Can a Spouse Sue Their Partner’s Lover for Ruining a Marriage? Delhi High Court Clarifies

The sanctity of marriage has long been recognised as both a personal bond and a social institution. Yet, what happens when a third party is alleged to have intentionally interfered in this union, causing its breakdown? Can the aggrieved spouse claim damages from the alleged interloper?

This question recently came before the Delhi High Court in Shelly Mahajan v. Ms Bhanushree Bahl & Anr. (Order dated 15 September 2025), where Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav addressed whether Indian law allows a civil claim for damages on the ground of Alienation of Affection (AoA)—a tort derived from Anglo-American common law.

The case is significant because it grapples with unresolved tensions between marital rights, personal autonomy, and the scope of tort law in India. It marks one of the rare instances where an Indian court has been asked to recognise and enforce “heart-balm” actions—civil suits seeking monetary relief for disruption of marital relationships.

Factual Background

The plaintiff, Shelly Mahajan, married Defendant No. 2 on 18 March 2012. The couple had twin children in 2018. While Ms. Mahajan joined the family business in 2019, her husband continued to manage both family and independent ventures.

In 2021, Defendant No. 1, Ms. Bhanushree Bahl, joined the husband’s venture as an analyst. Despite being aware of his subsisting marriage, she allegedly developed a close relationship with him. According to the plaint, she frequently visited the marital home, accompanied him on business trips, and gradually became his exclusive travel companion.

Matters escalated in March 2023 when the plaintiff discovered intimate communications and letters exchanged between her husband and Ms. Bahl. Family members attempted interventions, but the relationship continued. The husband subsequently filed for divorce in April 2025, leaving the plaintiff to seek damages against the lover for intentionally disrupting her marriage.

The claim was framed as a civil action for the tort of alienation of affection, alleging that the defendant knowingly interfered with the marital bond, leading to loss of companionship and humiliation.

Plaintiff’s Contentions

Counsel for the plaintiff argued that:

• The right to consortium and companionship is a valuable marital interest.
• Defendant No. 1’s active interference amounted to an intentional tort causing measurable injury.
• Indian courts, drawing from cases like Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013) and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), have acknowledged alienation of affection in principle, even if rarely enforced.
• The suit was not barred by the Family Courts Act, since the relief sought—compensation for tortious interference—was distinct from matrimonial remedies.

Defendants’ Objections

Both defendants challenged the maintainability of the suit:

1. Jurisdiction of Family Courts – It was argued that under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, disputes arising out of marital relationships fall exclusively within Family Court jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on Geeta Anand v. Tanya Arjun (2024 SCC OnLine Del 2327) and Tanvi Chaturvedi v. Smita Shrivastava (2025 SCC OnLine Del 5712)
2. Pending Divorce Proceedings – Since adultery had already been framed as an issue in the ongoing divorce case, the plaint was alleged to be a counterblast.
3. Personal Autonomy – Defendant No. 2 argued that as an individual he retained full rights over his body and choices, invoking the Supreme Court’s ruling in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019), which decriminalized adultery, as a principle against State interference in private relationships.
4. Absence of Legal Duty – Defendant No. 1 contended that as an outsider she owed no legal duty towards the plaintiff to abstain from interacting with her husband, and hence no cause of action could arise.

Court’s Analysis

1. Nature of Alienation of Affection

Justice Kaurav traced the doctrine’s roots to Anglo-American common law. AoA belongs to the category of “heart-balm” torts, which also include seduction and breach of promise to marry. While several U.S. states once recognised such claims, most have abolished them. In England and Canada, the tort has long been extinct.

In India, the concept has appeared sporadically in Supreme Court dicta:

• In Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal (2013), the Court described AoA as an intentional tort involving interference with the marital bond.
• In Indra Sarma (2013), the Court recognised that a woman who knowingly enters a relationship with a married man may be liable for alienating him from his wife and children.

However, no Indian statute expressly recognises such an action, and no reported civil case has resulted in damages being awarded for AoA.

2. Jurisdictional Question

A central issue was whether such a claim should lie before a Family Court or a Civil Court.

The Delhi High Court referred extensively to its Division Bench ruling in Geeta Anand v. Tanya Arjun (2024), which clarified that Family Courts have jurisdiction only where the cause of action is intrinsically linked to the marital relationship. Where an independent civil right is asserted—such as ownership or tortious interference—the Civil Courts retain jurisdiction.

Applying this test, Justice Kaurav held that the plaintiff’s claim was not matrimonial in nature, but rather a civil tort claim against a third party. Hence, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction was preserved, and the plaint could not be rejected under Section 9 of the CPC.

3. Autonomy v. Civil Consequences

The Court distinguished between criminal law and civil remedies. While Joseph Shine protected consensual relationships from criminalisation, it did not grant immunity from civil consequences. If a third party’s intentional acts disrupt a marriage, the aggrieved spouse may have a compensable claim.

The Court emphasised:

• If the spouse’s conduct were entirely voluntary, uninduced by the third party, no liability would arise.
• But if wrongful inducement or malicious intent is proven, the third party may be held accountable in tort.

4. Recognising Consortium as a Protectable Interest

Drawing on Hohfeld’s framework of rights and duties, the Court reasoned that if a spouse has a protectable right to marital consortium, there exists a correlative duty on third parties not to wrongfully interfere.

Thus, an AoA action is conceptually sustainable in India, provided the plaintiff can prove:

• Intentional and wrongful conduct by the defendant,
• Causation linking that conduct to loss of marital affection, and
• Quantifiable injury susceptible to rational assessment.

5. Summons Issued

Without ruling on the merits, the Court concluded that the plaint disclosed a prima facie cause of action. Summons were accordingly issued, allowing the defendants to contest under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at a later stage.

Key Takeaways

1. AoA Recognised in Principle – Indian courts accept alienation of affection as a potential tort, though not codified.
2. Civil Court Jurisdiction – Such claims lie before Civil Courts, not Family Courts, since they assert an independent civil wrong.
3. High Evidentiary Burden – Plaintiffs must prove intentional interference, not just association.
4. Autonomy Balanced with Accountability – While spouses have liberty, third parties may face civil liability for wrongful inducement.
5. Unsettled Territory – No Indian precedent has yet resulted in damages being awarded, making this a developing area of law.

Significance of the Judgment

The decision is groundbreaking for three reasons:

• First, it affirms the possibility of suing a spouse’s lover in tort, subject to proof.
• Second, it clarifies jurisdictional uncertainty, keeping such cases within Civil Courts.
• Third, it reorients the discourse around Joseph Shine, emphasising that decriminalisation of adultery does not erase civil accountability.

The case, therefore, marks a tentative but important step toward recognising personal injuries within family law contexts, situating them within tort law rather than criminal law.

Key Highlights of the Decision

Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav stated:

The grievance raised pertains instead to the alleged interference of defendant no.1 in the marital relationship of the plaintiff and defendant no.2, and it is asserted that such interference, whether actuated by intent and malice or otherwise, contributed to the breakdown of the relationship. The nature of that interference, and whether it was voluntary or otherwise, is a matter to be established during trial. Significantly, neither the HMA nor any other matrimonial legislation provides a codified remedy enabling the Family Court to grant relief against the alleged acts of a third party in such circumstances. In the absence of any such remedy under matrimonial law, and equally in the absence of any statutory bar, a civil action seeking damages against a third party is not excluded and can be pursued before the Civil Court.

…. When one spouse claims to have suffered legal injury on account of the disruption of the marital relationship, the law, under tort, recognises that compensation may be sought from those alleged to have contributed to the breach of that sanctified bond.

Conclusion

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