This case arose from a long-standing tenancy dispute between the petitioners, Ms. Farheen Israil and another (landlords), and the respondents, Ghulam Rasool Wani and others (tenants and alleged sub-tenants), over a property located at No. 745, Ground Floor, Phatak Dhobian, Farash Khana, Delhi.
The petitioners filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 before the Additional Rent Controller (ARC), Tis Hazari Courts, claiming bona fide need of the premises. The ARC, however, allowed the respondents’ application for leave to defend, finding that triable issues were raised.
Aggrieved, the petitioners approached the High Court in revision under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, seeking to set aside the order and obtain an eviction decree.
Title of the Case: MS Farheen Israil & Anr. v. Ghulam Rasool Wani & Ors.
Citation: RC.REV. 39/2024
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Judges: Justice Saurabh Banerjee
Date of Judgment: October 9, 2025
Facts of the Case
Ownership and Tenancy History
- The property in question originally belonged to the petitioners’ grandfather, who purchased it via a registered Sale Deed dated 6 January 1947.
- The grandfather had inducted Ghulam Qadir Wani, father of respondent no. 1 (Ghulam Rasool Wani), as a tenant in the premises.
- After the grandfather’s death, the property was mutated in the name of the petitioners’ mother, who began collecting rent from the tenant.
Possession by Respondents Nos. 2–8
- The petitioners alleged that the father of respondent no. 1 unlawfully handed over possession of the premises to one Syed Daud Meer, whose family (respondents 2–8) were in occupation.
- The respondents claimed that the petitioners’ mother had agreed to sell the property to Daud Meer for ₹2,00,000, accepting ₹50,000 as part payment, evidenced by a receipt dated 10 July 1997.
Bona Fide Requirement
- The petitioners contended that they genuinely required the premises for their own use since:
- The wife of petitioner no. 2 had undergone a caesarean surgery and was medically advised to avoid stairs.
- Their existing accommodation was dilapidated and uninhabitable.
- They further claimed that they had no alternative suitable accommodation.
Proceedings before the ARC
- Summons were served on respondent no. 1 via newspaper publication, but he did not file leave to defend.
- Respondents 2–8 filed for leave to defend, contesting ownership and the bona fide nature of the landlords’ need.
- They argued that the Sale Deed of 1947 pertained to property No. 746, not 745, and thus the petitioners’ title was doubtful.
- They also claimed possession was lawfully obtained through the 1997 sale receipt.
ARC’s Decision (Order dated 7 December 2023)
- The ARC allowed the leave to defend, holding that triable issues existed concerning ownership, the alleged 1997 receipt, and alternative accommodation.
- The ARC directed that the matter should proceed to trial.
Issues Before the High Court
- Whether a revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act was maintainable against an order granting leave to defend.
- Whether persons who were not original tenants (alleged unauthorised occupants or sub-tenants) could validly file an application for leave to defend.
- Whether the existence of the 1997 sale receipt and alleged discrepancies in property numbers constituted a bona fide triable issue.
- Whether the petitioners had established a genuine personal necessity for occupation.
- Whether the petitioners had other suitable accommodation, and whether this affected their right to eviction.
Arguments Advanced
A. Petitioners’ Submissions
- The respondents 2–8 were unauthorised occupants and not lawful tenants. Hence, they had no locus to seek leave to defend under the DRC Act.
- The original tenant (respondent no. 1) never contested or filed leave to defend; thus, the landlord-tenant relationship stood admitted.
- The receipt dated 10.07.1997, relied upon by respondents, had already been adjudicated upon in Suit No. 347/1998 (Syed Daud Meer v. Smt. Naeema Begum), where the Trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance, and the Delhi High Court also dismissed the appeal (RFA No. 394/2003) with costs.
- Hence, the respondents were estopped from raising the same issue again — the matter stood res judicata.
- The petitioners produced ample evidence — the registered sale deed, mutation records, and Aadhaar card linking them to the owner — to prove ownership.
- The ARC ignored these facts and erred in finding triable issues, defeating the legislative intent of a summary procedure under Section 25B designed for speedy relief to landlords.
B. Respondents’ Submissions
- The revision petition was not maintainable; the proper remedy was an appeal under Section 38 of the DRC Act.
- The petitioners failed to prove ownership or superior title. The Sale Deed of 1947 was for House No. 746, not 745, where the disputed premises lay.
- The receipt of 1997 demonstrated that the petitioners’ mother had agreed to sell the property to the husband of respondent no. 2 and delivered possession.
- They further contended that they were in adverse possession, enjoying uninterrupted occupancy for decades.
- The ARC had rightly granted leave to defend since genuine triable issues existed concerning ownership and possession.
The respondents relied upon precedents such as:
Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh C. Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222
Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua (2022) 6 SCC 30
Precision Steel & Engg. Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Tayal AIR 1982 SC 1518
Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh (2001) 1 SCC 706
Judgment and Reasoning
Justice Saurabh Banerjee delivered the oral judgment allowing the revision petition and setting aside the ARC’s order.
1. Maintainability
The Court held that a revision petition under Section 25B(8) is indeed maintainable against an order granting leave to defend.
This position has been settled in R.S. Bakshi v. H.K. Malhari (2002) 62 DRJ 272 (DB) and reaffirmed in subsequent decisions such as Prem Lata v. Pawan Kumar Khurana (2012) 187 DLT 340 and Amrit Mohini v. Brij Mohan Gupta (2023 SCC OnLine Del 6008).
Hence, the respondents’ objection to maintainability was rejected.
2. Competency to File Leave to Defend
The Court observed that respondent no. 1 — the original tenant — did not file leave to defend. Instead, respondents 2–8, who were sub-tenants or unauthorised occupants, filed it.
Since the DRC Act confers such a right only upon the tenant, their application carried no legal value. The landlord-tenant relationship was thus established beyond dispute. Allowing unauthorised occupants to defend would defeat the Act’s summary eviction mechanism.
3. Nature of Summary Proceedings under Section 25B
Justice Banerjee reiterated that Section 25B provides a speedy and summary remedy for eviction on bona fide need grounds. Permitting persons other than the tenant to contest would frustrate this legislative intent.
4. Analysis of the 1997 Receipt and Ownership Dispute
The ARC had granted leave to defend primarily based on the 1997 receipt, which allegedly showed part payment toward a sale transaction.
The Court found this reasoning perverse and unsustainable:
- The same receipt had already been considered and rejected in Suit No. 347/1998 (Syed Doud Meer v. Smt. Naeema Begum).
- The appeal (RFA 394/2003) was also dismissed by the High Court.
Hence, respondents were barred from re-agitating the same issue, amounting to an abuse of process.
Furthermore, respondents’ contradictory stands — simultaneously claiming ownership through the sale receipt while denying the petitioners’ title — were self-destructive. The Court remarked that one cannot sail in two boats or take mutually inconsistent positions.
5. Proof of Ownership
The petitioners had adequately proved ownership through:
- The 1947 registered Sale Deed in their grandfather’s name,
- Mutation in favour of their mother, and
- Documentary evidence (Aadhaar) showing relationship.
There was thus no material to doubt ownership. The ARC erred in treating this as a triable issue.
6. Bona Fide Requirement
The Court accepted the petitioners’ plea of bona fide need:
- Medical documents showed that the wife of petitioner no. 2, after a caesarean operation, could not climb stairs.
- Photographs showed their current accommodation was dilapidated.
- The respondents did not produce contrary evidence.
Hence, the requirement was genuine and pressing.
7. Alternative Accommodation
The petitioners had shown that other properties were either unfit for residence or occupied by tenants, and thus not available.
Relying on Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610 and Akhileshwar Kumar v. Mustaqim (2003) 1 SCC 462, the Court held that a landlord is the best judge of his needs and cannot be forced to live elsewhere. The mere existence of another property does not disqualify bona fide need.
8. Adverse Possession Claim
The Court rejected the plea of adverse possession, terming it self-defeating. By invoking adverse possession, the respondents admitted a lack of title — undermining their own claim to ownership.
9. Revisional Scope under Section 25B(8)
While acknowledging that the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction is limited and not appellate in nature, Justice Banerjee emphasised that it extends to correcting perversity, arbitrariness, or illegality in lower court orders.
Citing Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78, the Court held that manifest errors justified interference.
Decision
The High Court found the ARC’s order perverse and contrary to settled law, observing that no genuine triable issue existed. Accordingly, the Court:
- Set aside the ARC’s order dated 07.12.2023 granting leave to defend.
- Allowed the revision petition.
- Passed an eviction order in favour of the petitioners with respect to:
Two rooms, one kothri, dalan, open courtyard with latrine, bathroom and two kitchens in property no. 745, Ground Floor, Phatak Dhobian, Farash Khana, Delhi.
Directed that the eviction order shall not be executed for six months, as mandated by Section 14(7) of the DRC Act.
Parties were directed to bear their own costs.
Significance and Implications
This judgment reinforces the Delhi High Court’s consistent approach of protecting landlords’ rights in bona fide requirement cases under Section 14(1)(e), emphasising procedural efficiency and preventing dilatory tactics.
Key implications include:
- Unauthorised occupants cannot prolong litigation by masquerading as tenants.
- Earlier judicial findings (such as dismissal of specific performance suits) are binding and cannot be circumvented.
- Medical and personal grounds of landlords are given due weight, reflecting a humane approach.
- The Court’s reliance on R.S. Bakshi and Hindustan Petroleum cases clarifies the revisional court’s supervisory powers to correct manifest injustice.
Conclusion
Delhi High Court’s ruling in MS Farheen Israil & Anr. v. Ghulam Rasool Wani & Ors. is a reaffirmation of the principle that summary eviction proceedings must not be derailed by unfounded defences or unauthorised occupants.
Justice Saurabh Banerjee’s judgment demonstrates a balanced application of statutory interpretation, procedural discipline, and equitable reasoning. By restoring the landlord’s right to possession while granting six months’ grace for execution, the Court upheld both the spirit of the Delhi Rent Control Act and the fairness of due process.
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