Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya concerned the proof of a victim’s age under the POCSO Act and whether an accused could be convicted for rape under Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS) despite no specific charge being framed. The Supreme Court held that the victim’s minority was not proved as required under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, as the Baptismal Certificate alone was insufficient. However, since the evidence independently established rape and the ingredients of Section 3 POCSO Act and Section 375 IPC (Section 63 BNS) substantially overlapped, the Court held that the accused could still be convicted under Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS), provided no prejudice or failure of justice was caused.
Title of Case: Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria
Factual Background
The case originated from an incident dated 26 November 2019. On the following day, the victim’s mother lodged an FIR alleging that her 13-year-old daughter had been raped at Mokoidaling, Sutnga, East Jaintia Hills, Meghalaya, by the appellant, Pynchemalangaki Bareh.
The Khliehriat Women Police Station registered a case under Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed, and the case was committed to the Special Judge (POCSO). Charges were framed against the appellant under Section 506 IPC (Section 351 BNS) for criminal intimidation and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act for penetrative sexual assault.
During the trial, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses and produced several material exhibits. The victim’s statement under Section 164 CrPC (Section 183 BNSS) was also recorded. The appellant denied the allegations but did not lead any defence evidence.
The Trial Court found the prosecution witnesses reliable and convicted the appellant. It treated the victim as being 13 years old primarily on the basis of her mother’s testimony, a Baptismal Certificate and the medical material.
The appellant was sentenced to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000 under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. He was additionally sentenced to two years’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 506 IPC (Section 351 BNS). The Meghalaya High Court dismissed his criminal appeal on 8 July 2024 and affirmed both the conviction and sentence. The appellant thereafter approached the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Appellant
The principal challenge before the Supreme Court concerned proof of the victim’s age. The appellant argued that the prosecution had not proved that the victim was below 18 years in accordance with Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act. Reliance was placed particularly on the Supreme Court’s decision in P. Yuvaprakash v. State.
The prosecution had relied substantially upon a Baptismal Certificate dated 18 September 2016 recording the victim’s date of birth as 5 March 2006. The defence argued that the Church Minister who issued or maintained the relevant record had not been examined and there was no evidence explaining the basis on which the date of birth had originally been recorded. The certificate had merely been marked as “Papermark-I” rather than formally exhibited.
It was also emphasised that the Investigating Officer had neither collected the statutorily recognised documents concerning the victim’s age nor subjected her to an ossification or other medical age-determination test. The defence therefore contended that the mandatory mechanism prescribed under Section 94 had not been followed.
The appellant further questioned inconsistencies in the victim’s statements and argued that the forensic evidence did not adequately corroborate the prosecution case. It was contended that no seminal stains had been detected in certain samples and no DNA analysis had conclusively connected the biological material found on the victim’s clothes with the appellant.
Arguments of the State
The State of Meghalaya defended the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court. It argued that the victim’s age stood established by the Baptismal Certificate, her mother’s testimony and medical evidence.
The State maintained that the Baptismal Certificate recorded the victim’s date of birth as 5 March 2006, making her approximately 13 years old at the time of the incident. It also relied upon the medical record noting that the victim had not attained menarche.
The State further argued that the victim’s testimony remained consistent on the essential elements of the occurrence: the appellant dragged her into bushes, threatened her, sexually assaulted her, and she struck him with a stone before escaping. According to the State, minor discrepancies did not undermine the core prosecution case.
The State also relied upon medical and forensic evidence, including the victim’s injuries, the appellant’s forehead injury and the presence of human blood on the victim’s clothing.
Issues Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court formulated two principal issues:
- Whether the victim’s minority had been legally proved so as to sustain the appellant’s conviction under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act; and
- If minority had not been proved in accordance with law, whether the appellant could nevertheless be convicted for rape under Section 376(1) IPC (Section 64 BNS).
Determination of the Victim’s Age
The Supreme Court examined the law governing determination of age in considerable detail. It referred to Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, where the Court had held that the statutory mechanism under the Juvenile Justice framework for determining the age of a child in conflict with law could also be used for determining the age of a child victim.
The Court then considered P. Yuvaprakash v. State, which specifically dealt with a POCSO prosecution. In that decision, the Supreme Court had held that where a dispute concerning the age of a POCSO victim arises, courts must follow the steps contained in Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act.
Under Section 94(2), preference is given to the date-of-birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the examination board. In their absence, a birth certificate issued by a corporation, municipal authority or panchayat may be considered. Only when these documents are unavailable can age be determined through an ossification test or another recognised medical age-determination test.
Applying these principles, the Court found a significant deficiency in the investigation. The Investigating Officer had not obtained the victim’s school birth certificate, matriculation or equivalent certificate, or a birth certificate from a corporation, municipality or panchayat. Nor had the victim been subjected to an ossification test or any other medical age-determination procedure.
The only documentary material relied upon for determining age was the Baptismal Certificate issued by the Khasi Jaintia Presbyterian Assembly. Although the date of birth mentioned in it was supported by the victim’s mother, the Supreme Court held that a Baptismal Certificate was not one of the documents prescribed under Section 94.
Accordingly, the prosecution had failed to establish the victim’s age in the manner required by law. The State’s reliance on Luis Caetano Viegas v. Estrelina Mariana R.M.A. Da’Costa was rejected. The Supreme Court distinguished that decision because it concerned inheritance proceedings and involved a birth certificate in addition to baptismal records. More importantly, the present case concerned determination of the age of a POCSO victim, for which a specific statutory mechanism exists under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act.
Thus, the conviction based upon the victim being a child for the purposes of the POCSO Act could not stand.
Failure to Prove Minority Did Not Disprove Rape
The Court then drew an important distinction between failure to prove the victim’s minority and failure to prove the sexual assault itself.
It found that the factum of rape was clearly established through the evidence. Failure to establish the victim’s age according to the statutory procedure did not automatically negate the evidence proving the commission of sexual intercourse constituting rape.
This led to the second major question: could the appellant be convicted under Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS) when the Trial Court had not framed a charge under that provision?
Conviction Under Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS) Without a Separate Charge
The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative. The Court observed that the Trial Court ought to have been careful enough to frame an alternative charge under Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS), particularly when the allegations prima facie disclosed rape. Nevertheless, omission to frame such a charge did not necessarily absolve the accused.
Section 464(1) CrPC (Section 510 of BNSS) provides that a finding, sentence or order of a competent court does not become invalid merely because no charge was framed, or because of an error or irregularity in the charge, unless such omission or irregularity has actually occasioned a failure of justice.
The Court compared Section 375 IPC (Section 63 BNS) with Section 3 of the POCSO Act and found that the actus reus constituting rape and penetrative sexual assault was essentially the same. The distinguishing element for the POCSO offence was the minority of the victim.
Therefore, where penetrative sexual assault had been proved, but the prosecution failed to establish minority, the POCSO charge could fail while liability under Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS) could still survive.
The crucial test was whether the absence of a formal Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS) charge had prejudiced the appellant or caused a failure of justice.
The Court relied on precedents explaining that procedural rules exist to further justice rather than frustrate it through technicalities. An accused must know the substance of the allegations against him and receive a full and fair opportunity to defend himself. Where those requirements are satisfied, an inconsequential omission in framing charges does not necessarily invalidate the trial.
The Court summarised the relevant considerations as whether the accused:
- knew the basic ingredients of the offence;
- had the material facts sought to be proved against him clearly explained; and
- received a fair opportunity to defend himself.
Accordingly, an appellate or revisional court may convict an accused for an offence for which no formal charge was framed unless such conviction would actually cause a failure of justice.
Appreciation of Evidence
On the evidence, the Supreme Court found sufficient material proving that the appellant had subjected the victim to penetrative sexual assault.
The victim had identified the appellant in all three rounds of the Test Identification Parade. The account that she had struck him with a stone was corroborated by medical evidence showing a cut injury on his forehead.
The Court also considered the forensic material and medical examination of the victim. The medical findings recorded a torn hymen and partial penile penetration of the vagina. The victim’s Section 164 CrPC (Section 183 BNSS) statement further supported the occurrence of sexual intercourse.
The Supreme Court therefore concluded that penetrative sexual assault by the appellant was established. It also found the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC (Section 351 BNS) proved.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal. It held that the prosecution had failed to establish the victim’s minority in accordance with Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act. Consequently, the conviction based on Section 4 of the POCSO Act could not be sustained in its existing form.
At the same time, the Court held that the evidence established rape within the meaning of Section 375 IPC (Section 63 BNS). Since the appellant had been fully afforded an opportunity to defend himself against allegations involving essentially the same acts while facing the POCSO charge, his conviction under Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS) would not cause a failure of justice merely because a separate charge under Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS) had not been framed.
The Court accordingly convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC (Section 64 BNS) and sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000, with an additional six months’ rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of the fine. His conviction and sentence under Section 506 IPC (Section 351 BNS) were maintained. The judgments of the Trial Court and High Court were modified to that extent, and the appeal was partly allowed.