While displaying complete zero tolerance approach towards economic offences, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Rakesh Mittal vs Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary and another in Criminal Appeal of 2026 (@ Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 19708 of 2025) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026 INSC 161 that was pronounced as recently as on February 17, 2026 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that the principles governing bail in serious offences apply with equal force to economic crimes, as such offences directly erode the economic well-being and quality life of citizens. It must be laid bare that the Apex Court set aside the order of the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court granting bail to a habitual financial offender accused of cheating a food grain supplier of over Rs 6 crore through forged identity documents and fictitious addresses. It must be noted that after finding that the Lucknow Bench had mechanically extended the parity principle without weighing the accused’s persistent criminal conduct, multiple aliases, prior bail violations and active role as the alleged mastermind, the Apex Court deemed it fit to direct that the bail order could not be sustained on facts or in law.
At the very outset, this robust, remarkable, rational and recent judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Sanjay Kumar for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice K Vinod Chandran sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that, “The appellant is the complainant in FIR No. 0568 dated 29.12.2023, registered under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 , on the file of P.S. Risiya, District Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh. He is aggrieved by the grant of bail to an accused therein., viz., Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary, respondent No.1, vide order dated 12.11.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 9871 of 2025 by a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 while elaborating on the facts of this leading case stating that, “The case of the complainant was that he had supplied foodgrains to the four named accused in the FIR, including respondent No.1, but he was paid only Rs 5,02,57,000/- out of the total sum due and payable to him, i.e., Rs 11,52,38,156/-. He claimed that cheques were issued but when those cheques were presented, they were dishonoured for want of funds. He further claimed that his inquiries had revealed that the accused conspired with each other, prepared forged documents with false and fabricated addresses, including Aadhaar Cards, and had cheated him. Documents were filed in proof of respondent No.1 showing his own name and his father’s name differently on separate occasions.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 that, “When notice was ordered in this matter on 24.11.2025, this Court was informed that respondent No. 1 had not yet been released from prison pursuant to the impugned bail order. Noting the same, this Court directed that, if that be so, the impugned order should not be given effect to. In consequence, respondent No.1 still remains incarcerated.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 5 that, “We may note that respondent No.1, being accused No.1 in the FIR, was arrested only on 08.08.2025 after absconding for over one and a half years. The learned Sessions Judge, Bahraich, rejected his plea for grant of bail, vide order dated 29.08.2025 in Bail Application No. 2512 of 2025. Therein, the learned Sessions Judge, apart from noting various other aspects, found that respondent No.1 had deliberately made a false statement before the Court by suppressing the fact that there were three other FIRs registered against him in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 6 that, “Respondent No.1 then approached the High Court by way of the subject application on 03.09.2025. By the impugned order, the learned Judge noted his plea that he was entitled to parity, as his co-accused, viz., Devender Pal Singh was granted bail on 07.11.2025 and another co-accused, Uma Shankar Mishra, had been granted anticipatory bail even earlier on 18.08.2025. The learned Judge held that, in the light of the co-accused’s bail orders; the period that respondent No.1 had remained in prison; the fact that the chargesheet had been filed; and as the offence was triable by a Magistrate, respondent No.1 was entitled to grant of bail, subject to conditions. This order is the cause for grievance presently.”
It would be worthwhile to note that the Bench notes in para 9 that, “The State pointed out that respondent No.1 had remained a fugitive for more than 20 months since registration of the FIR and despite a picture publication and raids conducted across Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, he remained untraceable until 08.08.2025. It was stated that respondent No.1 was apprehended only after declaration and payment of a reward of ₹51,000/- to facilitate his capture. The State referred to the three known criminal antecedents of respondent No.1 in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. It stated that, insofar as FIR No. 229 of 2017 registered in Delhi was concerned, respondent No.1 had secured bail and did not co-operate thereafter during the trial. Even the address of the surety furnished by him was found to be fictitious. His co-accused, Vijay Pal Gupta @ Jivan Saini, whose real name was found to be Jivan Kaushik, was also arrested on 12.11.2025. According to the State, respondent No.1 had been operating under different names, as he had as many as 8 to 10 aliases with forged Aadhaar cards and PAN card, making it difficult to track and verify his criminal antecedents comprehensively against multiple jurisdictions. The investigation conclusively established that respondent No.1 was the principal offender and the master-mind behind the offence. The State asserted that the High Court had failed to take a holistic view of the matter while directing his release on bail. It was pointed out that even the surety furnished by him in this case was not found at the given address.”
Most significantly and most forthrightly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 19 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Though the observations made in some of the above cases were in the context of heinous offences, which is not the case presently, we may note that the value of life and liberty of members of society is not limited only to their ‘person’ but would also extend to the quality of their life, including their economic well-being. In offences of a pecuniary nature, where innocent people are cheated of their hard-earned monies by conmen, who make it their life’s pursuit to exploit and feast upon the gullibility of others, the afore-stated factors must necessarily be weighed while dealing with the alleged offenders’ pleas for grant of bail.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 20 that, “In the case on hand, the investigation against respondent No.1, as is borne out by the counter affidavit filed by the State, clearly demonstrates that he is a habitual offender. The number of diverse and unconnected aliases, fake IDs and the deliberate changes of identity, including his father’s name, clearly manifest his nefarious intention to dupe innocent victims and cheat them.”
Notably, the Bench points out in para 21 that, “Further, the fact that respondent No.1 was granted bail earlier but chose to indulge in the same activities once again, resulting in the registration of multiple FIRs over the years, demonstrates that he is a career criminal and a menace to society. The impugned order reflects that his past antecedents were not even taken into consideration. Similarly, his conduct in the context of the pending case was not noted. Having secured bail in relation to FIR No. 229 of 2017, respondent No.1 chose to abscond, resulting in issuance of a non-bailable warrant, which also brought to light the fact that his surety was not to be found.”
Quite significantly, the Bench points out in para 22 holding that, “In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have blindly extended the parity principle to him without considering the particular and distinctive features of his individual case. Given the fact that respondent No.1 has not turned over a new leaf, despite the indulgence shown by grant of bail in relation to FIR No. 229 of 2017, as evidenced by the FIRs registered against him over the years, we are of the opinion that letting him loose on society would only pose a risk and hazard to others.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench then hastens to add in para 23 noting precisely that, “The case law cited on behalf of respondent No.1, in the context of the value of liberty and the principles applicable to interference with bail orders, would have to be applied on the strength of the individual facts of each particular case and insofar as the present case is concerned, we find that the same have no application, given his antecedents and his past and present conduct.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding aptly in para 24 that, “The impugned order dated 12.11.2025 passed by the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, granting bail to respondent No.1, therefore, cannot be sustained either on facts or in law. The said order is accordingly set aside. The State shall, however, ensure that the trial in the case is expedited by taking all necessary measures. The appeal is allowed in the afore-stated terms. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.”
Sanjeev Sirohi