The Supreme Court clarified that the availability of revision under Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS) does not bar the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS). It also held that an opportunity notice under Section 61(2) of FERA is mandatory before prosecution and that prolonged criminal proceedings may violate the right to a speedy trial under Article 21.
Title of the Case: Standard Chartered Bank & Anr. v. Enforcement Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs & Anr.
Citation: 2026 INSC 727
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra
Decision Date: 21 July 2026
Facts of the Case
The appellant, Standard Chartered Bank, was an authorised dealer in foreign exchange under FERA, while the second appellant was an officer responsible for the conduct of the bank’s foreign exchange business.
The prosecution alleged that during 1991–1992 the appellants facilitated foreign remittances through the bank’s Vostro Account maintained at its Mumbai branch. According to the Enforcement Directorate, banker’s cheques and drafts purchased in India through proxy purchasers were forwarded through the bank’s overseas offices and credited for the benefit of Indo International Corporation Ltd., a person resident outside India.
Subsequently, the bank itself discovered that these remittances were inconsistent with the Exchange Control Regulations.
It reversed the entries, blocked the amount of approximately Rs. 30 lakhs, and surrendered the entire amount to the Enforcement Directorate pursuant to directions issued under Section 33(2) of FERA. Despite the reversal of the transactions and surrender of the funds, criminal complaints were filed alleging unauthorised credit of foreign exchange in violation of Sections 56(1) and 73(3) of FERA.
Procedural History
- The alleged transactions occurred in 1991-92.
- Criminal complaints were instituted on 30 May 2002, almost ten years later.
- The Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons.
- The appellants challenged the complaints before the Bombay High Court under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) seeking quashing.
- The High Court dismissed the petitions principally holding that since a revision under Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS) was available, petitions under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) were not maintainable.
- The matter reached the Supreme Court by way of criminal appeals.
Issues before the Supreme Court
The Court framed three principal questions:
- Whether availability of revision under Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS) bars a petition under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS).
- Whether failure to comply with the mandatory opportunity notice under the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA invalidates the prosecution.
- Whether the extraordinary delay violated the appellants’ fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21.
Arguments of the Appellants
The appellants contended that:
- The High Court wrongly dismissed their petition merely because an alternative remedy under Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS) existed.
- Section 61(2) of FERA makes issuance of an opportunity notice mandatory before filing a criminal complaint.
- No such notice had ever been served.
- No copy of the alleged notice was produced before the Magistrate.
- There had been nearly ten years’ delay in investigation and another ten years without commencement of trial, violating Article 21.
- Even after decades, the prosecution had failed to produce supporting documentary evidence.
Arguments of the Respondents
The Enforcement Directorate argued that:
- The High Court had considered the matter on merits despite discussing maintainability.
- Delay was substantially attributable to the appellants themselves because they did not initially appear before the Trial Court after service of summons.
- Speedy trial is violated only where there is intentional delay by the prosecution.
- No deliberate delay on the part of the department had been established.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in treating the availability of revision under Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS) as a threshold bar to invoking Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS). Relying upon Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan, and Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben, the Court reiterated that Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.
The Court clarified that Sections 397 and 482 CrPC (Sections 438 and 528 BNSS) operate in distinct spheres. Even where a revision is maintainable, the High Court retains its inherent jurisdiction. Further, the nomenclature of a petition is immaterial, and the High Court may convert a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) into one under Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS) if justice so requires. Consequently, the High Court’s refusal to entertain the petitions solely on the ground of alternative remedy was legally unsustainable.
II. Mandatory Nature of Opportunity Notice under Section 61(2) FERA
The Court examined the statutory scheme of Section 61 of FERA and emphasised that the proviso expressly prohibits the institution of a complaint unless the proposed accused has first been given an opportunity to show that the necessary permission existed.
Surveying several decisions of the Delhi High Court, including Devashis Bhattacharya, Sanjay Malviya, United India Airways Ltd., and Shilpi Modes, the Supreme Court observed that this requirement is mandatory and embodies the principles of natural justice. The opportunity must be genuine, meaningful and adequate rather than a mere procedural formality.
The burden lies upon the prosecution to establish that the opportunity notice was properly issued and served. Equally, before taking cognizance, the Magistrate must satisfy himself regarding compliance with this statutory pre-condition. Failure to do so renders the proceedings legally unsustainable.
III. Application to the Present Case
Applying the above principles, the Supreme Court found that the respondents had merely asserted that an opportunity notice had been issued but had failed to disclose its date, produce a copy of the notice, or furnish any proof of service. Despite opportunities granted by the Supreme Court itself, no such material was ever placed on record.
The Magistrate had taken cognizance without recording any satisfaction regarding compliance with Section 61(2), while the High Court failed to examine this fundamental defect altogether.
The Court therefore concluded that the mandatory statutory safeguard had not been complied with and that the prosecution was initiated in violation of both Section 61(2) of FERA and the principles of natural justice.
IV. Right to Speedy Trial
Although the findings on the first two issues were sufficient to dispose of the appeals, the Court proceeded to consider the constitutional question relating to Article 21.
Relying upon Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, and Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court reiterated that the right to a speedy trial extends to every stage of criminal proceedings, including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision.
The Court observed that more than three decades had elapsed since the alleged transactions and more than twenty-three years had passed after institution of the complaints, yet the proceedings had not progressed beyond the stage of summons. Such extraordinary delay could not be justified merely by reference to systemic factors and effectively kept the appellants in a prolonged state of uncertainty. The continuation of criminal proceedings in these circumstances was incompatible with the guarantee of fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21.
Judgment
The Supreme Court allowed both criminal appeals. It held that:
- the Bombay High Court erred in refusing to entertain the petitions under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) on the ground of availability of revision under Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS);
- compliance with the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA is mandatory before prosecution can be instituted;
- the respondents failed to establish issuance and service of the mandatory opportunity notice;
- the Magistrate illegally took cognizance without satisfying himself regarding compliance with the statutory requirement; and
- the prolonged pendency of the prosecution also offended the appellants’ right to a speedy trial under Article 21.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court, quashed the criminal complaints, the order taking cognizance, and the summoning orders, thereby terminating the criminal proceedings against the appellants.
Conclusion
The judgment in Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer is a significant reaffirmation of procedural safeguards in criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court made it clear that statutory requirements enacted to protect individuals from arbitrary prosecution cannot be diluted or treated as technical formalities. Before launching a criminal prosecution under FERA, the Enforcement Directorate must strictly comply with the mandatory opportunity notice contemplated under Section 61(2), and the Magistrate must independently verify such compliance before taking cognizance.
Equally important is the Court’s reaffirmation that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) remains available notwithstanding the existence of a revisional remedy under Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS). Finally, the judgment reinforces that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is not an abstract ideal but an enforceable fundamental right. Criminal proceedings allowed to remain pending for decades without meaningful progress undermine the fairness of the justice system and justify judicial intervention to prevent abuse of the legal process.
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