
It is definitely most refreshing to note that while displaying pragmatism of the highest order, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Atul Mishra vs Union of India in Writ Petition (C) No. 181 of 2026 that was pronounced just recently on February 19, 2026 in the exercise of its civil original jurisdiction was unambiguous in holding that 75 years into the life of the republic, India cannot afford to treat poetry, satire, films or other forms of art as automatic triggers for communal discord. It was held by the top court that the reasonable restrictions on free speech as provided for in Article 19(2) must remain reasonable and not fanciful and oppressive. It was made indubitably clear by the Apex Court that it is constitutionally impermissible for anybody to vilify and denigrate any community. Plainly speaking, the top court held that, “It is therefore constitutionally impermissible for anybody, be it the State or non-state actors, through any medium, such as, speeches, memes, cartoons, visual arts etc. to vilify and denigrate any community.”
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Ujjal Bhuyan for a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice BV Nagarathna and himself sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The writ petitioner herein is aggrieved by the upcoming film titled “Ghooskhor Pandat”, which according to them equates “Pandat” (a caste within the Hindu society) with “Ghooskhor” (bribe-taker). This, according to the petitioner, creates offensive stereotyping against an identifiable community and violates their right to dignity under Article 21. Therefore, he seeks restraining of the release, screening, or broadcasting of the said film.”
As we see, the Bench then observes in para 2 that, “On 12.02.2026, we had issued notice to the respondents in the Writ Petition. We had also recorded the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that steps are being taken to change the title of the movie.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 6 that, “Paragraph 5 of the affidavit reads as under:
“I respectfully submit that the earlier title, “Ghooskhor Pandit” stands unequivocally withdrawn and shall not be used in any manner whatsoever. While the new title has not yet been finalised, I undertake that any title that may hereafter be identified and adopted shall not be similar to, or evocative of, the earlier title in respect of which objections were raised, and shall accurately reflect the narrative and intent of the film without giving rise to unintended interpretations.””
Do also note, the Bench notes in para 7 that, “We find that respondent No.3 has positively responded to the grievances ventilated by the petitioner before this Court and has by a quick response realised that no purpose may be achieved by a prolonged standoff with the petitioner.”
Do further note, the Bench notes in para 8 that, “We find that the stand taken by respondent No.3 is appropriate having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case. Therefore, we take into consideration paragraph 5 of the affidavit and note that respondent No.3 has decided to change the title of the film from “Ghooskhor Pandat” to any other suitable title.”
As a corollary, the Bench then further directs and holds in para 9 that, “In view of the same, we find that the writ petition would not call for any further consideration and the same stands disposed.”
Most commendably and so also most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 10 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “We also observe that having regard to the positive and conciliatory response of respondent No.3 to this writ petition, it is expected that there should be a quietus given to this controversy in all respects whether in the form of civil or criminal proceedings or in any other form.”
Resultantly and finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 11 that, “In view of the disposal of the writ petition, all pending application(s) including the application for intervention/impleadment stand disposed.”
Be it noted, Hon’ble Mr Justice Ujjal Bhuyan in his separate concurring judgment sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Though in the ordinary course, a separate opinion would not have been warranted in this case in view of the fact that the third respondent has stated on oath that the title of the movie has been withdrawn on the basis of which the writ petition has been closed, however having regard to the larger issue involved, I am of the considered opinion that it would be appropriate to record my views on ink and paper.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 32.1 noting that, “Thus, this Court was clear in enunciating the principle that once the film is granted certificate by the competent statutory Board, unless the said certificate is nullified or modified by any superior authority, the producer or distributor of the film has every right to get it exhibited in a movie hall. Deprecating the activities of any body, group, association or individual seeking to prevent exhibition of a film, this Court was of the opinion that if such activities are encouraged, it would bring in anarchy and cripple the right to freedom of speech and expression.”
It is also worth noting that it is noted in para 33.2 that, “It has been highlighted that the freedoms which are guaranteed by Article 19 are universal. If organized groups threatening such freedom are not restrained, there is a real danger that art and literature would become victims of intolerance. This cannot be countenanced in a free society.”
Most remarkably, it is then pointed out in para 34 that, “Finally, let me revert back to what this Court had said in Imran Pratapgadhi. This Court had said that liberty of thought and expression is one of the ideals of our Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) confers such a fundamental right on all citizens. Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution carves out an exception to the fundamental right guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) of Article 19. Thus, Article 19(2) is an exception to the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). The reasonable restriction provided for in Article 19(2) must remain reasonable and not fanciful and oppressive. Article 19(2) cannot be allowed to overshadow the substantive rights under Article 19(1) including the right to freedom of speech and expression.
34.1. Turning to the courts, the Bench declared that courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may not like spoken or written words. But still it is the duty of the Judges of the constitutional courts to uphold the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a). Constitutional courts must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens, including the freedom of speech and expression which is one of the most cherished rights a citizen can have in a liberal constitutional democracy. The Bench cautioned that courts must not be seen to regulate or stifle the freedom of speech and expression. The Bench held as under:
49. The Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may not like spoken or written words. But, still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). We Judges are also under an obligation to uphold the Constitution and respect its ideals. If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights. There is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.
50. Courts, particularly the Constitutional Courts, must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the bounden duty of the Courts to ensure that the Constitution and the ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon. Endeavour of the courts should always be to protect and promote the fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech and expression, which is one of the most cherished rights a citizen can have in a liberal constitutional democracy. The Courts must not be seen to regulate or stifle the freedom of speech and expression. As a matter of fact, the Courts must remain ever vigilant to thwart any attempt to undermine the Constitution and the constitutional values, including the freedom of speech and expression.
34.2. In the said case, this Court while closing also observed as under:
53.9. 75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society.
34.3. This would equally apply to the title of a movie as well. I say this and no more.”
In his concluding para, Hon’ble Mr Justice Ujjal Bhuyyan then aptly concludes by reaffirming and stating upfront that, “Though no adjudication was called for in this case, I felt it necessary to restate the first principles, lest there remain any lingering misconception.”
Sanjeev Sirohi