It definitely stands absolutely justified and tenable that the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena & Anr Etc in Criminal Appeal No(s). 1047-1048 of 2010 with Criminal Appeal No(s). 2223 of 2010 and cited in Neutral Citation No: 2026 INSC 1015 that was pronounced just very recently on September 18, 2026 has set aside the conviction and life sentences of four accused persons in a 2001 murder case from Odisha. The top court has minced absolutely just no words to make it indubitably clear that murder convictions cannot stand on unreliable eye witnesses and incomplete circumstantial evidence. To put it differently, we thus see that the Apex Court has explicitly held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and reliable chain of circumstantial evidence connecting them with the death.
It was very rightly pointed out by the top court which found material inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses that the alleged identification of the assailants on a pitch-dark night could not safely be relied upon. We thus see that the alleged identification through voice and the claim that witnesses heard the assault could not be safely accepted after the Court found the eyewitness evidence unreliable. It was also noted that the alleged 53-kg laterite stone said to have caused the fatal injury was not recovered and there was no clear evidence showing how it had been brought to the spot.
In the ultimate analysis, we thus see that the prosecution had failed to establish a complete and consistent chain of circumstances excluding every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the appellants. By any reckoning, we see that the Supreme Court found it absolutely fit to allow the appeal while holding that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt and so deemed it fit to quash the Orissa High Court judgment dated May 6, 2009, as well as the Trial Court’s conviction and sentence dated January 28, 2004. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this pragmatic, pertinent, persuasive and peculiar judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Prasanna B Varale for a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice M.M. Sundresh and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present criminal appeals arise out of the judgment and order dated 06.05.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Criminal Appeal Nos. 78 and 84 of 2004. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Appellants and upheld the order of the Ad hoc Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jajpur [hereinafter referred to as “Trial Court”] passed in Sessions Trial No. 158/14/26 of 2002, thereby convicting the Appellants under Sections 148, 506, and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred to as “IPC”]. The Appellants were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 3000/- each, and in default of payment of fine to further undergo R.I. for 6 months.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while dwelling briefly on the facts stating that, “The factual matrix of the case is that on 14.05.2001 at approximately 4:00 PM, accused Narendra @ Narahari Behera arrived at the house of the informant (PW-3) and abused the family members in obscene language, specifically threatening to kill Dhruba Pradhan [hereinafter referred to as “deceased”]. Later that evening, at approximately 7:00 PM, a body of accused persons armed with deadly weapons including a kata, tenta, stones, and a saw, arrived at the informant’s house, searched for the deceased, and threatened to kill him before departing toward Abhayapur.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 3 that, “Around the same time, while the deceased was traveling by motorcycle, he was intercepted at Agi Chhak by the accused persons. When the deceased attempted to escape, the accused persons forcibly caught hold of him and lifted him into a nearby cultivable paddy field. Thereafter the accused persons assaulted the deceased by throwing laterite stone on his head and with thenga, iron rod, bhujali etc. as a result of which the deceased succumbed to the injury. The accused persons threw the deceased’s motorcycle into the pond.”
As we see, the Bench lays bare in para 4 disclosing that, “The First Information Report came to be lodged at the instance of P.W. 3/Sri Siba Prasad Pradhan at 2:00 AM on 15.05.2001. On lodgment of report i.e., FIR No. 128 of 2001, the criminal machinery was set into motion and the investigating agency proceeded to the spot and seized various articles including chopped up right wrist of the deceased, laterite stone and lathi.”
As things stands, the Bench observes in para 5 that, “The investigation concluded with the filing of a chargesheet against 18 accused persons. Out of the 18 chargesheeted accused, case against one accused abated due to his death and the case of three accused persons was split up (as they were declared absconders). The accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Consequently, 14 accused persons were committed to the Court of Sessions for trial.”
Truth be told, the Bench specifies in para 6 stating that, “The learned Trial Court framed charges against the 14 accused persons under Sections 148, 506/149, 302/149 of IPC and the Sessions Trial No. 158/14/26/2002 was registered.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 8 that, “On its appreciation of evidence, the Trial Court, vide its judgment and order dated 28.01.2004, convicted 6 accused persons (the present appellants before us) under Sections 148, 506, and 302/149 of the IPC, while acquitting 8 others by granting them the benefit of doubt. The Appellants were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 3000/- each, and in default of payment of fine to further undergo R.I. for 6 months for the offence under Section 302 IPC. As life imprisonment was awarded for the main offence no separate sentence was awarded for the offence under Sections 148/506/149 IPC.”
As a corollary, the Bench then lays bare in para 9 disclosing that, “Being aggrieved, the appellants challenged the judgment and order of the Trial Court by way of 2 separate appeals, CRLA 84/04 and CRLA 78/04 before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack. The High Court on re-appreciation of evidence, discarded the eye witness testimony holding that the persons who committed assault on the deceased could not have been identified in the pitch dark night merely by the sound of assault. The High Court, however, upheld the conviction of all the six convicted accused persons, holding that though the prosecution failed to prove charges by direct evidence, it has been successful in proving charges from circumstantial evidence.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 10 that, “Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High Court, the six convicted accused persons approached this court by filing present appeals. However, during the pendency of the appeal, appellant Upendra Sethi and appellant Madhu Pradhan passed away and, consequently, the appeal stood abated qua them. The present appeals are, therefore, confined to the remaining four appellants.”
Do further note, the Bench then also notes in para 16 that, “At the outset, it is necessary to note that the prosecution case, as unfolded in the FIR and during trial, rested primarily on the testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses, namely PWs 3, 4, 10, 11, 17 and 26. It is pertinent to note that all the aforementioned prosecution witnesses are related to the deceased. PW-3 and PW4 are the brothers of the deceased, while PW-10, PW-11, PW-17, and PW-26 are his sisters-in-law.”
While shedding light on the inconsistency in the prosecution case, the Bench points out in para 17 that, “Since the prosecution case rests primarily on the testimony of these alleged eye-witnesses, it is necessary to examine their evidence in some detail. The testimony of PW-3 reveals that he was not present at the spot when the incident occurred. Significantly, in the First Information Report lodged by him, he stated that only PW-17 and PW-26 had witnessed the occurrence. However, the testimony of PW-4 presents a materially different version. According to PW-4, he, along with PW-3, PW-10, PW-11, PW-17, and PW-26, was observing the accused persons at the time of the incident. Thus, while PW-3’s version indicates that he was not an eye-witness to the occurrence, PW-4’s testimony seeks to portray PW-3, along with the other prosecution witnesses, as being present and witnessing the incident, giving rise to a significant inconsistency in the prosecution case.”
Briefly stated, the Bench while citing the relevant case law states in para 18 that, “Further, referring to the testimonies of other eye-witnesses it is evident that the incident took place in a pitch dark night. The question which arises before us is whether it was possible for the eyewitnesses to have witnessed the incident in a dark night from a distance of 60 cubits. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar (1979) 3 SCC 1. In that case, the Supreme Court found the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses to be unreliable, holding that it was improbable for them to have identified the accused even in moonlight.”
Quite significantly, the Bench points out in para 19 that, “Though in the above referred case of Ashok Kumar (supra), the source of light was at least moonlight but in the present case, the testimony of witnesses clearly show that it was a pitch dark night and the source of light was provided by the accused themselves i.e. the torch light to identify the deceased. Considering this very aspect, a categorical finding was recorded by the High Court that it was not possible for the prosecution witnesses to have witnessed the incident on a pitch dark night or to identify the assailants merely on the basis of sound of the assault. The testimony of the alleged witness cannot be relied upon.”
In addition, the gist of para 20 is that, “The testimony of PW-4 reveals that the accused persons focused the torch light to identify the deceased. On this it is important to refer to Tamilselvan v. State (2008) 7 SCC 755, which held that:
9. Since it was the accused who allegedly carried torches, we find it difficult to believe how the prosecution witnesses could have identified the assailants. The position would have been different if the forest guards had been carrying torches and had been pointing them at the assailants, but here the position is just the reverse. In fact due to the torches of the assailants the prosecution witnesses would have been partially blinded by the light of the torchlight, and would not have been able to identify anybody.””
Resultantly, the Bench then propounds in para 21 holding that, “In view of the aforesaid decisions and the categorical finding recorded by the High Court that it was not possible for the prosecution witnesses to have witnessed the incident on a pitchdark night or to identify the assailants merely on the basis of the sound of the assault, the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses cannot be relied upon.”
It cannot be glossed over that the Bench observes in para 22 that, “Once the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses is discarded, the prosecution case necessarily becomes one based solely on circumstantial evidence. However, having discarded the ocular version, the High Court proceeded to examine whether the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused on the basis of the circumstantial evidence on record and, on that basis, upheld the conviction. The correctness of such an approach must, therefore, be examined in light of the settled principles governing cases resting entirely on circumstantial evidence.”
While citing a reputed and relevant case law, the Bench mentions in para 23 that, “Though the law regarding circumstantial evidence has been crystallised by this Court in various judgments but it will not be out of place to refer to an oftenly quoted judgment of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, wherein this Court has observed a “panchsutra” for dealing with the cases of circumstantial evidence. These are as follows:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established; (2) all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; (3) Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved; (5) there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”
Going ahead, to put it briefly, the Bench while citing yet another recent and relevant case law expounds in para 24 stating that, “Furthermore, in Kamal v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC Online SC 933, it was held that circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established . It held that it is settled principle that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
Needless to say, the Bench states in para 32 that, “Thus, it is a settled position of law that to convict the accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence each circumstance must be established beyond doubt and collectively point towards the guilt of the accused.”
Most significantly, most rationally and so also most forthrightly, the Bench encapsulates in para 33 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Viewed cumulatively, the prosecution has failed to establish a complete and consistent chain of circumstances excluding every hypothesis other than the guilt of the appellants. The evidence on record leaves substantial gaps which create a reasonable doubt as to their involvement. In criminal jurisprudence, where two views are reasonably possible, the one favourable to the accused must prevail.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 34 noting that, “In the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in affirming the conviction of the appellants. They are entitled to the benefit of doubt.”
Resultantly, the Bench then directs and holds in para 35 that, “In the result, we pass the following order:
a. The appeals are allowed;
b. The judgment and order of the High Court dated 06.05.2009 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 78 and 84 of 2004 and the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28.01.2004 passed by the trial court in Sessions Trial No. 158/14/26 of 2002 are quashed and set aside.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 36 that, “Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
In essence, the key takeaway from this notable pragmatic judgment is that murder conviction cannot stand on unreliable eye witnesses and so also incomplete circumstantial evidence. It is thus entirely in order that the Apex Court set aside Odisha murder convictions by mandating and holding explicitly that unreliable eyewitness testimony and gaps in circumstantial evidence failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No denying or disputing it!
Sanjeev Sirohi,