In a digital age where messages travel faster than the truth, the sanctity of judicial institutions is increasingly tested by irresponsible and defamatory communications circulated online. Allahabad High Court recently took suo motu cognizance of such an instance in Contempt Application (Criminal) No. 14 of 2024, initiating proceedings against one Krishna Kumar Pandey for a WhatsApp message that accused a sitting Additional District Judge of corruption and fabrication of court records.
The order, delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justices J.J. Munir and Pramod Kumar Srivastava, illustrates how the judiciary safeguards its dignity and institutional credibility against baseless attacks, especially those proliferated through social media.
Background of the Case
The contempt proceedings originated from a reference dated 10 August 2023 made by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court-I, Basti, under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
The reference reported that the contemnor, Krishna Kumar Pandey, had posted a lengthy WhatsApp message in a group of advocates practising in District Basti. The message contained scandalous allegations against the Presiding Officer—accusing him of accepting bribes, writing forged and fabricated order-sheets, and acting in violation of orders of the High Court and Supreme Court.
The post went viral among members of the legal fraternity and the general public. The Judge, considering it an act intended to “deliberately scandalise and lower the authority of the Court” within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the 1971 Act, made a formal reference to the High Court.
Nature of the Allegations in the WhatsApp Message
The message, reproduced in the order, was drafted in Hindi and addressed to “respected and learned advocates of District Basti.” It listed several civil and criminal cases pending before the same court and then accused the presiding judge, Shri Vijay Kumar Katiyar, of accepting bribes and manipulating judicial records.
The post alleged that the judge had created “fake, forged, and fabricated order-sheets” contrary to High Court directions, Supreme Court judgments, and e-Courts circulars, and that such conduct amounted to “treason, corruption, and offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.”
The contemnor further invited other advocates to join him in investigating and exposing the alleged misconduct, even publishing his mobile number for contact.
Such language, the Court noted, was not merely criticism but a direct assault on the authority and credibility of the judiciary.
Administrative Processing of the Reference
Upon receipt of the reference, the matter was placed before the Administrative Judge of the High Court, who found substance in the allegations of contempt. The Judge’s note highlighted that the contemnor’s conduct—circulating fake messages, levelling charges of corruption, and browbeating judicial officers—“brought down the image of the Court and undermined its authority.”
The Administrative Judge recommended initiation of contempt proceedings, a recommendation later reaffirmed by his successor on 8 May 2024. The matter was subsequently placed before the Chief Justice, who endorsed it for listing before the Division Bench holding the criminal contempt roster.
Pre-Charge Proceedings and Legal Representation
The Bench issued notice to the contemnor on 1 July 2024, directing his personal presence. Over the next several months, the Court afforded multiple opportunities for the contemnor to file objections, engage counsel, and prepare his defence.
Despite the Court’s efforts—including appointing senior advocates Vinay Saran and later Gajendra Pratap through the High Court Legal Services Committee—the contemnor repeatedly refused representation, insisting he was competent to argue in person. The order notes that he “expressed his disinclination to be represented by learned counsel”, leading to their withdrawal.
The Court recorded its concern, emphasising that legal assistance was being offered in the interest of justice, and cautioned that no further indulgence would be granted.
Preliminary Objections Raised by the Contemnor
Before framing of charge, the contemnor moved two applications:
Application No. 2 of 2025—argued that under Rule 3 of Chapter XXXV-E of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, prior permission of the Advocate General was required before proceeding with criminal contempt.
- The Court rejected this objection, clarifying that no such permission is necessary when the Court takes cognizance of criminal contempt on a reference or suo motu.
- The Bench held: “There is absolutely no warrant under the law for seeking permission of the learned Advocate General before proceeding in the matter.”
Application No. 3 of 2025—contended that complaints against subordinate judges should be investigated through an ‘in-house procedure’ and sought transfer of the proceedings to the Chief Justice.
- The Court dismissed this as misconceived, stating that no such mechanism exists for the subordinate judiciary.
- Judges of District Courts are under the disciplinary control of the High Court, and allegations against them are handled through administrative vigilance inquiries, not through judicial proceedings initiated by private individuals.
Interaction with Bar Associations and Scope of Inquiry
Since the offending message was posted in a WhatsApp group of advocates, the Bench sought to ascertain how a non-advocate like the contemnor had access to the group.
By order dated 18 April 2025, the Court issued notices to the Presidents and Secretaries of seven Bar Associations in Basti district—including the Civil Bar, District Bar, Young Bar, Commissionerate Bar, and Tehsil Bar Associations—to verify whether the contemnor was a member of any association or WhatsApp group.
In response, the Bar Associations categorically denied any involvement, assuring the Court that they would take corrective measures to ensure that only practising lawyers could join such online groups. They also clarified that neither they nor their members supported or shared the contemnor’s statements.
The Court accepted these assurances, exempting the personal appearance of the Bar officials while directing them to file affidavits confirming internal inquiries.
Court’s Observations on Contemnor’s Conduct
The Bench noted with concern that the contemnor, not being a practising lawyer, had infiltrated a WhatsApp group meant for advocates and used it to malign a judicial officer. His posts were found to have no basis in fact or law and appeared motivated to defame, intimidate, and scandalise the judiciary.
Despite repeated opportunities, the contemnor neither apologised nor expressed remorse. Instead, he persisted in procedural objections and self-representation. The Court observed that it had gone beyond fairness by providing “all possible opportunity, and even more than that,” yet the contemnor chose confrontation over contrition.
Framing of Charge and Substantive Findings
After rejecting the two preliminary applications, the Court proceeded to frame a formal charge against Krishna Kumar Pandey under Section 12 read with Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
The charge read that by publishing and circulating the WhatsApp post dated 14 July 2023, the contemnor “scandalised and lowered the authority of the Court of the Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court-I, Basti”, thereby committing criminal contempt.
The contemnor pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The Court directed that a copy of the charge, along with all relevant papers, be served upon him through the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, and fixed 9 October 2025 for further hearing.
Legal Principles on Criminal Contempt
1. Definition under Section 2(c)
Criminal contempt includes any act which—
- scandalises or tends to scandalise,
- or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court;
- prejudices or interferes with judicial proceedings; or
- obstructs the administration of justice.
The essence of such contempt lies in protecting the integrity of judicial institutions, not individual judges. The Supreme Court has consistently held that unfounded imputations of corruption or fabrication of judicial records strike at the heart of public confidence in justice.
2. Precedential Support
In Re Arundhati Roy (2002 3 SCC 343) and Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P. (AIR 1954 SC 10), the Apex Court held that while fair criticism of judgments is permissible, attributing motives or corruption to judges crosses the boundary of free speech.
Similarly, C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta (AIR 1971 SC 1132) affirmed that false allegations against judges in public constitute contempt, as they erode the foundation of judicial trust.
3. Application to Digital Media
Allahabad HC’s order extends these principles to social-media platforms, acknowledging that messages circulated via WhatsApp can have a “viral effect”, multiplying harm to the judiciary’s reputation. Such digital dissemination magnifies contemptuous impact far beyond traditional print or speech.
Freedom of Speech v. Judicial Accountability
The case revives the delicate constitutional tension between Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech) and Article 129 & 215 (powers of courts to punish for contempt).
While the right to criticise judgments is protected, imputing corruption or criminality without evidence does not constitute legitimate criticism. The Court’s intervention, therefore, seeks not to silence dissent but to ensure that critique remains responsible and within the bounds of decency and truth.
In this context, the Bench’s insistence on following proper grievance mechanisms—through administrative or vigilance channels—underscores that the rule of law offers remedies without resorting to public vilification.
Digital Accountability and Professional Ethics
The incident also spotlights the ethical responsibilities of legal professionals in managing online discourse. Although the contemnor was not an advocate, the participation of lawyers in the WhatsApp group raised institutional concerns.
The Bar Associations’ cooperative stance—assuring stricter control over group membership—reflects an evolving recognition of digital ethics within the legal community. The Court’s directive encourages self-regulation by professional bodies to prevent misuse of social media against the judiciary.
Procedural Fairness and Judicial Restraint
A striking feature of the proceedings is the Court’s measured restraint. Rather than rushing to a conviction, the Bench ensured due process at every stage: issuing notices, allowing affidavits, appointing amicus curiae, and even verifying bar memberships.
The order meticulously documents these steps, demonstrating that contempt jurisdiction is exercised cautiously and with procedural propriety. The contemnor’s repeated refusals and disruptions were met with patience, reinforcing that the Court’s ultimate aim was correction, not coercion.
Implications of the Order
- Strengthening Judicial Dignity: The decision reinforces that false allegations of corruption against judges—especially when broadcast digitally—will invite criminal contempt proceedings.
- Accountability in Online Spaces: Courts now recognise WhatsApp, Telegram, and other messaging platforms as public domains for the purpose of contempt law. Circulating defamatory content within such groups is no less punishable than publishing it in print.
- Guidance for Bar Associations: The judgment implicitly advises bar bodies to moderate and monitor digital forums, ensuring they remain professional and insulated from defamatory or contemptuous content.
- Educational Value for Legal Community: For law students and practitioners, the case serves as a modern illustration of how contempt law interacts with technology and speech rights.
Conclusion
Allahabad High Court’s initiation of contempt action, In Re: Krishna Kumar Pandey, CRCL No. 14 of 2024, is a timely reminder that digital freedom is not a license for defamation. The judiciary, though tolerant of criticism, cannot remain silent when baseless accusations threaten public confidence in justice.
By framing charges only after exhaustive hearings and procedural fairness, the Court balanced institutional dignity with individual rights. Its approach underscores that contempt jurisdiction, when invoked responsibly, protects not judges as persons but the very foundation of the rule of law.
As India’s courts increasingly confront misinformation and online hostility, this order sets a precedent: the digital courtroom of public opinion cannot supersede the constitutional court of law. Respect for judicial institutions remains the bedrock of democracy—and the Allahabad High Court has once again affirmed it.