[This post has been authored by SpicyIP intern Aditi Agrawal. Aditi is a final-year B.A., LL.B (IPR Hons.) student at The ICFAI University, Dehradun. Her previous posts can be accessed here.]
Hola, readers! Ever wondered what happens when an injunction is issued on an exaggerated sense of urgency, omitting key facts? The answer, as seen in DCM Shriram Limited v. Amreek Singh Chawla & Ors., is judicial reconsideration, vacated injunction, and a sobering reminder that equity does not reward half-truths. In this case, the Delhi High Court on December 17 vacated an ex parte interim injunction after finding that the plaintiff had suppressed material facts. DCM Shriram, the plaintiff, accused the defendants of infringing its trademarks, “Shriram Super 303” and “Shriram Super 404”, by selling wheat seeds under “Sartaj 303” and “Sartaj 404”. The case initially resulted in an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants, which was revised when the defendants moved to vacate the order, arguing that the plaintiff had suppressed material facts, including knowledge of the alleged infringement since 2018. The defendants furnished evidence proving that “303” and “404” were widely recognized seed varieties. They submitted a notified seed list showing NP-404’s recognition since 1965, a 2014 invoice evincing prior use of “Sartaj 404,” and a 2002 registration in favour of the third party for “Nirmal-303 (Julie).” Based on these, the Court held that “303” and “404” referred to widely recognized seed varieties, and the plaintiff could not claim exclusivity over them.
The Court’s detailed findings and eventual vacation of the injunction are commendable in rectifying its initial oversight. However, there’s more to unpack. The real issue was twofold—the plaintiff’s suppression of material facts and the Court’s failure to scrutinize the request before granting ex parte relief. In this post, I will shed light on some key takeaways from this detailed judgment.
Clean Hands Doctrine & Perils of Suppression
Equity demands transparency! The clean hands doctrine, a well-established principle in equitable relief, mandates that a party seeking an injunction must not suppress or misrepresent material facts. The Supreme Court, in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1993), unequivocally held that “a litigant who approaches the Court must come with clean hands,” and any suppression of material facts justifies dismissal of the claim.
In this case, the plaintiff argued recent discovery of infringement. However, the defendants produced a letter signed by the plaintiff’s authorized representative, demonstrating that the plaintiff had known of the defendant’s business for at least six years before filing the suit. This material suppression led the Court to question the plaintiff’s credibility and ultimately vacate the injunction. The DHC, relying on its ruling in Kent RO Systems Ltd. v. Gattubhai (2022), reiterated that parties engaging in suppression cannot benefit from injunctive relief.
Ex Parte Interim Injunctions- A Judicial Bottleneck
Ex parte interim injunctions are meant to protect against imminent harm, but the haste may lead to unnecessary delays. The Court in this matter initially granted an ex parte interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the marks “303” and “404” and packaging similar to the plaintiff’s trade dress. However, upon reconsideration after the defendants moved to vacate the order, the Court observed that the defendants had been operating in the market since 2014 and that the numbers “303” and “404” referred to widely recognized seed varieties, and the plaintiff could not claim exclusivity over them. Given these facts, the Court’s decision to vacate the order was a necessary correction. Pertinently, the DHC, in Freebit AS v. Exotic Mile Private Limited (2024), emphasized that ex parte injunctions should not be granted when plaintiffs fail to disclose material facts. In Forzest v. Folzest (2022), the Court even imposed costs of ten lakh rupees on the plaintiff for seeking an injunction without full disclosure. In fact, J. Dalveer Bhandari in Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors. vs Nirmala Devi & Ors. (2011) laid down important guidelines for the grant of ex parte orders. He stressed that courts must exercise extreme caution before imposing ex parte injunctions. If an injunction is granted based on false pleadings or forged documents—something that frequently happens in India—courts should impose costs on the litigants.
Although the Court later vacated the injunction in the instant case, this is not the first time the Delhi High Court’s approach to ad-interim, often ex parte injunctions has been contentious. Granting ex parte relief without considering the defendant’s perspective has repeatedly resulted in prolonged interim processes and unjust injunctions—only to be vacated later. A tale discussed time and again previously on this blog (see here, here, here, and here).
Mediation: A Judicial U-Turn?
Mediation is a more cost-effective and time-efficient alternative to litigation, especially in IP matters, where timely resolution is invaluable for protecting market presence and brand reputation. IP disputes are increasingly being resolved through mediation, as also seen in cases like Campus Activewear Limited vs Asian Footwears Private Limited & Ors., Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. A2 Lifesciences & Anr. Notably, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 mandates pre-institution mediation, except in cases requiring urgent interim relief. In the present case, the plaintiff sought and was granted an exemption from mediation on grounds of urgency. The Court relied on precedent, including Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi (2023), to justify the exemption. However, as the Court later referred the matter to mediation, it raises the question—was this truly a case where skipping mediation was warranted? And if mediation was deemed appropriate later, why was it bypassed initially? Courts have put forth different stances on pre-institution mediation in different cases (see discussions by Shravya, and Samridhi). Had the parties engaged in pre-institution mediation as mandated, the need for an ex parte injunction—and the subsequent judicial backtracking—might have been avoided altogether. With the Supreme Court revisiting this issue in a Special Leave Petition (SPL(C) No. 2753/2025), it could provide greater clarity on when mediation can be bypassed (if at all) in commercial suits. This will likely help avoid similar situations in the future.
Concluding Remarks
The DCM Shriram ruling is a much-needed precedent in IP litigation. The Court’s detailed findings are commendable—it parsed the facts, identified missteps only after the defendants moved to vacate the interim injunction, and ultimately vacated the injunction. However, should the plaintiff have been penalized for its conduct? I believe yes! Unlike in the Forzest case, the plaintiff here faced no financial consequences for its omissions. Given the plaintiff’s procedural lapses and the unnecessary burden placed on the judiciary and the defendants, a cost order could have acted as a deterrent against similar litigation (mal)practices in the future -as also laid down in Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors. vs Nirmala Devi & Ors.The matter is listed for hearing before the DHC on 10 March 2025, following the completion of mediation proceedings. For now, the ruling stands as a stern reminder—if you seek equity, you must come with clean hands. It reinforces why ex parte interim injunctions are a menace for IP litigation as they add to the Court’s heavy docket. Ultimately, the judgment is an essential corrective, both for the parties involved and the broader landscape of IP litigation, but it could have been more effective in preventing the misuse of legal processes by imposing monetary penalties.