Is Life Imprisonment Till Natural Life Constitutional? Supreme Court Explains

Background of the Case

The Supreme Court was dealing with four connected writ petitions raising substantially similar questions regarding the legality of imprisonment till the remainder of a convict’s natural life.

The lead petition was filed by Ramasrey @ Fakkad, who had been convicted under Sections 364A, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (Sections 140, 103, 238 BNS). The trial court had awarded the death penalty, but the Allahabad High Court modified the sentence to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. His Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court was subsequently withdrawn. Later, he approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, contending that such a sentence was unconstitutional because the Penal Code recognises only death or life imprisonment as punishments for murder.

The remaining petitions arose from similar factual situations. The petitioners included Chander Kant Jha, Atbir Singh, and three convicts, Sarabjit Singh, Gurdev Singh @ Baldev Singh, and Satnam Singh. Each had originally been sentenced to death for serious offences including murder, but their sentences had later been modified either by judicial orders or through the exercise of the President’s constitutional powers under Article 72 into imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, in some cases specifically without remission. All of them questioned the constitutional validity of such sentences.

Recognising that all four petitions raised common questions of law, the Court heard them together and delivered a common judgment.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Bench identified three principal issues for determination:

1. Whether imprisonment for the remainder of natural life is constitutionally valid.
2. Whether judicial review of the President’s exercise of powers under Article 72 (or the Governor’s powers under Article 161) was permissible in the circumstances of the present case.
3. Whether the Supreme Court could modify a sentence already altered by the constitutional authorities while exercising their clemency powers.

The judgment, therefore, required the Court to examine the intersection between criminal sentencing, statutory remission, constitutional clemency, and judicial review.

Maintainability under Article 32

Before considering the merits, the Supreme Court examined whether the writ petitions themselves were maintainable.

The Court reiterated that Article 32 occupies a unique position in the constitutional framework. It guarantees the right to directly approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights and forms part of the Constitution’s basic structure.

However, the Court also clarified that Article 32 cannot be converted into a substitute for every available legal remedy. Prisoners cannot bypass statutory procedures or constitutional mechanisms merely because they seek a different outcome. Unless there is a genuine violation of fundamental rights, Article 32 cannot be invoked as an appellate forum against executive decisions.

The Court observed:

“The right of a prisoner to approach this Court obviously cannot be outrightly restricted but this right cannot be used to circumvent other procedures.”

Whether Life Imprisonment Till Natural Life is Constitutional?

The central question before the Supreme Court was whether a sentence directing imprisonment till the remainder of a convict’s natural life is constitutionally valid or whether it amounts to creating a punishment not contemplated by law.

Answering the issue in the affirmative, the Court categorically rejected the petitioners’ challenge. It held that the question was no longer res integra because a Constitution Bench in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1 had already authoritatively settled the legal position. Consequently, there was no scope for a smaller Bench to revisit or dilute that principle.

The Bench observed that the petitioners had attempted to argue that imprisonment for natural life constitutes a punishment distinct from “life imprisonment” recognised under Indian Penal Code/Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. However, this submission overlooked the settled interpretation consistently adopted by the Supreme Court for decades.

The Court therefore proceeded to examine the statutory provisions governing life imprisonment before analysing the Constitution Bench decisions that had conclusively answered the controversy.

Meaning of “Life” under the IPC and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita

The Court began its analysis by referring to the relevant provisions of both the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Section 45 of the IPC defines the word “life” to mean the life of a human being unless the context indicates otherwise. Section 53 includes imprisonment for life as one of the recognised punishments under the Code. Similarly, Section 2(17) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita defines “life” in identical terms, while Section 4 continues to recognise imprisonment for life as one of the prescribed punishments.

The Court found that neither statute limits life imprisonment to any fixed number of years. On the contrary, the language employed by both enactments indicates that life imprisonment ordinarily continues for the entire lifespan of the convict.

This interpretation, the Court noted, has consistently formed the basis of Indian sentencing jurisprudence and has repeatedly been affirmed by Constitution Benches.

Does Life Imprisonment Mean Fourteen Years?

One of the most common misconceptions surrounding criminal sentencing is that life imprisonment automatically comes to an end after fourteen years. The Supreme Court once again clarified that this belief has no legal basis.

The Bench explained that the notion of fourteen years arises from provisions relating to remission and premature release. It does not define the duration of a life sentence itself. A sentence of life imprisonment continues until the death of the convict unless it is lawfully remitted, commuted or otherwise shortened by a competent constitutional or statutory authority.

In reaffirming this principle, the Court relied extensively upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India v. V. Sriharan.

Quoting from that decision, the Court reproduced the following important observation:

“Imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Penal Code only means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict.”

The judgment further quoted Justice U.U. Lalit (as His Lordship then was), who explained:

“The sentence of life imprisonment means imprisonment for the rest of the life or the remainder of the life of the convict.”

These observations completely undermine the petitioners’ argument that imprisonment till natural life creates a new category of punishment. According to the Court, imprisonment for the remainder of natural life is simply an expression of what “life imprisonment” has always legally meant.

The Special Category of Sentence: Swamy Shraddananda

A significant portion of the judgment revisits the landmark decision in Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka (2008). In that case, the Supreme Court recognised that certain murders fall into an intermediate category. Such cases may not satisfy the “rarest of rare” doctrine warranting death penalty, yet ordinary life imprisonment subject to remission may appear disproportionately lenient.

To bridge this gap, the Court evolved a special category of punishment whereby death could be substituted with imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life or for a specified period exceeding fourteen years.

The objective was to preserve proportionality while reducing unnecessary imposition of the death penalty.

The Court quoted the following important observation:

“A far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court…”

An equally important aspect of the judgment concerns the distinction between statutory remission and constitutional clemency. The petitioners argued that directing imprisonment till natural life effectively nullifies their statutory right to seek remission under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 473 BNSS).

The Supreme Court rejected this submission. It clarified that statutory remission and constitutional clemency operate in different spheres.

While Section 432 CrPC (Section 473 BNSS) empowers the appropriate Government to remit or suspend sentences in accordance with statutory conditions, Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution confer independent constitutional powers upon the President and Governors respectively.

These constitutional powers are neither derived from nor controlled by the Code of Criminal Procedure (now BNSS). Referring to earlier Constitution Bench decisions including Maru Ram, Kehar Singh, Epuru Sudhakar and V. Sriharan, the Court reiterated that constitutional clemency remains untouched even where courts impose imprisonment till natural life without statutory remission.

Thus, while courts may restrict the operation of statutory remission in exceptional cases, they cannot curtail the constitutional mercy jurisdiction vested in the President or Governor.

Scope of Judicial Review over Articles 72 and 161

The Court also dealt with another important constitutional issue. Some petitioners sought reconsideration of sentences that had already been modified by the President while exercising powers under Article 72.

The Supreme Court refused to entertain such a challenge. It reiterated that judicial review over constitutional clemency is extremely limited and is confined to well-recognised grounds.

The Court summarised these principles as follows:

• absence of application of mind;
• mala fide exercise of power;
• consideration of wholly irrelevant or extraneous factors;
• failure to consider relevant material; or
• arbitrariness.

Since none of these grounds had been established, the Court held that it could not sit in appeal over the President’s decision.

The Bench observed that accepting the petitioners’ request would effectively require the Supreme Court to independently reconsider and reduce a sentence already modified by the constitutional authorities, an exercise plainly outside the permissible scope of judicial review.

Why the Supreme Court Rejected the Constitutional Challenge

The Supreme Court dismissed the challenge, holding that the issue had already been conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench in Union of India v. V. Sriharan. It observed that there was no scope for a two-Judge Bench to reconsider the constitutional validity of imprisonment till the remainder of natural life. The Court described the petitions as “a misuse, if not the abuse of process of law”, emphasising that while ordinary life imprisonment remains subject to statutory remission under Section 432 CrPC (Section 473 BNSS), courts may, in exceptional cases, direct imprisonment till natural life without remission depending on the gravity of the offence. Such a sentence, the Court held, is constitutionally valid.

Click Here to Read the Official Judgment

Individual Findings in the Four Writ Petitions

The Court dismissed all four writ petitions. It held that Ramasrey @ Fakkad and Chander Kant Jha had not exhausted the statutory or constitutional remedies available to them before invoking Article 32. As regards Atbir Singh, Sarabjit Singh, Gurdev Singh @ Baldev Singh, and Satnam Singh, the Court found that their sentences had already been modified through the President’s clemency powers under Article 72, and none of the recognised grounds for judicial review, such as mala fides, arbitrariness, or non-application of mind, were established. Accordingly, all the petitions were dismissed.