Interim injunctions play a crucial role in civil litigation. They protect the rights of parties during the pendency of a suit and prevent the subject matter of the dispute from being altered or prejudiced before the final adjudication.
But what happens when a party files an application for interim injunction, the Court decides the application without granting the entire relief sought, and the party later files another application seeking substantially the same relief? Can a second application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) be entertained?
Delhi High Court considered this important procedural question in Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Exotic Mile, CS(COMM) 519/2019, decided on 6 July 2026.
Justice Jyoti Singh held that although the CPC does not expressly prohibit the filing of a second interim injunction application, successive applications seeking the same relief on identical facts cannot ordinarily be entertained.
Background of the Trademark Dispute
Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd., the plaintiff, instituted a commercial suit against Exotic Mile concerning the use of the trademark BOULT and certain associated device marks.
The plaintiff claimed rights in the registered trademarks BOAT/boAt and alleged that the defendant’s use of BOULT and related device marks amounted to trademark infringement, passing off, copyright infringement, dilution of its trademarks and unfair competition.
According to the plaintiff, the competing marks were deceptively similar, particularly from a phonetic perspective, and were being used in relation to similar categories of goods.
The suit was instituted in 2019. Along with the suit, the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 13041/2019 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking an ex parte interim injunction.
The plaintiff sought restraint against the defendant from selling, exporting, importing, offering for sale, distributing, advertising or otherwise dealing in goods or services under the mark BOULT, the impugned device marks or any other mark deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered BOAT/boAt trademarks.
On 25 September 2019, the Delhi High Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendant in terms of the relief sought in the plaintiff’s application.
The defendant subsequently filed I.A. No. 14039/2019 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC seeking vacation of the ex parte injunction.
The Single Judge eventually decided both applications through a judgment dated 21 January 2020.
Single Judge Finds BOAT and BOULT Phonetically Similar
While deciding the interim applications, the Single Judge examined the competing trademarks, logos, taglines and the manner in which the products were marketed. The Court observed that the plaintiff was the prior user of the trademark BOAT for the same category of goods.
The Court also considered the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s adoption of the mark BOULT. It was noted that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s trademark and business.
The Single Judge found phonetic similarity between BOAT and BOULT. The Court emphasised that deceptive similarity cannot always be determined merely through visual comparison. The resemblance between trademarks must be considered with reference to the ear as well as the eye.
Consumers do not ordinarily compare competing trademarks side by side. Instead, the test involves considering the overall impression retained in the mind of an average consumer with imperfect recollection.
The Court observed that the first two and last letters of BOAT and BOULT were the same and that the marks were phonetically similar.
Defendant Challenges the Interim Injunction Before the Division Bench
The defendant challenged the Single Judge’s judgment by filing FAO(OS)(COMM) No. 20/2020 before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.
On 27 January 2020, the Division Bench stayed the operation, implementation and execution of the judgment. The interim stay continued until the appeal was finally decided on 15 September 2025.
The Division Bench affirmed the Single Judge’s judgment insofar as the defendant had been restrained from using the specified device marks. However, the direction restraining the defendant from using the tagline “UNPLUG YOURSELF” was set aside.
An important development had also taken place during the pendency of the appeal. The defendant informed the Division Bench that it had discontinued the use of the impugned marks, including BOULT, except for two marks, which were also proposed to be phased out from August 2025.
The defendant stated that it had transitioned to the trademark GOBOULT. The Division Bench clarified that GOBOULT had never been challenged before the Single Judge.
Therefore, no injunction operated against the use of GOBOULT. The Court observed that if the plaintiff wanted to challenge the defendant’s use of GOBOULT, such challenge would constitute a separate cause of action and would have to be pursued through appropriate proceedings.
After disposal of the appeal, the plaintiff filed another application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The second application once again sought an interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the wordmark BOULT or any deceptively similar mark.
Why Was the Second Interim Injunction Application Filed?
The plaintiff argued that the standalone wordmark BOULT had not been expressly mentioned in the operative portion of the judgment dated 21 January 2020 merely because of an inadvertent omission.
According to the plaintiff, the reasoning contained in the judgment clearly demonstrated that the Single Judge had found BOAT and BOULT to be phonetically and deceptively similar.
The plaintiff contended that once the Court had restrained the defendant from using device marks prominently containing the word BOULT, the standalone wordmark should also necessarily be restrained.
It was argued that the Division Bench had not interfered with the Single Judge’s finding regarding phonetic similarity between BOAT and BOULT.
Accordingly, the plaintiff claimed that the finding of phonetic similarity had attained finality. The plaintiff further argued that both parties had understood the earlier injunction as extending to the wordmark BOULT.
According to the plaintiff, the defendant itself had stopped using the impugned marks after the original ex parte injunction and resumed their use only after the Division Bench stayed the Single Judge’s judgment.
Another important argument concerned the maintainability of successive interim injunction applications. The plaintiff submitted that there is no express prohibition under the CPC against filing more than one application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2.
Relying upon the principles governing interlocutory orders and Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC, it was argued that interim orders do not possess absolute finality and can be varied or reconsidered when circumstances change or when their continuation causes undue hardship.
According to the plaintiff, the Division Bench’s judgment constituted a changed circumstance because it clarified for the first time that the Single Judge’s operative order did not restrain the use of the standalone wordmark BOULT.
The plaintiff also argued that the defendant’s continued use of the allegedly infringing mark resulted in a recurring cause of action.
Every commercial use of the mark, according to the plaintiff, constituted a fresh instance of infringement or passing off.
Defendant Opposes the Second Application
The defendant strongly opposed the maintainability of the application. It argued that the plaintiff was seeking precisely the same relief that had been sought in the first interim injunction application.
The earlier application had already been disposed of by the judgment dated 21 January 2020. The defendant emphasised that the plaintiff had accepted that judgment.
It had neither sought review, modification or clarification of the judgment at the appropriate stage nor challenged it before a higher Court.
Even when the defendant filed an appeal, the plaintiff did not file a cross-appeal questioning the failure to grant an injunction against the standalone wordmark BOULT.
The defendant therefore contended that the plaintiff could not wait for six years and subsequently file another interim injunction application seeking the same relief.
It was also pointed out that after the Division Bench judgment, the plaintiff had filed I.A. No. 25533/2025 seeking clarification that the judgment dated 21 January 2020 had restrained the use of the wordmark BOULT.
The Court had expressed a prima facie view that the clarification application was beyond its jurisdiction in view of the Division Bench judgment.
The plaintiff thereafter withdrew that application unconditionally and without seeking liberty to initiate another application.
Despite this, the plaintiff subsequently filed the second interim injunction application. The defendant argued that such successive proceedings amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Can a Second Interim Injunction Application Be Filed?
The Delhi High Court observed that the controversy involved a narrow but significant question concerning successive applications for interim injunction.
The Court clarified that the CPC does not contain an express prohibition against filing a second application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2.
However, the absence of an express statutory prohibition does not give litigants an unrestricted right to repeatedly approach the Court seeking the same interlocutory relief.
The Court relied upon the principles recognised in Rakesh Madan v. Rajasthan Financial Corporation. Interlocutory injunction orders do not necessarily attain the same degree of finality as final judgments.
Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC itself permits a Court to discharge, vary or set aside an injunction order under appropriate circumstances.
This demonstrates that an interlocutory order can be reconsidered where subsequent developments justify judicial intervention.
At the same time, the Court stressed that a party cannot repeatedly seek the same injunction on identical facts merely because the earlier application did not produce the desired result.
The Delhi High Court held that a second application seeking the same interim relief can be entertained only where the applicant establishes:
- A genuine change in circumstances; or
- Undue hardship justifying reconsideration of the earlier interlocutory order.
Without satisfying either of these conditions, a second application seeking the same relief cannot ordinarily be entertained.
The principle prevents litigants from repeatedly filing applications before successive Presiding Officers in the hope of obtaining a different result.
Judicial proceedings cannot be converted into a wager where a party repeatedly seeks the same relief until a favourable order is obtained.
What Constitutes a “Change in Circumstances”?
The Court explained that changed circumstances require some altered facts, additional facts or subsequent developments capable of materially affecting the basis on which the earlier application was decided.
A mere allegation that the earlier Court inadvertently omitted to grant a particular relief does not constitute a change in circumstances.
The party cannot allow the order to remain unchallenged and later file another application seeking the same relief.
In the present case, the plaintiff contended that the Division Bench judgment constituted a changed circumstance because it clarified that the Single Judge had not restrained the use of the standalone wordmark BOULT.
The Court rejected this argument. According to the High Court, there was no ambiguity in the Single Judge’s judgment dated 21 January 2020.
The operative portion clearly did not contain an injunction against the standalone wordmark BOULT. The Division Bench had merely recorded what was already apparent from the Single Judge’s judgment.
Therefore, the appellate judgment did not create any new factual or legal situation capable of constituting a change in circumstances.
Plaintiff Waited Six Years Without Challenging the Earlier Order
The Delhi High Court considered the plaintiff’s conduct significant. The Single Judge’s judgment was delivered on 21 January 2020.
The plaintiff did not seek modification, clarification or review of that judgment. It also did not independently challenge the judgment before the appellate Court.
When the defendant preferred an appeal, the plaintiff did not file a cross-appeal concerning the absence of an injunction against BOULT. The plaintiff waited until the Division Bench disposed of the appeal in September 2025 before seeking to reopen the issue.
The Court observed that there was no satisfactory explanation for waiting nearly six years. The argument that the plaintiff realised the scope of the Single Judge’s judgment only after the observations of the Division Bench were rejected.
The Court held that it was “as clear as day” from the operative portion of the judgment that no injunction had been granted against the standalone wordmark BOULT.
Was Undue Hardship Established?
The second exception permitting reconsideration of interlocutory relief is undue hardship. The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s continued use of BOULT caused serious commercial prejudice.
It claimed that the defendant’s use of a phonetically similar trademark harmed its goodwill, deprived it of commercial benefits and interfered with its ability to exploit its intellectual property rights. However, the Court found that there were no specific pleadings in the application establishing changed circumstances or undue hardship.
These arguments had largely emerged during oral submissions and written arguments. The plaintiff relied upon screenshots of e-commerce websites to claim that BOULT continued to be used commercially.
The defendant denied the allegation. It stated that the screenshots concerned discontinued products, unavailable products or archived listings.
The Court noted that the plaintiff had not rebutted this explanation in its rejoinder. More importantly, the defendant had informed the Division Bench that it had discontinued the use of BOULT and had transitioned to GOBOULT.
The defendant reiterated the same position before the Single Judge. It also offered to cooperate in removing any stray online listings reflecting residual use of BOULT.
In these circumstances, the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish undue hardship.
Phonetic Similarity Could Not Justify Reopening the Earlier Application
The plaintiff strongly relied upon the earlier finding that BOAT and BOULT were phonetically similar. It argued that once the Courts had recognised deceptive similarity between the marks, the defendant should necessarily be restrained from using BOULT.
The High Court rejected this argument in the context of the maintainability of the second application. The question before the Court was not whether phonetic similarity could constitute a valid ground for granting an injunction.
The real issue was whether the plaintiff could seek the same relief through a second application after having already relied upon the same ground in the earlier proceedings.The first injunction application had expressly relied upon phonetic similarity between BOAT and BOULT.
The plaintiff had also sought an injunction against the standalone wordmark BOULT. However, the final interlocutory order did not grant that relief.
Thus, phonetic similarity was not a new ground or subsequent development. The second application essentially sought reconsideration of the same relief based on the same factual foundation.
The Court held that permitting such an application would effectively amount to rewriting the earlier Single Judge judgment as well as the Division Bench judgment.
Withdrawal of the Clarification Application Also Weighed Against the Plaintiff
Another important circumstance was the plaintiff’s earlier clarification application. After the Division Bench judgment, the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 25533/2025. Through that application, the plaintiff sought clarification that the judgment dated 21 January 2020 had also restrained the defendant from using the wordmark BOULT and other deceptively similar marks.
The defendant raised objections regarding maintainability. The Court expressed a prima facie view that the application was beyond its jurisdiction considering the Division Bench judgment.
The plaintiff subsequently withdrew the application unconditionally and without obtaining liberty to pursue the same relief through another application.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the present application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The High Court held that the plaintiff could not seek the same relief circuitously after withdrawing the clarification application.
Successive applications for the same relief on the same factual foundation, particularly after an earlier application has been disposed of or withdrawn, may constitute abuse of the process of the Court.
Inherent Powers Under Section 151 CPC Could Not Be Invoked
The plaintiff also sought to rely upon the Court’s inherent powers. The High Court rejected the argument that Section 151 CPC could be invoked to grant the relief.
The Court observed that the CPC contains specific provisions governing interim injunctions. The earlier application had already been considered under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2.
The Court had restricted the injunction to specified device marks. The plaintiff had not sought review, modification or clarification of the order at the appropriate time and had not challenged the omission before the appellate Court.
In these circumstances, the Court held that inherent powers could not be invoked to circumvent the consequences of the earlier proceedings.
Delhi High Court Dismisses the Second Injunction Application
Delhi High Court ultimately dismissed the application. The Court found that the plaintiff was essentially seeking the same interim relief that had been sought in the earlier application.
There was no genuine change in circumstances after the judgment dated 21 January 2020. The Division Bench’s observations concerning the scope of the earlier injunction did not constitute changed circumstances because they merely recorded what was already evident from the operative portion of the Single Judge’s judgment.
The plaintiff had also failed to establish undue hardship. The defendant had stated that it had discontinued the use of BOULT and transitioned to GOBOULT.
The plaintiff’s allegations concerning continued online use of BOULT were disputed and had not been effectively rebutted.
Granting the injunction at this stage would amount to reopening and rewriting orders that had already attained finality between the parties. The application was accordingly dismissed.
Conclusion
Delhi High Court’s decision in Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Exotic Mile draws an important distinction between the legal possibility of filing a second interim injunction application and the circumstances in which such an application can actually be entertained.
The CPC does not impose an absolute prohibition against successive applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2.
However, a litigant cannot repeatedly approach the Court for the same interim relief merely because the earlier order did not grant everything that was sought.
Where the factual circumstances remain unchanged and no undue hardship is established, a second application seeking identical relief is liable to be rejected.
The judgment also highlights the importance of promptly challenging an interlocutory order where a party believes that a relief has been wrongly omitted.
A litigant who fails to seek clarification, modification, review, appeal or cross-appeal at the appropriate stage cannot ordinarily reopen the same issue years later by filing another injunction application.
The decision therefore reinforces procedural discipline in civil litigation while preserving the limited flexibility necessary for Courts to reconsider interlocutory relief when genuinely changed circumstances or undue hardship demand judicial intervention.
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