Is Fraudulent/Collusive Initiation of CIRP Permissible? Analysing the Supreme Court’s Latest Judgment

[Raghav Bhatia is an Advocate practising at the Supreme Court]

Recently, in Orris Infrastructure Private Limited v. Rakesh Kumar Gupta (30 September 2026), the Supreme Court observed that even though the National Company Law Tribunal has the power to recall a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process which was admitted at the behest of a collusive operational creditor by dismissing the petition under section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the CIRP proceedings may nonetheless continue if there are genuine creditors. In the opinion of the author, while the Supreme Court could have laid down the mechanism for continuing a CIRP whose initiation was fraudulent with greater precision, this judgment is in the right direction and further strengthens the framework of the IBC.

Factual Background

Orris Infrastructure Private Limited, the owner of a parcel of land in Gurugram, Haryana, had entered into a Development Agreement on 2 November 2011 with Three C Shelters Private Limited (“Corporate Debtor”) “for construction of a real estate project called Greenopolis with 1862 flats” whereunder the Corporate Debtor was “to develop the Project at its own cost”. Subsequently, the parties also executed agreements with homebuyers which provided for strict construction deadlines.

As the construction was not progressing as per the contractually agreed timelines, the homebuyers approached the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority (“HRERA”) as well as the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“NCDRC”). On 23 January 2019, the HRERA directed the Corporate Debtor to complete construction in accordance with the timelines provided. In parallel proceedings, the NCDRC vide its judgment dated 20 July 2020, had observed that the Corporate Debtor and Orris shall be responsible towards their respective allottees/consumers.

During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, on 17 October 2019, Straight Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd. filed a petition under section 9 of the IBC against the Corporate Debtor, claiming to be its operational creditor. Pursuant to an affidavit dated 27 January 2020 filed by a director of the Corporate Debtor admitting the debt, the NCLT allowed Straight Edge’s section 9 petition on 20 July 2020.

The Order of the NCLT was challenged by the homebuyers before the NCLAT, which vide an Order dated 6 January 2021 dismissed the Appeal.

Thereafter, on an Application filed by the Resolution Professional of Three C Universal Developers Pvt. Ltd., which held 38.25% of the Corporate Debtor’s equity, the NCLT passed an Order dated 29 March 2022 with a categorical finding of fraud and collusion between Straight Edge and the Corporate Debtor. Nonetheless, the NCLT observed that it had no power to review or recall its admission order and that the CIRP must therefore continue.

Aggrieved, various parties appealed to the NCLAT, which, by the impugned judgment dated 28 August 2023, held that the NCLT did have the power to recall an order obtained by fraud, and set aside the CIRP in its entirety. Orris, legitimate creditors and homebuyers, all aggrieved by the termination of the CIRP, approached the Supreme Court in the present proceedings.

Present Proceedings before the Supreme Court

Before the Supreme Court, there were two issues: firstly, whether the NCLT has the power to recall the CIRP by dismissing the section 9 petition which was filed and admitted at the behest of a collusive operational creditor;secondly, if the NCLT is indeed empowered to recall CIRP in such cases, can CIRP proceedings nonetheless continue?

At the outset, the Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of fraud and collusion, noting that these findings were not contested before it and that the suspended directors had even withdrawn their appeal challenging them.

On the first issue, the Supreme Court, relying on Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons and Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Brothers, observed that the power of statutory authorities, such as NCLT/NCLAT, to exercise “jurisdiction rests on the existence of certain facts”. In the context of IBC, existence of a “debt” is a jurisdictional fact and a tribunal cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself in the absence of such a fact. Since the debt in the present case was a “mirage” (designed only so that a moratorium could be imposed and the creditors’ and homebuyers’ remedies before different fora such as NCDRC and HRERA get blocked), there was no existence of the jurisdictional fact and thus the NCLT had the power to recall the CIRP by dismissing the section 9 petition.

Importantly, the Supreme Court also noted that fraud in public law differs from fraud in private law, as it corrupts the decision-making process itself, and that those who invoke the IBC proceedings are under a public law duty “not to deceive or mislead”.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court relied on GLAS Trust Company LLC v. Byju Raveendran to reiterate that once a petition for initiation of CIRP under sections 7, 9 or 10 is admitted, the proceedings cease to be in personam and become in rem. This is so because before admission of a petition, the lis is “between the Operational Creditor and the Corporate Debtor”. However, after the admission, the character of the proceedings does not remain the same. Analysing the scheme of IBC through a reading of sections 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 30(2), 53 and 12A of the IBC, the Supreme Court observed that the petitioner in such cases is the triggering creditor with the “carriage of the proceedings till the petitions are admitted”.

However, the carriage of the proceedings after admission of the petition rests with the Resolution Professional and the Committee of Creditors under the supervision of the NCLT. Therefore, the CIRP can continue even after a finding that the section 9 petition “was initiated fraudulently and with active collusion of the suspended Directors of the corporate debtor”.

On how to decide if such proceedings should continue, it was observed that where the NCLT holds that initiation of CIRP “is based on fraud and collusion, it shall disallow the original applicant from participating”. In such circumstances, proceedings under section 65 of the IBC may also be initiated. On the contrary, where the NCLT is of the opinion that the CIRP proceedings nonetheless are required to be continued as there are genuine stakeholders, it is for the NCLT to decide after hearing the Resolution Professional, the CoC and other stakeholders, guided by the need to conclude the process “with integrity and transparency, and that the purpose and object of the code is subserved”.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT’s judgment, restored the CIRP, and remitted the question of its continuation to the NCLT, which was to decide the same in accordance with the principles stated in this judgment.

Analysis

The author is of the opinion that practically, the judgment is in the right direction on both questions. The NCLT’s view that it was powerless to undo an admission procured by an admittedly collusive applicant would have left the insolvency process open to exactly the abuse that the courts have repeatedly warned against. Equally, the NCLAT’s approach of terminating the CIRP altogether would have penalised the homebuyers and other creditors, and would have handed the colluding parties a second advantage.

At the same time, in Shrisht Dhawan, on which the Supreme Court relied, it was observed that an error of jurisdictional fact renders the order in question void. If the debt of Straight Edge was indeed a “mirage”, as observed by the Supreme Court, then the admission order was made without jurisdiction. The question then is how a process commenced by a void order can be “continued” without a fresh jurisdictional foundation.

In the author’s opinion, the more coherent course would have been to require the NCLT, before continuing the CIRP, to be satisfied of a genuine debt and default owed to another creditor, and to substitute that creditor as the applicant. This is akin to the substitution as contemplated under Rules 101 to 103 of the erstwhile Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, which was also argued in this case but not analysed in detail. On the facts, this would not have been difficult, as the NCLAT had itself noted the presence of bona fide creditors and homebuyers.

This judgment also missed an opportunity to discuss IBBI’s circular dated 9 September, 2026 on “Due diligence by Insolvency Professionals regarding misuse of IBC framework”. This circular provides for illustrative indicators that Insolvency Professionals should remain vigilant about as these can be telling of a “fraudulent or malicious” initiation of CIRP proceedings. While the case at hand was a clear-cut case of a collusive CIRP, the Supreme Court nonetheless could have strengthened the jurisprudence on this point by analysing the circular.

Interestingly, unlike in Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. Shubh Gautam, where the Supreme Court discussed but did not invoke section 65 of the IBC (as discussed here), the Supreme Court in this case has expressly recognised that the NCLT may initiate proceedings under section 65 upon a finding of fraud and collusion. Since the findings of fraud in this case were affirmed by the Supreme Court itself, the case for invoking section 65 against Straight Edge is far stronger. It remains to be seen whether the NCLT will act on it, as doing so would send out a clear message that the IBC cannot be used as an instrument to shield a corporate debtor.

It will be interesting to see the development of law on the issues discussed in this judgment.

– Raghav Bhatia

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