The recent government-led blocking of 3100+ Telegram channels marks a significant shift in India’s intermediary liability regime and censorship architecture. Priyam Mitra examines how this move and the newly created Sahyog Platform erode due process and free speech safeguards. Priyam is a third-year student at NLSIU, Bengaluru, and is deeply interested in IP and Data Protection laws. His previous posts can be accessed here.
Sahyog or Suppression? The New Architecture of Intermediary Liability
By Priyam Mitra
Telegram has been the subject of intense litigation through the years when it comes to the emerging issue of intermediary liability (see here and here). The recent blocking orders issued by the Government on the surface seem to be a continuation of this saga. Over 3100 channels were identified and blocked following complaints by OTT platforms indicating large-scale piracy. However, the critical difference is that the determination of whether the content hosted on these channels was infringing (or demanded suspension) and the delivery of notice to the intermediary was undertaken by the officers of the government. The intermediaries, with merely 3 hours (reduced from 36 hours in February 2026) to comply with these orders, are given an illusion of choice. No court order preceded these orders, and no hearing or notice was afforded to channel administrators. This large-scale blocking has been made possible because of the broad powers issued to the authorities through amendments introduced in late 2025 to the IT Rules (discussed in detail below). The amendments give effect to and formalize MeitY’s Office memorandums, which envisioned a centralized takedown and blocking process under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 through the creation of the Sahyog Platform (see here). In this post, I will present how these orders should serve as an example of the chilling effects of the Sahyog Platform on free speech and natural justice.
What is the Sahyog Platform
Sahyog Platform was formally notified through the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2025 (here) in October 2025. Ostensibly, the platform does not create a new mechanism of takedown and is meant to ensure that the scattered process of notices and follow-ups is streamlined by relying on S.79 of the IT Act and Rule 3(1)(d) of the 2021 Intermediary Rules. However, the “reasoned intimation” in the amendment departs from the 2009 Blocking Rules as takedown orders through the Sahyog platform do not require any notification to the user/originator and only require the reasons to be given to the intermediary. The consequence then, as noted by the Internet Freedom Foundation, is that the originator of the content, without any reasons for takedown may not be able to challenge it in court, also restricting their right to legal remedies. Further, media reports have revealed that through RTIs, the number of such notices issued is obtainable, but RTIs regarding the content of these notices have been met with vague responses. Even if the intermediaries are given reasons, there is no mechanism for hearing the intermediary or the user under the mechanism before such notification is issued.
The amendment also expands the scope of authorities who can issue such orders to both officers not below the rank of joint secretary and police administration not below the rank of deputy inspector general of police. An important point to note here is that the division bench in the MySpace judgment effectively denounced the safeguards enshrined in the 2013 Copyright Rules (Rule 75), which include an obligation to put-back content unless the rightsowner/complainant obtains a court judgement within 21 days of providing notice to the intermediary. The Sahyog platform takes this forward and safeguards found in the Copyright Rules are nowhere to be found in the 2021 Intermediary Rules, and even the basic safeguard of hearing has been discarded.
How it differs from the Shreya Singhal standard
At the outset, it must be noted that the Sahyog platform, through Rule 3(1)(d)(ii), locates its powers in Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act. Why this is particularly important is because this is where the procedure departs from the safeguards that had been envisioned by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal. The Court in Shreya Singhal noted that “it must first be appreciated that Section 79 is an exemption provision […] being an exemption provision, it is closely related to provisions which provide for offences including Section 69A (¶121)”. This clarifies that blocking orders need to be based on the grounds mentioned in section 69A of the IT Act and the 2009 Blocking Rules under the same. The 2009 Rules provided for hearing the intermediary and the host of the content being complained of before finally issuing the order of blocking (rule 8). These safeguards are missing in the Sahyog Platform. Strikingly, in X v UOI, where the Sahyog Platform was challenged before the Karnataka High Court, this argument was raised but was dismissed by the Court by stating that Shreya Singhal has been confined to history since it deliberated on the 2011 Intermediary Rules, which have been superseded by the 2021 guidelines. It must be stated that while the court in Shreya Singhal did adjudicate upon the 2011 Rules which have been superseded now, its findings on the interface between S.69A and S.79 are still good law and should have been noted by the Karnataka High Court (see here and here for more critiques of the judgment).
A Hobson’s Choice
The safeguards enshrined in the 2009 Rules have been effectively bypassed by mounting a parallel mechanism of government notices not under S.69A but the Sahyog Platform. As we have seen with the recent designation of police officers as officers capable of issuing these notices (see here and here), these notices are then given without a hearing and without much reason. The intermediaries are then faced with what is a classic example of a Hobson’s choice. A Hobson’s choice refers to a situation where there is an apparent free choice presented, but in all practicality, a person (intermediary here) is forced into an unfavorable situation. The platforms are doomed if they don’t abide by the notice within the given time frame, thereby losing their safe harbour, and if they abide by the notice, they risk freezing free speech of the users on their platforms. Justice Patel in Kunal Kamra (¶81) puts this much more eloquently:
“An intermediary will do anything to retain safe harbour. It will bend the knee to a Government directive regarding content. Its business depends on safe harbour and immunity from prosecution for hosted content. Between safe harbour and user’s rights regarding content, the intermediary faces a Hobson’s choice; and no intermediary is quixotic enough to take up cudgels for free speech. Compromising one particular chunk of content is a small price to pay; better the user content is thrown under the bus than having the bus run over the entire business.”
Vasudev Devadasan talks about why using the safe harbour as a carrot for generating compliance is dangerous. There have also been concerns raised about the scheme of notice and takedown regime in its entirety (see here, here, and here). These concerns become more acute when the time period for compliance is reduced to 3 hours in most cases. Worryingly, recent news reports suggest that the time period might be further reduced to 1 hour! The natural consequence then would be that the intermediaries would be incentivized to over-censor content and perhaps even preemptively take down possibly infringing content. These concerns were raised when the 2021 guidelines were amended to include this due diligence standard. It does seem like intermediaries are now pushed to comply with these proactive measures, further designating intermediaries as the custodians of free speech. It can only be hoped that such a wide scheme of censorship is rolled back for the aforementioned reasons. Kunal Kamra recently approached the Bombay High Court, challenging the platform on grounds of the rules bypassing the safeguards of S. 69A. Perhaps this is an opportunity for the High Court to deliberate on the matter, keeping in mind the correct interpretation of Shreya Singhal.