The boundary between administrative accountability and criminal culpability often becomes indistinct when public officials perform quasi-judicial functions. Dissatisfied litigants frequently respond to adverse orders by initiating criminal proceedings alleging conspiracy, fraud, or abuse of authority, raising serious constitutional concerns about the independence of statutory adjudicators. The threat of criminal prosecution, if permitted to arise merely from the exercise of adjudicatory discretion, risks undermining fearless and impartial decision-making by public officers.
This issue was squarely addressed by the Patna High Court in S. Kumar @ Shailesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), where criminal proceedings were launched against a senior government officer solely for passing a stay order in mutation proceedings. Rejecting such an approach, the Court held that a quasi-judicial order passed in the discharge of official duties cannot, by itself, form the basis of criminal prosecution.
Consequently, the High Court quashed the FIR, the sanction for prosecution, and all consequential proceedings, reaffirming the statutory and constitutional protections available to quasi-judicial authorities under Indian law.
Factual Background
The petitioner, Mr. S. Kumar @ Shailesh Kumar, was serving as Executive Officer, Circle Office, Bankipur, Patna Municipal Corporation, and later as Deputy Secretary, Department of Health, Government of Bihar. A criminal case was registered against him in connection with Kadamkuan P.S. Case No. 238 of 2014, alleging offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, corresponding to Sections 318(4), 338, 336(3), 340(2) and 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
The genesis of the dispute lay in a property mutation controversy relating to a residential building in Rajendra Nagar, Patna. Allegations of fraud and impersonation were primarily directed against private individuals who allegedly secured mutation by falsely claiming lineage. A civil title suit concerning the same property was already pending.
During mutation proceedings remanded by the appellate authority, the petitioner passed an order staying further proceedings till disposal of the pending civil suit, holding that revenue authorities should not adjudicate title disputes. This stay order became the sole basis for alleging criminal conspiracy against the petitioner.
Subsequently:
- An FIR was registered,
- A charge-sheet was filed, and
- Sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC (Section 218 BNSS) was granted by the State Government.
The petitioner approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) seeking quashing of the FIR, sanction order, and proceedings.
Issue
- Can a quasi-judicial order passed in discharge of official duty expose a public servant to criminal prosecution, absent any independent allegation of mala fides or corruption?
Nature of Quasi-Judicial Functions
The Court began by reiterating that officers deciding mutation, revenue, or similar statutory proceedings perform quasi-judicial functions. Such functions involve:
- Application of law to facts,
- Exercise of discretion, and
- Passing orders that attain finality unless appealed.
An error in such an order, the Court observed, does not automatically attract criminal liability. The appropriate remedy lies in appeal, revision, or judicial review, not prosecution.
Protection Under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985
Wide Definition of “Judge”
The Court placed heavy reliance on Section 2 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, which defines “Judge” expansively to include any person empowered by law to give a definitive judgment in legal proceedings.
The Patna High Court held that:
- An Executive Officer deciding mutation disputes is legally empowered to pass determinative orders
- Such an officer squarely falls within the statutory definition of “Judge”
- Formal designation as a judge is irrelevant for invoking statutory protection
Bar on Criminal Proceedings
Section 3 of the Act expressly bars courts from entertaining or continuing civil or criminal proceedings against judges for acts done while acting or purporting to act in discharge of judicial or official functions.
The Court clarified that:
- Protection is not absolute
- It does not extend to acts of corruption or conduct unrelated to judicial duty
- However, mere allegations of collusion without supporting material cannot pierce this protection.
Section 197 CrPC (Section 218 BNSS) and Sanction for Prosecution
Purpose of Sanction
Reiterating Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court noted that Section 197 CrPC exists to:
- Protect honest officers from vexatious litigation.
- Prevent criminal courts from being used as instruments of harassment.
- Ensure fearless discharge of public duties.
Sanction is not a mechanical formality; it is a jurisdictional prerequisite.
The Supreme Court in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar (2025) comprehensively examined the law governing sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC. Relying on Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta (2025), the Court reiterated that the object of sanction is to protect public servants from unjustified criminal prosecution for acts performed in the discharge of official duties, unless such acts fall outside the scope of authority or involve excess beyond official functions.
The Court further reaffirmed the principles crystallised in Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2016), holding that sanction serves as an assurance to honest officers to perform their duties fearlessly, while not shielding criminal conduct. The grant of sanction is not a mere formality but a solemn exercise requiring due application of mind, intended to prevent frivolous and vexatious prosecutions, as earlier emphasised in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. (1979). Sanction, therefore, operates as a safeguard for the innocent but cannot be used as a cloak for guilt.
Failure of Application of Mind
The Patna High Court found the impugned sanction order dated 28 December 2020 to be cryptic, non-speaking, and legally unsustainable. It did not:
- Examine whether the act complained of had a reasonable nexus with official duty
- Consider the protection under the Judges (Protection) Act
- Refer to any material suggesting corruption, bribery, or mala fides.
The Court relied on recent Supreme Court rulings, which mandate that sanction orders must reflect an independent application of mind, failing which the entire prosecution collapses.
Distinction Between Wrongful Orders and Criminal Acts
A central contribution of this judgment is its clear doctrinal distinction between:
- Wrong or erroneous orders, and
- Criminal acts committed under the guise of official duty
The Court observed that:
- Even a “grossly erroneous” quasi-judicial order does not ipso facto amount to a criminal offence.
- Criminal liability arises only when there is independent evidence of corruption, fraud, or extraneous considerations.
- Courts must resist the tendency to convert administrative grievances into criminal cases.
Abuse of Criminal Process
The Court strongly deprecated the practice of using criminal law as a pressure tactic in civil or revenue disputes. It held that:
- The complainant had already availed civil remedies.
- Appellate mechanisms were available against the stay order.
- Initiating criminal prosecution in such circumstances amounted to mala fide litigation.
The judgment underscores that criminal law cannot be weaponised to browbeat adjudicating officers.
Final Ruling of the Patna High Court
The Patna High Court conclusively held that:
- The petitioner’s stay order was passed in discharge of quasi-judicial functions.
- No prima facie criminal offence was made out.
- The sanction order suffered from non-application of the mind.
- Continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process.
Accordingly, the Court quashed the FIR, charge-sheet, sanction order, and all consequential proceedings against the petitioner.
Conclusion
The Patna High Court’s ruling in S. Kumar @ Shailesh Kumar v. State of Bihar makes it clear that a quasi-judicial order, even if alleged to be erroneous or unfavourable, cannot by itself form the basis of criminal prosecution. Judicial and quasi-judicial decisions are subject to correction through appellate and revisional mechanisms, not through the invocation of criminal law. Permitting criminal proceedings in such situations would undermine the independence of adjudicatory authorities and discourage officers from performing their statutory duties fearlessly.
The judgment also draws an important distinction between bona fide adjudication and criminal misconduct. While public servants remain accountable for acts tainted by corruption or mala fides, criminal law cannot be used as a tool to challenge or retaliate against judicial decisions. By quashing the prosecution, the Court has reinforced the principle that adjudicatory errors are matters of legal remedy, not criminal liability, thereby preserving both administrative justice and the rule of law.
Important Link
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