judgment supported the broader principle that tribal identity cannot be determined through an inflexible formula, the High Court found that the present controversy was more directly governed by the principles concerning conversion and continuing tribal identity laid down in Chandramohanan and Chinthada Anand.
Why the Petitioner Failed on Facts
The State’s case was not founded merely upon the petitioner’s marriage to a Muslim man. The Court considered the cumulative circumstances extending over several decades: her marriage to Sirajuddin, subsequent identity as Naimunnisha, prolonged family life with him, the names of her children, the entry regarding religion in the family register and other inquiry material.
The Court was careful to state that none of these circumstances, individually, could conclusively determine the petitioner’s Scheduled Tribe status. Nevertheless, they could not be ignored while determining whether her tribal identity continued.
What proved particularly significant was the absence of convincing evidence demonstrating her continuing connection with the Bhuiyan community.
The petitioner failed to produce sufficient material establishing that she continued to follow Bhuiyan customs and traditions, participate in the social and community life of the tribe, or remain recognised and accepted by the community.
The Court clarified that a claimant cannot be expected to prove observance of every tribal custom throughout her life. Nor can a single document describing a person as belonging to another religion determine the issue.
The conclusion must instead emerge from the cumulative evidence concerning continuing tribal life and affiliation.
Scheduled Tribe Certificate Is Relevant but Not Conclusive
Another important aspect of the judgment concerns the evidentiary value of a Scheduled Tribe certificate. The Court acknowledged that such a certificate issued by a competent authority is undoubtedly relevant evidence. However, it held that the certificate cannot foreclose an inquiry into the underlying question of continuing tribal status where subsequent material raises legitimate questions regarding that status.
In the present case, the respondents alleged that while obtaining the certificate, the petitioner relied upon her parentage and tribal origin without disclosing her long-standing marriage, subsequent name and changed religious and social circumstances.
The High Court therefore declined to treat the certificate as conclusive proof that she possessed Scheduled Tribe status on each of the relevant dates.
Similarly, recitals in registered sale deeds describing the purchaser as belonging to a Scheduled Tribe could constitute evidence of such a representation, but could not themselves confer statutory status upon a person who otherwise did not possess it.
Which Land Law Applied?
The Court also addressed an important temporal issue regarding the applicable land law. The transactions had been executed between November 4, 2011 and November 26, 2018. The Court held that their validity had to be examined under the statutory regime governing the respective dates of transfer and that provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code could not simply be applied retrospectively.
Accordingly, the Court examined the transfers with reference to Section 157-B read with Sections 166 and 167 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.
Section 157-B imposed restrictions upon the transfer of land by a bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person who did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. Consequently, the petitioner’s Scheduled Tribe status on the respective dates of acquisition became crucial.
The Court further relied upon Additional Commissioner, Revenue v. Akhlaq Hussain, (2020) 4 SCC 507, for the principle that registration, payment of stamp duty or the manner in which a transaction is structured cannot validate a transfer prohibited by statute.
Delay Cannot Validate a Void Transfer
The petitioner had emphasised that the revenue authorities initiated proceedings many years after the transactions.
The Court rejected delay as an independent ground for validating the transfers.
Where a transaction violates a protective statutory prohibition and is consequently void, mere passage of time, continued possession or mutation in revenue records cannot convert it into a valid transaction.
The protective object of restrictions governing tribal land would otherwise be defeated merely because an unlawful transaction remained undisturbed for several years.
Final Decision
On cumulative consideration of the evidence, the Allahabad High Court held that the petitioner had failed to establish that she continued to possess Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe status on the respective dates of the disputed sale deeds.
Importantly, the Court expressly clarified that its conclusion was not based merely upon:
- her marriage with Sirajuddin;
- the allegation of religious conversion; or
- the isolated entry describing her religion as Muslim.
Instead, it was based upon the prolonged circumstances concerning her subsequent family, religious and social identity, together with the absence of convincing evidence showing continued adherence to Bhuiyan customs, participation in tribal community life and acceptance by the Bhuiyan community.
Since she failed to establish the requisite Scheduled Tribe status on the relevant dates, the transfers were held to fall within the statutory prohibition. Registration of the sale deeds, revenue entries, possession or passage of time could not override the consequences prescribed by law.
Finding no jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226, the High Court dismissed all the connected writ petitions and affirmed the orders dated January 22, 2026 passed by the Deputy Collector, Duddhi.
Conclusion
The decision in Nanhki @ Naimunnisha v. State of U.P. and Others draws an important distinction between religious conversion and loss of tribal identity. Conversion, inter-religious marriage, adoption of a different name or a document recording another religion cannot individually operate as an automatic statutory disqualification from Scheduled Tribe status.
The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 does not make membership of a Scheduled Tribe dependent upon adherence to a particular religion. Therefore, the question cannot be answered merely by asking whether a person has converted.
At the same time, Scheduled Tribe status involves more than ancestry viewed in isolation when the claimant’s continuing membership is specifically disputed on the evidence. Courts may examine whether the person continues to retain a meaningful connection with tribal customs, traditions, social organisation and community life, as well as whether the person continues to be accepted by the concerned tribal community.
The ruling therefore establishes a fact-sensitive approach: conversion alone cannot extinguish Scheduled Tribe status, but continuing tribal identity and community affiliation remain central to determining whether that status survives in a particular case.
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