It is entirely in the fitness of things that while striking the right chord, the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Nitesh Rastogi Vs State of UP Thru. Addl. Chief Secy/Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and 2 others in Application U/s 482 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:AHC-LKO:89that was reserved on 15.11.2025 and then finally pronounced on 05.02.2026 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) does not possess the statutory authority to transfer a criminal case from one court to another upon an application moved by a party. It is high time that judicial officers who are CJM must without fail pay heed to what the Single Judge Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held so very clearly, cogently and convincingly in this leading case and abide fully and firmly by it. There can be just no denying or disputing it!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Tej Pratap Tiwari of Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present petition has been filed under section 528 BNSS to quash/set aside impugned Transfer Order dated 10.10.2025 passed by learned court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow whereby, trial of the Criminal case no. 6148/2022 “State vs. Bijendra Pal Singh and other” has been transferred from the court of Judicial Magistrate 1st (A.T.S.), Lucknow to the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate 1st, Lucknow.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while elaborating on the factual matrix comprising the facts of the case stating that, “Shorn of the details, an FIR lodged against opposite party no.2 Bijendra Pal Singh and opposite party no.3 Rajiv Singh alleging fraudulent misappropriation of gold jewellery worth approximately 3,20,00,000/- on 02.09.2021, registered as Case Crime No. 219 of 2021 under Sections 406, 419, 420, 506 IPC, with Sections 170, 467, 468, 471 and 411 IPC added during investigation. On 03.09.2021, the police arrested opposite party no.3 Rajiv Singh and recovered 5 kg 743 gm 90 mg of gold jewellery belonging to the informant firm M/s Mohan Shyam Kalyan Das Jewellers (MJK), along with a forged identity card purporting to be that of an IPS officer. The seized jewellery was released in favour of the informant on 05.10.2021. Subsequent applications moved by opposite party no.3 for recall of the release order were rejected on 29.01.2022, against which he filed Application U/s 482 Cr.P.C. No. 1667 of 2022 before this Court challenging the orders dated 05.10.2021 and 29.01.2022. Meanwhile, the police filed charge sheet on 22.01.2022 and cognizance was taken by the trial court on 08.02.2022.”
As it turned out, the Bench then enunciates in para 3 observing that, “During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, opposite party no.2 and 3 moved an application for transfer of the case from the court of Judicial Magistrate First class (ATS) Lucknow to any other court before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Lucknow, which was rejected by the learned court of Session Judge Lucknow. The opposite party no. 3 preferred an application thereupon the learned trial court which was partially allowed in favour of the accused person and directed to take back the jewellery from the applicant and deposit the same in Malkhana Police Station. Another transfer application was submitted by opposite party no. 2 and 3 before CJM. The learned CJM Lucknow sought a report from the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (ATS) Lucknow where, the trial of the criminal case no. 6148/2022 was pending. On 09.10.2025, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (ATS) Lucknow had submitted the report. After considering the report, the learned CJM Lucknow passed the order dated 10.10.2025 by which the trial of the criminal case was transferred.”
Most significantly, most rationally and so also most remarkably, the Bench encapsulates in para 14 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “The scheme of powers relating to transfer of criminal cases demonstrates the legislative intent with sufficient clarity. Under these provisions, the authority to transfer criminal cases has been expressly conferred upon the Supreme Court, the High Court, and the Court of Session. A careful reading of the statutory framework makes it evident that the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) has not been vested with any power to transfer criminal cases. The hierarchy and subordination prescribed under the Code clearly establish that the CJM is subordinate to the Sessions Judge. Had the Legislature intended to empower the CJM with the authority to transfer cases, such power would have been explicitly provided for in the statute.”
While citing the relevant and recent case law, the Bench points out in para 15 that, “This court choose to rely on the judgment of Sudesh Chhikara v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1641
“The Court referred to Radical Works (P) Ltd. v. Padmanabh T.G., in Crl.P. No. 1291 of 2023, decided on 18-04-2023, Special Railway Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Virendra Kumar Jain, 1999 SCC OnLine MP 357 and Chandrkantbhai Bhaichandbhai Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2015 SCC OnLine Guj 2891 and stated that the Court was of firm view that since the legislature in its own wisdom had conferred the power of the transfer only to Supreme Court, High Courts and the Sessions Court, it could not be given by way of inference to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate. The law of interpretation did not provide interpretation of any provision which in any manner contravened the intention of the legislature. The legislature could have specifically given the power of transfer to the Chief Judicial Magistrate if it would have considered it proper to do
so.””
Be it noted, the Bench then notes in para 19 that, “Although Section 13(2) of the BNSS authorises the CJM to make rules or give special orders, such powers must be exercised strictly in conformity with the Sanhita. These administrative powers cannot override or supplement the explicit statutory framework governing transfer of cases. Any attempt by the CJM to order a transfer, in the absence of statutory authorization, would amount to an excess of jurisdiction.”
It is definitely worth noting and cannot be just glossed over that the Bench notes in para 20 that, “In the instant case, the legality of the impugned order dated 10.10.2025 needs to be tested in the light of the legal provisions and circulars discussed above. If the said order is taken to be an administrative in nature, as it distributes the work among the Judicial Magistrate and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate then learned C.J.M., Lucknow should have taken prior approval of the District Judge as it is mentioned in the Circular No. 198/Admn. (A) dated 10th December, 1976 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (mentioned above) but as per the instructions sought from the learned C.J.M. Lucknow, it is clear that neither prior approval has been taken nor information was given to the learned Session Judge. On the other hand, if the impugned order is said to be passed on judicial side (as said by learned C.J.M. in his report dated 14.11.2025), on the transfer application in Criminal Case No. 6148/2022, then this would be clearly in the absence of statutory authorization and thus, would amount to be passed without having jurisdiction, which does not stands. It is further pertinent to take note that prior to the passing of the impugned order, the transfer application had earlier been filed, considered and rejected by the learned Session Judge, ignoring which the impugned order has been passed.”
As a corollary, the Bench then directs and holds in para 21 that, “In view of the discussions made herein above and the references of the case laws as well as the statutory provisions/circulars referred above, this Court is of the considered view, that the impugned Transfer Order dated 10.10.2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Lucknow under Section 406, 419, 420, 506, 467, 468, 471, 411, 170 IPC, is not in conformity with law, therefore, the said impugned Transfer Order is liable to be set aside and the instant petition deserves to be allowed.”
Resultantly, the Bench then further also directs and holds in para 22 that, “Accordingly, the impugned order dated 10.10.2025 is hereby set aside and the instant petition is allowed.”
Finally and far most commendably, the Bench on a serious note then concludes by precisely directing and holding in para 23 that, “Delving into the importance of the issue raised in the instant matter and taking note of the grave fact that such practice is being followed by most of the District Courts across the State of Uttar Pradesh, the learned Registrar General of this Court is directed to issue an appropriate circular in this regard.”
Sanjeev Sirohi