The Supreme Court of India in Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr. v. Sheesh Ram Saini & Ors. delivered on 10 September 2025, addressed a long-pending dispute involving allegations of abuse of authority and fabrication of records by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) officers. The case highlights the tension between protecting law enforcement officers in the discharge of their duties and ensuring accountability when such officers allegedly misuse their positions.
The judgment, authored by Justice Pankaj Mithal and concurred by Justice Prasanna B. Varale, examined whether the High Court was justified in directing the registration of an FIR against the CBI officers despite the contrary findings of a CBI preliminary inquiry.
This summary analyses the facts, procedural history, issues, arguments, and ratio decidendi, and provides a critical evaluation of the Court’s reasoning.
Factual Background
The appellants in the case were Vinod Kumar Pandey, then Inspector of CBI, and Neeraj Kumar, then Joint Director of CBI. Both were accused of misconduct while discharging official duties on deputation to the agency. Two different complainants approached the Delhi High Court through writ petitions.
The first complaint, filed by Vijay Aggarwal in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 675 of 2001, alleged that Pandey summoned him on multiple occasions despite the existence of a bail order, abused him, and threatened him with dire consequences if his brother did not withdraw a complaint against Neeraj Kumar. The second complaint, filed by Sheesh Ram Saini in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 738 of 2001, alleged that documents were seized by CBI officers on 26 April 2000 without preparing a seizure memo. The memo was prepared only the following day, indicating possible forgery and misconduct.
Both complaints alleged offences under Sections 506, 341, 342, 166, 218, 463, 465, 469, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. These allegations, if true, reflected grave abuse of power by officers of the country’s premier investigative agency.
Proceedings Before the High Court
The complaints were considered by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in 2006. After examining the material, including the preliminary inquiry conducted by the Joint Director of CBI in 2005, the Court found that prima facie cognizable offences were disclosed. The High Court directed the Delhi Police (Special Cell) to register FIRs and investigate the matter through an Assistant Commissioner of Police, without being influenced by the CBI’s internal inquiry report.
The Court specifically noted the irregularity in the seizure memo, observing that the seizure without proper documentation violated procedure and attracted penal consequences. It also recorded that summoning a person despite bail orders and coercing him with threats could not be ignored.
Aggrieved by this, the officers filed Letters Patent Appeals (LPAs) before the Division Bench of the High Court. In 2019, the Division Bench dismissed the LPAs solely on the ground of maintainability, without going into the merits.
Appeals Before the Supreme Court
The officers then approached the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) in 2019. By this time, more than twelve years had passed since the 2006 High Court order. The appellants argued that the delay should be excused because they had been pursuing LPAs in good faith. The Court condoned the delay, emphasising that the appellants were vigilant in protecting their rights and that there was no mala fide in approaching the Supreme Court belatedly.
Issues Before the Court
The Supreme Court had to consider several legal questions:
- Whether the High Court was justified in directing registration of FIR despite the CBI’s inquiry report finding no cognizable offence.
- Whether writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC were maintainable when alternative remedies existed.
- Whether protection under Section 197 CrPC (requiring sanction for prosecution of public servants) or Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act barred prosecution.
- Whether the Special Cell of Delhi Police was the appropriate authority to conduct the investigation.
- Whether a delay of twelve years in filing the appeals should prevent adjudication on merits.
Arguments
Appellants
- Complaints did not disclose cognizable offences; High Court exceeded jurisdiction in ordering FIR.
- Findings of cognizable offences by the High Court prejudiced the investigation, leaving no discretion to the Investigating Officer.
- CBI’s inquiry had already found no offence; the High Court could not substitute its view.
- No specific allegations against Neeraj Kumar; he was wrongly implicated.
- Investigation by Special Cell, which handles terrorism cases, was inappropriate.
- Delay of 12 years in filing SLPs should bar relief.
Respondents
- The complaints clearly disclosed cognizable offences of intimidation, abuse of power, and falsification of records.
- Alternative remedies did not bar writ jurisdiction, especially when police refused to act against CBI officers.
- Section 197 CrPC sanction not required where acts alleged are not reasonably connected with official duty.
- Public servants cannot hide behind institutional protection when accused of abuse of power.
- Delay was justified as appellants pursued LPAs; moreover, the matter involved accountability of CBI officers, which is of public importance.
Additional Solicitor General (for impleadment of CBI)
- CBI should be impleaded since its officers and inquiry report were in question.
- Complaints were barred by limitation and sanction provisions.
- However, the Supreme Court refused impleadment, holding CBI as an institution was not aggrieved; the individuals were.
Court’s Analysis
1. On Delay
Though pursuing LPAs was not a strong reason, the Court condoned the delay since the appellants were vigilant and not negligent.
2. On Preliminary Inquiry by CBI
The Court reiterated Lalita Kumari v. State of UP (2014) 2 SCC 1:
- Registration of FIR is mandatory when a cognizable offence is disclosed.
- Preliminary inquiry is permissible only in limited cases.
- The CBI’s 2005 inquiry report was not binding; it was merely preliminary.
- High Court was right to form a prima facie view based on material.
3. On Cognizable Offences
Seizure Memo: Documents were seized on 26.04.2000, but the memo was prepared only on 27.04.2000. This procedural lapse was not trivial; it suggested falsification of records.
Intimidation & Coercion: Allegations of summoning Vijay Aggarwal despite bail, abuse, threats, and coercion to withdraw a complaint indicated serious misconduct.
These acts went beyond official duty and prima facie constituted cognizable offences.
4. On Alternative Remedy
- Normally, writ petitions should not bypass remedies under Sections 154(3), 156(3) CrPC.
- But where police refused to act against CBI officers, writ jurisdiction was rightly invoked.
- Reliance placed on Ramesh Kumari v. State (2006) 2 SCC 677 and Sakiri Vasu v. State of UP (2008) 2 SCC 409.
5. On Section 197 CrPC and Section 140 Delhi Police Act
- Protection is available only when the act is reasonably connected with official duty.
- Fabricating seizure memos, abusing or intimidating a citizen, or violating bail orders are not official acts.
- Hence, a sanction was not required at the FIR registration stage.
6. On Investigation by Special Cell
Court modified the High Court’s direction:
- Investigation to be done by Delhi Police by an officer not below the rank of ACP.
- Special Cell is reserved for terrorism matters.
7. On Need for Accountability
The Court emphasised: “It is high time that sometimes those who investigate must also be investigated to keep alive the faith of the public at large in the system.”
Justice must not only be done but seen to be done. Failure to investigate would erode public confidence.
Ratio Decidendi
- FIR Registration: High Court rightly directed registration of FIR as the complaints disclosed prima facie cognizable offences.
- Preliminary Inquiry: CBI’s report could not override the constitutional court’s power to ensure registration of FIR.
- Alternative Remedy: Existence of alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction when police refuse to act against their own officers.
- Official Duty Immunity: Acts alleged (falsification, coercion, abuse) were not in discharge of official duty; sanction not required.
- Investigation: To be carried out by Delhi Police, ACP-rank officer, within 3 months.
- Protection to Officers: No coercive steps (like arrest) unless custodial interrogation is necessary, provided appellants cooperate.
Final Directions
- Appeals partly allowed by modifying High Court orders.
- FIR to be registered and investigation conducted by Delhi Police (not Special Cell).
- Investigation to conclude within 3 months.
- Appellants to cooperate; no coercive action unless custodial interrogation essential.
- Preliminary inquiry report may be looked at during the investigation, but not treated as conclusive.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Vinod Kumar Pandey v. Sheesh Ram Saini is a landmark in asserting accountability of law enforcement officers. While protecting procedural fairness for the accused officers, the Court firmly upheld the principle that “those who investigate can also be investigated.”
By mandating FIR registration, clarifying the limited role of preliminary inquiries, and stressing public trust in justice, the ruling strengthens the rule of law and ensures that authority is not misused under the cloak of official duty.
Important Link
Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams