In Associated Broadcasting Company v. Google, the Delhi High Court offers a respite to content creators against copyright strikes through Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Shubham Thakare explains the decision and how it provides creators with a meaningful, if limited, tool to challenge abusive copyright strikes. Shubham is a third-year B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) student at the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru, with an interest in copyright and trademark law.
A New Shield for the “Strike” Era? Analysing the Delhi High Court’s Reasoning in Associated Broadcasting v. Google
By Shubham Thakare
Content creators work under a constant risk of copyright strikes, where even a few complaints can disrupt income or even threaten their account’s existence on digital platforms. The Delhi High Court’s order last month in Associated Broadcasting Company v. Google (the TV9 case) now offers some ground to creators to push back against this position. The dispute concerned copyright strikes issued against Associated Broadcasting’s (“TV9”) YouTube news channels for the use of short clips depicting natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, and snowstorms by certain footage-owning agencies based in the U.S. and Turkey. The Court held, in favour of TV9, that the footage in question did not meet the threshold of “modicum of creativity” required for copyright protection and that the use of the clips within news broadcasts constituted fair dealing.
Beyond this, perhaps the order is more significant for its engagement with Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which provides a remedy against groundless threats of infringement proceedings. The Court’s reasoning addresses an interpretive difficulty surrounding the proviso to this section, which bars the remedy where the threat is supported by a genuine infringement action, and also addresses how copyright claimants (here, the footage owners) attempt to avoid liability by subsequently filing suits to present earlier threats as bona fide assertions of rights.
This post situates the order within controversies surrounding the use of copyright strikes by news agencies and rights holders (such as the disputes involving Mohak Mangal). It examines the Court’s interpretation of Section 60 and argues that the order places a meaningful constraint on attempts to rely on nominal or short-lived infringement suits to avoid liability for groundless copyright strikes. The post also shows how the order can be considered a victory for TV9 and, more broadly, for content creators, while acknowledging its limits.
Facts and the “Modicum of Creativity”
The dispute arose when TV9 received several copyright strikes on its YouTube news channels from different agencies claiming ownership of raw footage of natural calamities such as hurricanes, floods, and snowstorms. TV9 had used short portions of this footage, typically between 4 and 65 seconds, within news broadcasts that included commentary and analysis. Given that three strikes can lead to a channel’s termination, this puts TV9’s entire online presence at risk. TV9 was also warned that the matter would go poorly if it refused to share confidential revenue records as part of a settlement. One agency also filed a suit in a U.S. court, which TV9 argued was a tactical move to sustain the strikes. Faced with this, TV9 approached the Delhi High Court seeking two things: relief under Section 60 against what it described as groundless threats, and a declaration that its use of the footage did not amount to infringement.
In granting summary judgment, the Delhi High Court made two crucial observations. First, it questioned whether the defendants’ footage qualified for copyright protection at all. Emphasising that copyright does not subsist in bare facts or “facts of nature”, the Court observed that the recordings lacked any meaningful creative input. By contrast, TV9’s broadcasts transformed these raw events into structured news reporting through editorial framing and commentary. As Tanishka Goswami has pointed out previously on this blog, factual news snippets that lack even a minimal “modicum of creativity” may fall outside the scope of copyrightable works under Section 2(y). The Court’s reasoning in the TV9 case appears to support this view, suggesting that purely mechanical recordings of public events may struggle to meet the threshold for protection.
Second, the Court held that TV9’s use qualified as fair dealing under Section 52(1)(a)(iii). The clips were brief, embedded within a broader narrative, and unlikely to cause any meaningful harm to the potential market for the defendants’ footage.
Section 60 and the Problem of Tactical Lawsuits:
The most analytically significant part of the order for us lies in its treatment of Section 60 of the Copyright Act. The provision allows a person who is threatened with groundless infringement proceedings to approach a court for an injunction and damages. At the same time, the proviso to Section 60 limits this remedy. It states that the provision will not apply if the person making the threat commences and prosecutes an action for infringement with due diligence.
This proviso has long created interpretive difficulty for courts. As Praharsh Gour and Tejaswini Kaushal have previously noted here in their discussion of Chancery Pavilion v. IPRS, some courts have taken the view that a Section 60 claim becomes infructuous the moment the defendant files a subsequent infringement suit, even if that suit appears to be little more than a tactical response. This has allowed copyright owners to neutralise allegations of groundless threats simply by initiating litigation elsewhere.
The facts in TV9 presented a variation of this problem. One of the defendants had indeed filed an infringement suit before a United States District Court, but later chose to withdraw it. Justice Karia held that this was insufficient to trigger the protection of the proviso. Drawing on the Bombay High Court’s reasoning in Manya Vejju v. Sapna Bhog (a decision closely analysed by Anirud Raghav here), the Court emphasised that the phrase “commences and prosecutes” must be read conjunctively. It is not enough to merely institute a suit. The party issuing the threat must pursue the action in a manner that meaningfully carries the dispute toward adjudication.
On this reading, a suit that is voluntarily withdrawn cannot qualify as prosecution with due diligence. The interpretation is significant because it prevents Section 60 from being reduced to an empty remedy. As Raghav has observed, the idea of “prosecution” itself signals that the threat of legal action cannot remain mere rhetoric. Justice Karia’s reasoning reinforces this understanding.
The Court also clearly lays out that while a YouTube copyright strike is clearly a “threat” within the meaning of Section 60, it is not an “action” in itself that can substitute for a suit before a court of law. A proper “action”, according to the court, must be a legal proceeding instituted before a competent court of law that is capable of providing a final and meaningful resolution to the copyright dispute between the parties. This ensures that the Section 60 remedy is not easily bypassed, since a rights holder cannot issue a platform strike, file a nominal suit to rely on the proviso, and then drop it once the immediate pressure has served its purpose.
Impact on the “Strike” Culture: Looking at the Mohak Mangal case
This interpretation of Section 60 assumes particular significance given the increasing number of infringement threats issued through copyright strikes on digital platforms. “Copyright strike” is not a term found in the Copyright Act, 1957, but a platform-driven enforcement mechanism. On platforms like YouTube, infringement claims are converted into formal strikes under a three-strike/graduated system, where repeated allegations can lead to loss of features, demonetisation, or even channel termination. For creators who rely on these platforms, the consequences can be immediate and severe.
Some creators have also suggested that copyright strikes are occasionally followed by demands for costly licensing arrangements if they wish to have the strikes withdrawn. For instance, in May 2025, news agency ANI was publicly accused by YouTuber Mohak Mangal of using copyright strikes to demand licensing fees reportedly as high as Rs. 50 lakhs for the use of brief, 10-second news clips.
Against this backdrop, the TV9 order offers creators a clearer road to respond to such claims. As Tanishka Goswami has observed here, many news agencies assert proprietary control over what are essentially public facts, relying on what she described as a “monopoly of news.” The Delhi High Court’s reasoning on the copyright status of raw factual recordings suggests that several such claims may lack any valid legal foundation from the outset.
The judgment also reflects the Court’s growing discomfort with parties who attempt to enforce claims through platform mechanisms rather than judicial processes. A similar concern appeared in ANI v. Dynamite News (analysed here extensively by Md. Thahir Sulaiman), where the Court criticised ANI for approaching YouTube directly to issue strikes after litigation had already begun, describing the conduct as unfair. The TV9 decision moves further in this direction. It indicates that where the underlying infringement claim lacks merit, or where the claimant does not diligently pursue a suit, platform strikes themselves may amount to actionable groundless threats under Section 60.
So, does this order meaningfully strengthen protection for creators, or is it a hollow victory? In several respects, it is a landmark win. By granting summary judgment, the Court signals that disputes over groundless threats under Section 60 need not always proceed through a prolonged, costly trial. The time and expense of litigation often discourage smaller creators from challenging aggressive copyright claims in the first place. A quicker route to adjudication lowers that barrier somewhat.
The victory is also far from hollow for TV9. It is true that although YouTube and Google were parties, TV9 did not seek a mandatory direction against them (Para 3.30), and the Court did not order the direct removal of the strikes. However, even when YouTube’s three-strike policy does not provide for automatic compliance with judicial decrees, the basis for the strikes effectively falls away once a court finds no infringement. As the Court itself explains (¶30), where a user submits a counter-notification opposing a strike, it is forwarded to the claimant, who must, within ten business days, produce evidence of having initiated legal proceedings. Failing this, the content is liable to be restored. The Court also clarifies that a competent court ultimately determines the question of infringement, and that strikes stand resolved upon receipt and review of such judicial determination. TV9 can thus rely on the order, particularly the findings on fair dealing and the absence of a “modicum of creativity.” The burden now lies on TV9 to present this determination to YouTube and trigger its internal mechanisms to lift the strikes, which should ordinarily follow.
The order also sits comfortably with the logic behind the five-factor test for de minimis use articulated in India TV v. Yashraj Films, which recognises that trivial or incidental uses should not trigger disproportionate legal consequences. The use of brief clips, ranging from about 4 to 65 seconds, as in TV9’s case, within a longer news broadcast was both limited and segmented, and served a clearly transformative reporting purpose.
At the same time, the limits of the victory are hard to ignore. The Court’s reasoning was shaped by the fact that the footage owners did not appear in court to contest the proceedings. Had they participated and attempted to justify the dismissal of their US lawsuit as an exercise of due diligence, perhaps on financial or strategic grounds, the Section 60 inquiry might have turned into a more complex factual dispute. There is also a clear cross-border problem. With the rights holders located abroad, enforcing an Indian injunction remains difficult; if similar strikes are issued again, TV9 may have little option but to return to court. Further, by giving up its claim for damages (Para 3.30) to secure quicker relief, TV9 effectively settled for protection going forward without compensation for past harm.
Conclusion:
By reading the proviso to Section 60 to require the genuine prosecution of an infringement suit, the Delhi High Court order will limit the ability of claimants to neutralise allegations of groundless threats through tactical litigation. The ruling does not resolve the structural power that platform enforcement systems continue to exert over creators. But it does suggest that, in appropriate cases, copyright strikes themselves may attract increasing scrutiny under ordinary copyright law.