Supreme Court Asked to Clarify Definition of Printed Publication in Patent Law
SCOTUS Petition Questions Scope of Prior Art in AIA IPR Proceedings
Overview of the Legal Dispute
Lynk Labs, a developer of alternating current light-emitting technology, has formally petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concerning the interpretation of prior art in inter partes review proceedings. At the heart of the dispute is whether a U.S. patent application—unpublished until after the critical date of the challenged claims—can nevertheless be treated as a “printed publication” sufficient to invalidate patent claims during IPR at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
The Federal Circuit previously upheld the PTAB’s decision in favour of Samsung, a respondent in the case, affirming that the “Martin” patent application qualified as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102. However, Lynk Labs argues that this interpretation defies both historical precedent and statutory clarity.
Challenging the Federal Circuit’s Interpretation of Section 102
Lynk Labs’ petition for writ of certiorari contends that the Federal Circuit erroneously blended two distinct legal concepts within Section 102. Specifically, the company asserts that the CAFC inappropriately categorized “Martin” as a printed publication for the purpose of establishing the type of prior art, while simultaneously treating it as a patent application for purposes of determining temporal relevance.
According to Lynk Labs, this bifurcated treatment creates a legal contradiction—a “Catch-22”—that undermines over a century of precedent. Historically, courts have consistently required that documents qualify as “printed publications” only if they were publicly available before the date of invention. Under this longstanding interpretation, an unpublished patent application like Martin’s—made public only after the critical date—should not qualify.
Implications for Administrative Law and Legislative Intent
In its petition, Lynk Labs draws a direct line between the CAFC’s current interpretation and a departure from legislative and administrative consistency. The company notes that despite multiple statutory overhauls—most notably the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 and the America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011—Congress has never expanded the definition of “printed publication” under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) to explicitly include U.S. patent applications in the context of IPR.
By contrast, in the 2018 Helsinn v. Teva case, the Supreme Court reinforced adherence to pre-AIA precedent when interpreting similar statutory language. Lynk Labs urges the Court to maintain this interpretive discipline and resist what it calls the CAFC’s “statutory gymnastics,” which in effect erode the boundaries that Congress deliberately set.
The Broader Consequences of the CAFC’s Approach
Beyond the particulars of this case, Lynk Labs raises broader policy and procedural concerns. If the Federal Circuit’s decision stands, the definition of a “printed publication” could become overly elastic, enabling litigants to present virtually any form of documentation—whether publicized before or after the critical date—as valid prior art in IPR proceedings.
Such a shift, Lynk Labs argues, would blur the clear statutory lines that currently differentiate printed publications, patents, and public uses or sales. The petition warns that this reinterpretation risks destabilizing settled expectations around patent validity and could jeopardize substantial district court verdicts based on now-vulnerable patent rights.
The petition also critiques the CAFC for undermining its own 2022 ruling in Qualcomm v. Apple, where the court explicitly rejected the bifurcated analysis of prior art in IPR, reinforcing that both the type and timing of prior art must meet the strict statutory criteria under Section 311(b).
A Call for Judicial Clarification
Ultimately, Lynk Labs is asking the Supreme Court to resolve a fundamental tension in patent law: Can a document simultaneously qualify as a “printed publication” under one statutory clause, while evading the temporal limitations traditionally imposed on such publications?
The stakes are high. The outcome could impact how prior art is evaluated not only in IPR but also across administrative and judicial contexts, with significant financial and strategic implications for patent holders and challengers alike.
Lynk Labs underscores that this issue remains relevant regardless of whether a patent was filed before or after the enactment of the AIA. The statutory distinction between printed publications and patent applications remains clear in both frameworks, and the Court’s intervention is needed to ensure that this clarity is preserved.