
The concept of remission of sentence is a cornerstone of India’s criminal justice system. While punishment ensures deterrence and retribution, remission serves as a tool of reform and mercy, giving convicts a chance at rehabilitation and reintegration into society. The question that often arises is whether convicts sentenced to life imprisonment for the remainder of their natural life—a seemingly absolute punishment—can still claim the right to seek remission.
The Supreme Court of India, in Mahendra Vishwanath Kawchale & Anr. v. Union of India (2025), has offered clarity on this matter, reaffirming that the right to seek remission is both a constitutional and statutory entitlement, applicable even in the gravest cases, such as gang rape under Section 376DA IPC.
Facts of the Case
- Petition: The writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by Mahendra Vishwanath Kawchale and another petitioner, like a Public Interest Litigation (PIL).
- Challenge: The petition challenged the constitutional validity of Section 376DA of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which prescribes punishment for gang rape of a woman under sixteen years of age.
- Provision in Question: Section 376DA mandates life imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life, along with a fine. The contention was that this provision violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution by eliminating judicial discretion and by being arbitrary.
- Support by NLU Delhi’s Project 39A: An impleading application was filed by Project 39A of National Law University, Delhi, represented by Senior Advocate Siddharth Agarwal, supporting the petitioner’s arguments.
Argument by Petitioners
- The word “shall” in Section 376DA indicates there is no alternative punishment.
- It excludes consideration of mitigating circumstances or judicial discretion.
- It creates a mandatory, disproportionate punishment, which they argued was unconstitutional.
Counter by the Government
The Attorney General and Solicitor General, assisted by other law officers, defended the provision. They argued that:
- The punishment reflects the gravity of the crime (gang rape of minors).
- Parliament, in its wisdom, deliberately imposed a stringent punishment to deter such heinous offences.
- Therefore, the provision is a policy choice and cannot be struck down as arbitrary.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and R. Mahadevan considered these submissions and focused on whether such a sentence extinguishes the convict’s right to remission
Issues Before the Court
- Does Section 376DA IPC, prescribing mandatory life imprisonment till natural life, violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution?
- Does such a sentence take away the convict’s right to seek remission under the Constitution or criminal procedure law?
The Supreme Court’s Observations
1. Nature of the Sentence under Section 376DA IPC
Section 376DA IPC prescribes a mandatory life sentence till the end of natural life, leaving the Sessions Court with no option but to impose this punishment once guilt is proven. The petitioners argued that such a provision is harsh and against principles of proportionality and sentencing policy.
The Court, however, refrained from deciding on the constitutional validity of the provision in the absence of case-specific facts, leaving the larger question of “mandatory sentencing without alternatives” open for future adjudication.
2. Right to Seek Remission is Intact
The Court drew a vital distinction:
Judicial Side: Once convicted, the sentence imposed is binding unless modified by appellate courts.
Executive Side: Even after such a sentence, the convict retains the right to seek remission under both constitutional and statutory frameworks.
The Bench clarified that:
- Constitutional Remedies: Articles 72 (President’s power) and 161 (Governor’s power) empower constitutional authorities to grant pardons, reprieves, remissions, or commutations of sentences. These powers are unfettered by judicially imposed sentences.
- Statutory Remedies: Sections 432–433A CrPC and their equivalents in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 provide statutory avenues for remission. These provisions authorise governments to frame remission policies, which may apply even to life convicts.
Thus, even if a convict is sentenced to imprisonment “for the remainder of natural life,” this does not strip away their right to seek remission
3. Applicability Across Heinous Crimes
The Court extended this reasoning to equally severe provisions like Section 376DB IPC (gang rape of a woman under twelve years, punishable with life imprisonment till natural life or death penalty). Even here, the constitutional and statutory right to seek remission survives, subject to state remission policies.
Key Highlights of the Decision
Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice R. Mahadevan stated:
the right to seek remission is not only a constitutional right but also a statutory right and each State has its own policy of remission, which is a reduction in the sentence, even in cases of death penalty or life imprisonment and is applicable even when the sentence is imposed under Section 376DA IPC or for that matter 376DB IPC.
Constitutional and Statutory Framework
A. Constitutional Powers
Article 72: Empowers the President to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions in all cases, especially where death sentences are imposed.
Article 161: Empowers Governors with similar powers at the state level.
These powers act as a safety valve against excessive punishment, ensuring that even in extreme cases, avenues of mercy exist.
B. Statutory Provisions under CrPC and BNSS
Section 432 CrPC / Section 473 BNSS: Authorises the appropriate government to remit sentences.
Section 433A CrPC / Section 475 BNSS: Places certain restrictions (e.g., minimum 14 years in cases involving life imprisonment for serious offences), but does not extinguish the right altogether.
State Governments periodically issue remission policies determining eligibility, ensuring uniform application.
Judicial Reasoning: Balancing Deterrence and Reform
The Court recognised Parliament’s intent to impose stringent punishments for heinous crimes like child rape. However, it emphasised that the sentencing policy of Parliament does not curtail constitutional guarantees.
Thus, while Parliament may restrict judicial discretion at the stage of sentencing (by mandating life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life), the executive’s discretion under Articles 72 and 161 remains untouched. This ensures that justice does not become purely retributive, but retains its reformative and humane dimensions.
Implications of the Ruling
For Convicts:
- Even those sentenced to imprisonment till the end of their natural life can approach constitutional and statutory authorities for remission.
- This upholds their dignity under Article 21, ensuring that they are not permanently excluded from reformative justice.
For Victims and Society:
- While remission rights remain, it does not mean automatic release. The grant of remission will depend on state policies, the nature of the crime, the conduct of the convict, and societal impact.
For the Judiciary:
- The decision leaves the constitutional validity of “mandatory life imprisonment till death” provisions open for challenge in future cases with concrete facts.
- It also reaffirms the Court’s stance that remission powers are distinct from sentencing powers.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the right to seek remission survives even when a convict is sentenced to life imprisonment for the remainder of their natural life. This right flows not only from the Constitution (Articles 72 and 161) but also from statutory provisions (CrPC/BNSS).
By doing so, the Court struck a balance between the deterrent objective of stringent punishments and the constitutional commitment to reformative justice. The ruling reinforces that no punishment is entirely beyond the reach of mercy and remission, thereby ensuring that India’s criminal justice system remains firmly anchored in both retribution and rehabilitation.
Important Link
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